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ABSTRACT
PARTICIPATE FOR PEACE:
THE IMPACTS OF PARTICIPATORY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY ON
POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING IN CENTRAL AMERICA

May 2020

Marcia D. Mundt, B.A., New Mexico State University
M.A., University of Bradford
M.S.P.P., University of Massachusetts Boston
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts Boston
Liberal peacebuilding is at the center of a critical debate amongst scholars and practitioners
due to the horrific consequence of conflict relapse or escalation in the wake of failed
international interventions. Despite international efforts to promote durable peace, empirical
research suggests that up to one half of all civil wars relapse into conflict within five years of
negotiated settlement (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; Suhrke & Samset, 2007). As an alternative to
top-down liberal peace, locally-led post-conflict peacebuilding has been proposed as an
innovative solution (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013). Participatory deliberative democracy,
when applied in post-conflict contexts, aligns with this ‘local turn' by supporting ‘hybridity’ in
peacebuilding practice. However, its potential for contributing to sustainable peace has not yet
been empirically tested. This dissertation explores how two post-conflict nations in Central
America—El Salvador and Guatemala—have implemented participatory deliberative
democracy mechanisms following civil war and the impacts of these mechanisms on the longterm peace process. Combining theoretical frameworks from across political science,
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economics, and conflict resolution disciplines alongside an international comparative mixed
methodology, this study identifies the impacts associated with participatory deliberative
democracy over time in two Central American post-conflict countries and the structural and
contextual factors that influence deliberative decision making as a possible mechanism to
support lasting peace following civil war.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Improved peacebuilding and post-conflict development practices are a pressing
concern across the global community. Since the introduction of the Marshall Plan following
World War II, attempts to build peace in post-conflict contexts have been pursued largely by
international actors in partnership with national-level governments and elites. Though the
Marshall Plan is certainly considered a successful endeavor, having sowed the seeds of the
European Union created mere decades after devastating war, the nature of conflict today has
changed. Walter (2011) indicates that over 90% of modern-day wars are intrastate versus
interstate conflicts. Thus, traditionally structured international interventions intended to help
may not actually be turning the tide on the durability of peace in post-conflict nations.
Ricigliano (2012) explains, “The international community is better at stopping violence than
building or consolidating peace. […] The challenge is not making peace, at least in some partial
sense; rather, the difficulty is making peace last” (p. 5).
Despite international efforts to promote durable peace, post-conflict societies have a
track-record of recurring direct violence. In fact, empirical research suggests that up to half of
all civil wars begin within five years of a prior conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002, p. 436). Even
conservative estimates suggest a post-conflict relapse rate of 23% (Suhrke & Samset, 2007).
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Rwanda is the most well-known case of failed peacebuilding prior to the genocide in 1994,
though Walter (2011) finds that Ethiopia, Myanmar, and India are the most severe cases of
conflict relapse and repeated civil war cycles.
Furthermore, conflicts have a lingering effect, especially in the wake of civil war. Junne
& Verkoren (2005) describe a post-conflict context as “a conflict situation in which open
warfare has come to an end (though) such situations remain tense for years or decades and can
easily relapse into large-scale violence” (p. 1). Even in countries touted as cases of successful
peacebuilding, violence can soar far above war-time levels. In El Salvador and Guatemala,
gang-related crime has driven the current homicide rate to a record high within the top ten
world-wide (UNODC Statistics, 2014). Fragile states, 70% of which have seen internal conflict
since 1989, were the furthest away from achieving the UN Millennium Development Goals by
the 2015 target date (OECD, 2010).
Throughout the last several decades, particularly in the aftermath of the Cold War, a
growing debate about the values and strategies used to pursue peace has developed in both
academic and practitioner circles. This debate is between those that approach peacebuilding as
a top-down liberal project and those that support bottom-up local agency to consolidate peace.
Participatory deliberative democracy (PDD), which encourages public engagement in the
policy-making process by emphasizing political inclusion and citizen empowerment through
deliberation, is a bottom-up approach that has been linked to improved political, social, and
economic outcomes (Cini & Felicetti, 2018; Mundt, 2019). These links have been explored
largely in studies on international development (e.g. Blair, 2000; Boulding & Wampler, 2010;
Gaventa, 2004; Osmani, 2001; Schneider, 1999; Wampler, 2012), and several scholars have
written theoretically about how it may (or may not) apply in divided societies such as Northern
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Ireland (divided by sectarianism), Kenya or Bosnia (divided by ethnicity), or Columbia
(divided by ideology) (e.g. Aragaki, 2009; Coelho & Waisbich, 2016; Delaney, Van Der Haar,
& Van Tatenhove, 2017; Deutsch, 2000; O’Flynn, 2007, 2017; Siu & Stanisevski, 2012;
Steiner, Jaramillo, Maia, & Mameli, 2017; Ugarriza & Trujillo-Orrego, 2018).
In Central American, PDD has been used to engage the public in policy decision
making following civil war. Two nations in particular—Guatemala and El Salvador—have
implemented PDD alongside their national peacebuilding processes and have not relapsed into
civil war since their peace agreements were signed. While both nations passed laws calling for
PDD, the way PDD has been occasioned, implemented, and enforced differs greatly between
the two nations.
In Guatemala, the introduction of participatory democracy was called for directly in the
Guatemalan Peace Accords signed in December of 1996. Development Councils with
deliberative structures that scale within a hierarchy from each neighborhood to municipal,
departmental, regional, and national level are the primary PDD mechanism in execution.
Traditional forms of participation were also re-initiated such as open Town Hall meetings and
public budget hearings. Over twenty years post-conflict, I spoke with eighteen of the country’s
municipalities, each one employing these same mechanisms with minor innovations in
structure and implementation to adapt to local context and build upon the participatory and
deliberative trajectory of citizen engagement established in the peace accords. PDD, in this
case, has been pushed from the top-down with established funding pools, reporting
requirements, and incentive systems to ensure implementation.
In El Salvador, PDD has developed through small-scale innovations by municipal
officials and non-governmental organizations both local and international. While
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decentralization of state power and government transparency was certainly propelled forward
through the peace process and gradually institutionalized in law, PDD was not an explicit goal
nor a mechanism envisioned as a tool for peacebuilding. Thus, each municipality and
administration in succession has developed its own approach to engaging citizens in public
decision making. Most PDD processes are built upon Community Development Associations
and a plethora of mechanisms outlined in the Municipal Code. In this study, over twenty-five
years post-conflict, I spoke with local officials in twenty-six of the nation’s municipalities
employing thirteen different participatory mechanisms with variation therein at the local level.
While several mechanisms are unique to local context or a single mayor’s vision, the most
common mechanisms include public assemblies, Community Development Associations, and
participatory planning. In this case, PDD has been developed from the bottom-up and its
success or failure largely depends on the commitment and execution of municipal leaders.
Despite the distinct way PDD has been rolled out and sustained in both nations
following civil war, we do not yet know the impact of PDD processes on each nation’s progress
toward building sustainable peace. It is unknown whether PDD is contributing to, or potentially
detracting from, peace in these countries. The key research question explored in this
dissertation is: How, if at all, does the implementation of participatory deliberative democracy
in post-conflict contexts impact peacebuilding? In particular, this study explores how PDD is
associated with what Galtung (1969) refers to as “negative peace,” or the absence of violence,
as well as “positive peace,” which refers to social justice or improved quality of life.
Using a comparative case study and mixed methods research design, I find that PDD
can indeed influence peace. In Guatemala, PDD took over a decade to show an effect on peacerelated factors, but after twenty years I find that participation is associated with both political
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and social dimensions of ‘positive’ peace. Although at first, PDD was associated with adverse
effects on ‘negative’ peace, specifically PDD participants showed increased experience with
violent crime, this association disappears over time. In El Salvador, PDD contributes positively
to the political dimension of ‘positive’ peace both at fifteen and twenty-five years after the
civil war ended. Similar to the case of Guatemala, El Salvador’s PDD participants experienced
and increased incidence of violent crime compared to non-participants in the early years of
implementation, but this effect eventually faded out. Comparing structural factors of PDD
design and contextual factors stemming from the two nations’ peace agreements and political
climates after the war, I find that both countries pursued a ‘hybrid’ approach to locally led
peacebuilding via PDD spaces. However, the approach differed greatly between the two
countries, and each PDD system offers important lessons for implementation in alternative
post-conflict contexts.

1a. Research Design Overview
Building upon literature on peacebuilding and the interdisciplinary theories of
deliberative democracy, horizontal inequality, and intergroup contact, I develop several
hypotheses and propositions about the possible links between PDD and peace. I then use a
comparative case study, each case explored with mixed methods, to identify how local-level
PDD mechanisms used in post-conflict Guatemala and El Salvador are influencing peace. I
then look to structural and contextual factors of PDD implementation to explain divergent
peace-related outcomes in each nation.
My selection of case countries stems from three primary considerations: First, like any
large-scale initiative designed to create behavioral change, peacebuilding investments take
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time to show results; thus, I sought out countries that had been ‘post-conflict’ for at least two
decades. Second, I selected countries that had instituted PDD programs in the post-war period.
Third, I looked for case countries of a similar cultural and historical background to eliminate
one of many factors that may influence the observed effects of PDD on peace. Post-conflict
Guatemala and El Salvador were ultimately selected in alignment with these three criteria. By
drawing comparisons across these two Central American countries, this study sheds light on
which forms of PDD can be most effective in the aftermath of war and the contextual and
structural conditions that promote the successful implementation of these policy initiatives as
part of a larger peacebuilding agenda.
Using integrated mixed methods to delve into each case, I combine qualitative and
quantitative techniques for data collection and analysis to allow me to answer two sub-research
questions: 1) To what extent and in what ways does the implementation of PDD in post-conflict
contexts impact peacebuilding?; and 2) How do structural design and contextual factors of
PDD implementation in post-conflict contexts influence these effects? To answer these
questions, I completed a two-time-period quantitative analysis of an internationally
comparative secondary dataset and conducted original qualitative interviews and observations
with municipal officials and PDD participants in each case country. Each of these components
are further elaborated below.
To gauge the impact of PDD on peace, I developed several regression models to
determine if there was an association between PDD participation and measures I tied
theoretically with ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ peace. For ‘positive’ peace, I explore associations
with political, economic, and social outcomes that reflect structural and social justice. Related
to ‘negative’ peace, I investigate the association between PDD participation and individual’s

6

experience with and perceptions of violent crime. Each of these measurers is operationalized
using secondary data from the AmericasBarometer survey in 2008 and 2018. The
AmericasBarometer survey is an internationally comparative dataset developed from a biannual survey coordinated by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at
Vanderbilt University. In 2008, 1,538 individuals in Guatemala and 1,549 individuals in El
Salvador, a nationally representative sample in each country, were asked about their
participation in three types of local PDD programs: community associations, open Town Hall
meetings, and participatory budgeting and planning initiatives. I petitioned LAPOP to ask all
three of these questions again in the 2018/19 survey round to 1,596 individuals in Guatemala
and 1,511 people in El Salvador to enable a ten-year snapshot of the long-term effects of citizen
participation in government decision making.
To identify the structural and contextual factors that influence PDD success in the two
selected Central American post-conflict nations, I completed interviews with municipal
officials and participants in PDD programs alongside observations of PDD in action in each
country. Municipalities were selected first based on their inclusion in my secondary dataset
and then in four strata based on majority rural versus urban composition and political party
leadership (Guatemala/El Salvador) or indigenous majority (Guatemala). From June of 2017
to June of 2019, I conducted extensive fieldwork during which I visited eighteen municipalities
in Guatemala and twenty-six in El Salvador. This fieldwork entailed interviewing thirty-one
and thirty-seven public officials in each country, respectively, about their experiences and
perceptions with PDD. Municipal questions largely focused on the implementation and
observed impacts of PDD mechanisms. I returned to at least one community in each strata of
my municipal selection matrix to observe PDD in action and completed subsequent participant
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interviews with the aim of reaching saturation. In the end, I observed eighteen separate PDD
processes and interviewed fifty-eight participants in Guatemala, and I observed sixteen PDD
processes and spoke with thirty-six participants in El Salvador. The observations provided me
with a more nuanced view of the dynamics of PDD in practice, and allowed me to rank different
types of PDD mechanisms by deliberative and contact quality using Steenbergen, Bächtiger,
Spörndli, & Steiner's (2003) Discourse Quality Index (DQI) and an original Contact Quality
Index (CQI). Participant interviews explored individual interactions with government and
neighbors in PDD programs and any impacts related to PDD involvement. In combination,
these qualitative methods triangulated my data sources including elite and participant
perspectives alongside my own observations for each type of PDD process.

1b. Contributions of the Study
This dissertation marks one of the first international comparative case studies on the
relationship between local-level PDD and post-conflict peacebuilding. Indeed, this relationship
has been largely unexplored in the literature to date. Theoretical research promoting the
interdisciplinary study of these two fields in tandem is currently limited. There is a growing
interest in how participatory deliberative democracy and conflict transformation theorists
might offer insights to one another (Kiefer, 2015; Menkel-Meadow, 2006; O’Flynn, 2007,
2017; Ron, 2010). As forwarded by Menkel-Meadow (2006), deliberative democracy and
conflict resolution fields converge in the belief that popular participation will produce better
outcomes when the community engages in intergroup contact to develop and legitimize public
investments on initiatives that maximize public benefit. Dryzek (2005) has long argued that
deliberative democracy has the potential to “process what are arguably the toughest kind of
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political issues, the mutually contradictory assertions of identity that define a divided society”
(p. 218). However, theorists debate whether the two fields should even be in dialogue. A more
thorough theoretical investigation of this link by Aragaki (2009) argues that there are strong
normative differences between the two fields, which ultimately puts them at odds on the basis
of each’s understanding of conflict, the function of discourse, and the role of interest-based
positions in dispute resolution. Though the two fields of study emphasize the role of discourse
in the form of deliberation for deepening democracy and dialogue for advancing reconciliation,
the theoretical link between the two has often been limited to elite level deliberation or
negotiation in post-conflict contexts (Johnstone, 2007; Nakagawa, 2018).
Most scholars that study PDD explore its effects on democratic consolidation or
deepening democracy in post-conflict contexts. They ask if PDD improves the legitimacy of
local government and the democratic system more broadly. While there are many studies that
explore how PDD has been implemented in these two case countries during the post-conflict
era (e.g. Bird, 2001; International City/County Management Association, 2004c; Kapustin &
Charles, 1997; National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1995; Ucles, 1992;
Wolf, 2009), only one author has started to explore how PDD processes are tied to
peacebuilding focusing on the durability and sustainability of such initiatives in El Salvador
specifically (Bland, 2011, 2017).
Those that study post-conflict peacebuilding typically focus on macro-level or national
initiatives to consolidate peace, such as peace agreements, national elections, truth and
reconciliation commissions, or demobilization efforts targeting the rebel and government
armed forces. There is also a growing body of literature on civil society’s role in peace
processes, which is explored in greater depth in my literature review. There have been several
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researchers to explore peacebuilding in both Guatemala and El Salvador (e.g. Pearce, 1998,
1999; Pérez, 2003; J. Pugh, 2009), but these studies merely touch upon or simply do not explore
how PDD has been integrated into or impacted the peace process. One study that does make
this connection empirically explores public participation and deliberation in Zones of Peace
established to reduce violence in El Salvador as well as Colombia and the Philippines
(Hancock, 2018). Thus, though these two cases have been explored previously in the literatures
on both PDD and peacebuilding, my research question linking these two fields of inquiry has
yet to be explored.
The research design used in this study is also quite unique for this area of research as
it offers a comparative perspective on this question. I have encountered a handful of other
studies looking into local-level participatory democracy and peacebuilding, but they tend to
focus on just one case. For example, a few researchers are exploring the use of PDD in postconflict Colombia (Dajer Barguil, 2017; Hancock, 2018; Ugarriza & Trujillo-Orrego, 2018).
Additionally, I one article investigates deliberative democracy and peacebuilding in Kosovo
(Delaney et al., 2017). However, there is a dearth of peer reviewed and formally published
comparative work in this area. Likewise, in both other articles on this topic, researchers have
shied away from the use of quantitative methods preferring a qualitative approach. The mixed
methodology employed in this dissertation, therefore, brings a rare and powerful lens through
which to explore this area in greater depth.
The primary aim of this study is to explore PDD as a mechanism to bolster the
sustainability of post-conflict peacebuilding and to prevent and mitigate a return to violence
following civil war. Given the empirical evidence on the failure of peace settlements and the
possibility of post-conflict societies backsliding into violence, it is vitally important that
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innovative mechanisms such as PDD be evaluated for areas of impact and optimal contextual
and structural factors that may contribute to effective implementation in post-conflict settings.
This dissertation advances both public policy and peace studies fields as it explores the
implications of PDD in post-conflict Guatemala and El Salvador. While any post-conflict
peacebuilding method applied to one conflict case cannot be applied directly to another due to
the unique conflict characteristics in each circumstance, this research can offer insightful
lessons learned and suggest policy implications for other cases in which PDD implementation
is being contemplated in post-conflict contexts. Three current contexts, to my knowledge,
exploring this option are Colombia (Dajer Barguil, 2017), Northern Ireland (Bohman, 2012;
Hayward, 2014), and Israel/Palestine (Ahmed, 2005).

1c. Structure of the Dissertation
This dissertation is divided into six chapters. From this overview provided in Chapter
1, I proceed in Chapter 2 with a discussion about how my research fits into the literature on a
key debate about peacebuilding. Specifically, I place this study at the intersection between
proponents of top-down ‘liberal peace’ approaches and bottom-up ‘local turn’ supporters. I
also outline the theoretical links between PDD and peacebuilding across political, economic,
and social dimensions of the peace process by combining deliberative democracy, horizontal
inequality, and intergroup contact theory into a comprehensive framework to make a case for
why PDD may be a promising method for peacebuilding and the potential impacts of its
implementation in post-conflict contexts.
In Chapter 3, I outline my primary and secondary research questions, my hypotheses
and propositions, and the research design I utilize for my analysis. The primary research
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question guiding this study is: How, if at all, does the implementation of participatory
deliberative democracy in post-conflict contexts impact peacebuilding? My research design is
structured to answer two sub-questions: 1) To what extent and in what ways does the
implementation of PDD in post-conflict contexts impact peacebuilding?; and 2) How do
structural design and contextual factors of PDD implementation in post-conflict contexts
influence these effects? Stemming from academic literature and practitioner experience to date,
I hypothesize that PDD participation will improve peace through its influence on political,
economic, and social domains that contribute to more just and peaceful societies. I also propose
that various structural and contextual factors, such as the size and frequency of PDD
mechanisms or national political systems, will make a difference in the outcome. To answer
these questions, I outline how I combine a comparative case study and mixed methods to
investigate PDD implementation in Guatemala and El Salvador.
The final three chapters reveal the results of my analysis. In Chapter 4, I discuss my
findings in the case of Guatemala; and in Chapter 5, I share my findings in El Salvador. While
there are many similarities in the two cases, such as the troubling finding that PDD
participation is associated with increased incidence of violent crime during earlier years of
implementation, I also find some key differences in the outcomes of these two cases. Most
notably, I find that El Salvador’s experience with PDD was more influential earlier on than in
Guatemala and has generated far more variants of PDD. However, Guatemala’s centralized
and hierarchical PDD system has gained incredible strength with regards to its capacity to
influence policy making and budgetary decisions at the local level. PDD mechanisms in both
countries are currently associated with strong and multidimensional elements of ‘positive’
peace, but Guatemala’s PDD system demonstrates a broader range of positive effects. I close
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in Chapter 6 with an in-depth comparison of my findings in both countries and the structural
and contextual factors that produce divergent results. I also share policy implications and a
response to the literature for both practitioners interested in implementing PDD in alternative
post-conflict contexts and future scholars interested in expanding upon this relatively new area
of research.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

2a. The Call for Peacebuilding
Galtung (1975) was the first to use the term ‘peacebuilding’ in reference to efforts to
move toward sustainable ‘positive’ peace following conflict. “Positive peace” he defines as the
“absence of structural violence,” whereas “negative peace” is the “absence of personal
[physical] violence” (Galtung, 1969). This typology is one of the most frequently utilized
conceptualizations of peace in the field of conflict resolution today, as demonstrated by its
recent use in the creation of the Positive Peace Index by the Institute for Economics and Peace
(2016) designed to evaluate state stability (versus fragility). While ceasefires and peace
agreement negotiations largely focus on the achievement of ‘negative’ peace through cessation
of direct, physical violence, Galtung’s conception of post-conflict peacebuilding aspires to go
beyond ‘negative’ peace, to establishing ‘positive’ peace in which the causes of social injustice
that gave rise to conflict have been adequately addressed and structures for the peaceful
resolution of future disagreements have been installed.
In the realm of international relations and foreign assistance, peacebuilding was
brought into the limelight by former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali (1992) in An
Agenda for Peace in which he describes it as “comprehensive efforts to identify and support
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structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and wellbeing among people.” Touching upon the same core outcomes espoused by practitioners
engaged in ‘peace work’ over a decade later, Ricigliano (2012) offers that “peace is a state of
human existence characterized by sustainable levels of human development and healthy
processes of societal change” (p. 15). Like Galtung, Boutros-Ghali and Ricigliano suggest that
peacebuilding efforts should go beyond stopping violence to include structural change and
development. More succinctly, rather than just seeking to stop violence, peacebuilding should
enhance quality of life in post-conflict communities such that the root causes of conflict are
addressed, and relapse is averted. Peacebuilding activities can range from reconciliation at the
individual psychological level; to interpersonal restorative justice; and systemic structural
change seeking to resolve the causes of conflict across political, economic, and social sectors
(Pruitt & Kim, 2004, p. 253).
While peacebuilding aspires to ‘positive’ peace in the wake of conflict, there is not one
defined set of measures for this concept. Lederach (1997, p. 75), a leading scholar in the field
of conflict resolution, identifies ensuring the sustainability of peace and development as well
as a transformation of confrontation to dynamic, peaceful relationships as key outcomes of
long-term peacebuilding processes. Sustainability is frequently measured by the durability of
peace agreements without relapse into conflict, which has been explored by scholars through
various statistical models using datasets on war duration, battle deaths, and conflict termination
(Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000). Lederach (1997) describes
transformation as the “transition from emergency disaster response to relief operations and to
rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development […] underscoring the goal of moving a given
population from a condition of extreme vulnerability and dependency to one of self-sufficiency
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and well-being” (p. 75). He goes on to explain that conflict party relationships across personal,
relational, structural, and cultural dimensions signal progress toward this outcome.
Other scholars have offered alternative conceptualizations and operationalizations of
peace. Przetacznik (1999) gives a detailed overview of definitions of peace over time and
challenges Galtung’s notion of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ peace on the basis of semantics. He
argues, “In the context of peace the wording ‘negative peace’ literally and in substance means
the nonexistence of peace. There is no such thing as ‘negative peace.’ Peace either exists or
does not exist” (p. 200). He also notes that international peace and internal, nation-state peace
are quite different; limiting the idea of ‘positive’ peace to harmony within a state. Anderson
(2004) also acknowledges that peace cannot necessarily be measured in the same way from
macro- to micro-levels of analysis. However, he aligns his approach with Galtung’s
dimensions of peace to suggest two conceptualizations of peace: violence and harmony. He
then outlines subjective and objective measures of each, including statistics on violence and
an individual’s own assessment of violence levels in a country or statistics on social integration
and travel within a country and an individual’s assessment of harmony within their home
nation.
Within the last decade, two datasets have been developed to measure both ‘negative’
and ‘positive’ peace at a national level: the Global Peace Index and Positive Peace Index
published by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP). IEP also publishes US, UK, and
Mexico versions of the Global Peace Index that compare ‘negative’ peace indicators at the
state or regional level. The two most recent peace indices by IEP for Mexico have also included
an assessment of ‘positive’ peace. However, there has not been a large-scale effort to measure
‘negative’ or ‘positive’ peace at the municipal or individual level. Various evaluation networks

16

have been established with the aim of formalizing peace measures for organizations dedicated
to peace work. The Design, Monitoring, and Evaluation for Peace (DM&E for Peace) initiative
as well as the Alliance for Peacebuilding’s Eirene Peacebuilding Database project have sought
to compile peacebuilding evaluation measures, methods, and outcomes. The Everyday Peace
Indicators Project encourages evaluations to include ‘bottom-up’ indicators of peace developed
by those living within the local conflict-affected context (Mac Ginty, 2014; Mac Ginty &
Firchow, 2016). For those working within the peace industry, the predominant approach is for
each peacebuilding program to develop its own theory of change and associated impact
measures with no steadfast options recommended across the board. In summary, no one
operationalization of peace has been forwarded by the scholarly or practitioner community at
this time, though the interest in measuring the impact of peacebuilding efforts is on the rise.
Just as there is no one way of measuring peace, there is also not a consensus on how best to
consolidate peace in post-conflict contexts, the topic explored in the proximate section.
2b. Liberal Peace
Early peacebuilding practice employed many approaches to assist the transition of postconflict societies into sustainable communities from the top-down, bucketed under the ‘liberal
peace.’ The liberal peace tradition is a vein of peacebuilding practice and scholarship that
proposes a combination of liberal democracy and marketization to stabilize peace after conflict
(Chandler, 2010, p. 138). It developed following observations and research indicating that
democracies do not tend to go to war with one another, an association best known today as the
democratic peace thesis (Doyle, 1983b, 1983a, 2005; Z. Maoz & Russett, 1993; Owen, 1994).
Political transformation through the establishment of rule of law and legitimate institutions of
governance, sometimes referred to as statebuilding or the liberal democratic peace, has been a
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central element of post-conflict peacebuilding since its conception (Junne & Verkoren, 2005;
Mac Ginty, 2011; Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2007; Paris, 2002; Schirch, 2004). While disaster
assistance and economic development are key to peacebuilding practice, statebuilding is often
the focal point of international assistance following civil wars (Paris, 2004). Statebuilding
often begins while writing peace agreements in which elites of the relevant conflict parties
devise a means of power-sharing (Hartzell & Hoodie, 2003; Lijphart, 1969) and outline the
terms of justice and reconciliation (Olsen, Payne, & Reiter, 2010).
Top-down statebuilding initiatives have come under harsh criticism within academic
circles (Barnett, 2006; Jahn, 2007a, 2007b; Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2007; M. Pugh, Cooper,
& Turner, 2008; Richmond & Franks, 2009). Though the liberal approach preferences the
establishment of a constitutional democracy and “republican representation” seen as necessary
to fulfill the democratic peace (Doyle, 2005), the thesis has been partially debunked depending
on the strength of the democracy (Mousseau, 2000). Additionally, liberal peace imposes
Western values on societies that may not hold the same individualistic perspectives on life,
liberty, property, and human rights. Above all, the approach does not have a great track-record
of success. Call & Cook (2003, pp. 1-2) found that 72% of UN peacekeeping missions that
have included a democratization component ended up with an authoritarian regime as of the
early 2000s. Also, as noted above on the causes of war, recent prior conflict is a key predictor
of ‘new’ conflict outbreaks suggesting that this predominant strategy may not be the most
effective for building and sustaining peace.
Even when democracy persists, traditional representative elections in post-conflict
societies have mixed effects (Lyons, 2009, pp. 91-92). Scholars have both theoretically argued
and empirically linked elections with increased levels of violence both within (Bates, 1983;
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Kumar, 1998; Reilly, 2004; Snyder, 2000; Wilkinson, 2004) and between states (Gaubatz,
1999). Political competition and its related incentives to incite violence as a tactic to build a
loyal electoral base, often prompted by elite members of society, is central to these descriptions
of conflict exacerbation in democratic nations and transitioning democracies (Human Rights
Watch, 1995; Wilkinson, 2004). Scholars have therefore advised that the elite and top-down
nature of representative politics, especially at a national level, should no longer be the central
focus of statebuilding initiatives as part of the peace process. Collier, Hoeffler, & Söderbom
(2008) have even suggested that elections should not be considered a mechanism for sustaining
peaceful transitions post-conflict. Despite the evidence counter to this approach, practitioners
continue to promote democratization as a means of conflict transformation (Lyons, 2009;
Sandole, 2010). In response to these critiques and continued propagation of top-down liberal
peace in practice, a new body of literature has developed promoting hybrid or multi-track or
multi-level peacebuilding involving international supporters, elite leadership, and national
governments as well as, and with emphasis on, grassroots civil society and local governments.
2c. A Turn Toward the Local
Approaching the turn of the twenty-first century, several practitioners and academics
began to explore alternatives to the top-down, internationally enforced liberal peace. This
series of literature has more recently been called the ‘local turn’ in academic peace studies
circles (Feiock Richard C., 2009; Hughes, Öjendal, & Schierenbeck, 2015; Leonardsson &
Rudd, 2015; Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013; Öjendal & Ou, 2015; Paffenholz, 2015; Randazzo,
2016; Schierenbeck, 2015; Wallis, 2017). Scholars in this tradition posit that mid-level and
grassroots leadership (Lederach, 1997), civil society (Paffenholz & Spurk, 2006), religious
leadership (Al Qurtuby, 2013), and the general public should be engaged in peacebuilding. For
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some scholars, this translates to decentralization efforts such as holding local elections prior to
national elections in line with statebuilding (Diamond, 2006), but for others it has come to
mean the rise of social movements and civil society either in collaboration with or in
contradiction to top-down efforts (Chesters, 2004; Hughes et al., 2015). Schierenbeck (2015,
p. 1023) describes these two forms of local peacebuilding as “local institutions” versus a
“radical or alternative” approach. A third set of locally-oriented approaches sits under the
umbrella of “hybrid” peacebuilding, which acknowledges the role of the international
community and top-down actors in the peace process alongside local leadership (Hall, 1999;
Jarstad & Belloni, 2012; Mac Ginty, 2010, 2011; Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2015; Nadarajah &
Rampton, 2015).
One way of thinking about the ‘local turn’ as a response to top-down approaches is that
it emphasizes the value of local knowledge. Scott (1998) describes “knowledge embedded in
local experience” as metis as opposed to teche in the form of “abstract knowledge deployed by
the state and its technical agencies” (p. 311). He further elaborates on the concept of metis as
cunning, in that it’s acquired knowledge such as habit developed through practice, and
employing case-specific rules of thumb only known through informal norms. In post-conflict
societies, though infrastructure and trust are severely broken, one’s local culture survives and
develops as a socio-psychological infrastructure designed to cope with and manage conflict in
one’s daily life and community (Bar-Tal, 2007). Metis extant in a post-conflict community is
vitally important to understanding both the former culture of the community and how it has
evolved over time. Metis, too, can help a community build systems and structures that meet
the felt needs and cultural chemistry of the society. As Scott (1998) explains, “metis is most
valuable in settings that are mutable, indeterminate (some facts are unknown), and particular”
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(p. 316). While teche, with its precision and purported universality, is valuable in organizing
concepts and building the steps of precise processes, it is not personal or adaptable enough to
properly address the human needs of a community in reconstruction. The ‘local turn’ literature
gives appropriate credence to the fact that only after a new culture of peace has been developed
through metis can teche be useful in ensuring the sustainability of the organic recovery process.
While it is attractive to Western nations involved in humanitarian missions abroad to
think that proven teche in our own communities will surely work in foreign lands, statebuilding
as peacebuilding does not pass Scott's (1998, p. 323) “litmus test for metis”: practical success.
For this reason, both practitioner and academic communities now consider how to integrate
metis at multiple levels of society into the work of peace. While literature in this tradition
comes from within the critical epistemology focused on power and poor people’s liberation
(Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013), peacebuilding actors have been quick to adopt the movement
into the global peace and development agenda. Hughes et al. (2015) explain:
The appeal of the local is in its relationship to core ideals of liberalism and
democracy. The agency of the rational individual, and the representation of
that agency via a hierarchy of aggregative forums, is the keystone of both
liberal development and liberal peace making. […] In fact, the
complementarity between liberal approaches to economics and public
administration and local-level action has underpinned a wave of
development interventions going back to the 1970s, promoting
microfinance, decentralisation, civil society associations, social capital, and
social accountability (p. 819).
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To further underscore this point, the New Deal for the Engagement of Fragile States (OECD,
2011) specifically calls for “country-led and country-owned transitions out of fragility” (p. 1).
Likewise, the US Global Fragility Act (2019) calls for a strategy to “encourage and empower
local and national actors to address the concerns of their citizens” and “address the long-term
underlying causes of fragility and violence through participatory, locally led programs”
amongst other approaches.
The investigation undertaken in this dissertation acknowledges the value of local
knowledge and agency, specifically the knowledge shared and developed through deliberation
in locally-led spaces for public policy making, as vital to building both ‘negative’ and
‘positive’ peace. Placing this exploration within the local turn literature, I seek to further
explore the peacebuilding potential of local collaborative decision making via dialogue as
exchanged in spaces that promote participatory deliberative democracy.
2d. Participatory Deliberative Democracy as a Mechanism for Peacebuilding
In line with the local shift in peacebuilding, a participatory and deliberative approach
to democratic decision making has evolved, what I refer to as participatory deliberative
democracy. Various forms of PDD have been employed around the globe including
deliberative polls, citizens’ juries, Town Hall meetings, participatory budgeting, and
participatory strategic planning processes, among others (see resources such as Coleman,
Przybylska, & Sintomer, 2015; Gastil & Levine, 2005). PDD meets the call of critics of the
liberal peace by decentralizing power over policy design to the local level and increasing
citizen participation in public policy decision making.
Deliberative democracy has been defined and redefined over the last several decades.
The term was coined by Bessette (1980). He described it as a decision-making processes
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idealized by the US founding fathers in which representatives would deliberate to form a
“public voice” by “taking longer to develop and resting on a fuller consideration of information
and arguments,” (p. 106) rather than jumping to ignorant or impulsive propositions as may be
instigated by pure or direct democracy alone. More recently, scholars have developed a large
body of articles and books describing the value of deliberation for engaging the public in
policy-related dialogue and improving public policy choices. Besson & Martí (2006), for
example, define it as “an ideal of political legitimacy […] which implies publicly exchanging
arguments offered by and to participants who are committed to the values of rationality and
impartiality" (p. xv). Lafont (2017) describes the ideal form of deliberative democracy as one
in which “citizens must justify to one another–based on reasons that everyone can reasonably
accept–the coercive policies with which they must comply” (p. 85). Common to all definitions
is that deliberative democracy offers decision makers, whether politicians or the public, an
opportunity to debate alternative approaches to community problems, which improves
information access and rational decision making.
Though some scholars have forwarded the notion of representative democracy as a
form of deliberative democracy (Barber, 1984; Bessette, 1980, 1997; Gargarella, 1998; Gregg,
1997; Wolfensberger, 2000), others have emphasized the participation of the public at large as
integral to the deliberative ideal (Cini & Felicetti, 2018; Cohen, 1998; Cohen & Fung, 2004;
Cohen & Sabel, 1997; Fishkin, 1991, 1995; Fung & Wright, 2001; Lafont, 2017). In line with
Rousseau and Kant’s conceptualization of self-legislation and the more modern notion of the
discursive public sphere developed by Frobel and Habermas (Habermas, 1997), PDD as
referred to in this dissertation aligns with the notion that “legitimate lawmaking issues from
the public deliberation of citizens” (Bohman & Rehg, 1997, p. ix). I thus place a ‘participatory’
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emphasis on my own exploration of deliberative democracy. Authors Cini & Felicetti (2018)
have undertaken a thorough theoretical analysis of the participatory and deliberative
democratic traditions, carving out from the literature and debates between the two a
participatory deliberative democratic tradition which aligns with the more “radical deliberative
democrats.” In full support of their analysis and approach, I concur that what distinguishes
PDD is its focus on “social inclusiveness, political pluralism, and public activism. […] On the
one hand, these deliberative positions point towards overcoming the elitist characteristics of
deliberation by deepening the concept of ‘political equality;’ on the other hand, they propose
to redefine the category of ‘the political’ in more extensive yet efficacious terms” (p. 10). As
derived from the work of Cini & Felicetti (2018), I define PDD as a set of democratic
mechanisms which encourage public engagement in the policy-making process by
emphasizing political inclusion and citizen empowerment through deliberation (Mundt, 2019).
Given that PDD departs from both participatory and classical deliberative democracy
traditions to promote both citizen empowerment and political inclusion, transformative
moments (Steiner et al., 2017) within the deliberative space can take many forms. For example,
though deliberative democracy does often involve voting to make a final choice on public
spending or policy decisions (Besson & Martí, 2006), voting is not the focal point of the
political process. As Farrelly (2003) explains, “the aggregative model conceives of voting as
the primary political activity because it maintains that policy formation should be based on
preferences of the majority [while] the deliberative democrat's conception of democracy places
much more emphasis on the opportunities for effective participation and gaining enlightened
understanding” (pp. 138-139).
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Cini & Felicetti (2018) advocate the position that “alternative linguistic codes” should
be given legitimacy in addition to rational argumentation, in effect “opening the public sphere
to the entry of ‘the other’ and raising the level of political inclusiveness” (p. 11). Black (2012),
a scholar arguably aligned with the radical deliberative tradition, suggests: “Deliberative
theory is not limited to the analytical aspects of group discussion. Ideal models of deliberation
also provide some guidance about the social process and relationships that are created and
maintained through group members’ communication” (p. 69). She goes on to describe how
equality of participation, consideration and comprehension of alternative views,
demonstrations of respect, emotional expression, and identity statements are all essential
within deliberative spaces. Considering these critiques and expansions upon the classical
conceptions of participatory and deliberative democracy, I take a more holistic approach in my
exploration of PDD. I explore not only rational debate and appeals to Rawls' (1993) public
reason, but also the social and emotional information exchanged in these spaces.
Citizen engagement can take on several forms, ranging from consultative to 100%
citizen-controlled, depending on how the local government and communities design and
interact in the PDD process (Arnstein, 1969). PDD mechanisms can engage citizens in dialogue
about resource allocation or involve direct participation of community members in project
design and implementation. The amount of control citizens have in each type of space differs
widely. Town Hall meetings, on one end of the spectrum, are generally considered a form of
consultation in which citizen input is collected, but decision-making power still sits with
government. Whereas participatory planning and budgeting are often associated with greater
citizen control and active participation in policy formation on the opposite side of the spectrum
(Arnstein, 1969; Afonso, 2015, p. 8-9; Cabannes, 2004).
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Additionally, it has been shown that the level of deliberation can change greatly within
the course of a single discussion. Steiner et al. (2017) introduced the concept of “deliberative
transformative moments” building on their observations of dialogue groups on peace across
deeply-divided communities in Colombia, Brazil, and Bosnia. They noted that deliberation
moves from low- to high- levels, even under conditions of deep division. The transformation
of deliberation was driven by ‘traditional’ rational argumentation as well as storytelling,
humor, and even silence. In their study, higher levels of deliberation allowed actors of both
parties to reach agreements. This finding offers promise for the possibility that PDD processes
applied in conflict contexts can result in public policy decision making of mutual benefit to
parties on both sides of a divided society.
Given this background on participatory and deliberative forms of democracy, I posit
that, alongside top-down negotiation and power-sharing of warring elites, PDD may offer an
alternative democratic model for bringing together post-conflict parties in collective problem
solving. Furthermore, I suggest that PDD has the capacity to reestablish the legitimacy of
government, advance social justice, rebuild trust, and ultimately contribute to the consolidation
of ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ peace in fragile post-conflict states. Participatory deliberative
approaches can accomplish these aims in two ways.
First, PDD devolves decision-making power to everyday citizens. Hancock (2018)
explores how deliberative governance integrated into peacebuilding processes can produce
elevated levels of both local agency as well as internal and external legitimacy for the actors
involved. Building local agency on equality of voice, respect, trust, and accountability are
pivotal in post-conflict environments.
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Second, PDD engages citizens in actionable dialogue. Addis (2009) and Dembinska &
Montambeault (2015) have suggested that deliberative democracy promotes a view of
pluralism that allows groups in conflict to ‘hear the other side’ through dialogue. When
properly structured, dialogue and contact between parties previously in conflict has the
potential to decrease prejudice and improve social relations between groups. These factors
increase the likelihood that all voices will be heard, a demonstration of procedural justice (Lind
& Tyler, 1988); that public resources will be directed toward the felt needs of community
members, a form of distributive justice (Richmond, 2014); and that all groups can be formally
recognized within the political system, an appeal to social justice (Fraser, 1996).
In summary, PDD can increase the likelihood that the root causes of conflict will be
addressed—a central tenet of peacebuilding—because it allows for grassroots stakeholders to
join in authentic discourse about their needs, preferences, and subjective reality in a way
representative and electoral democracy does not. In the following three sub-sections, I review
a series of literature that highlights the possible political, economic, and social impacts of PDD
mechanisms in post-conflict contexts to further build upon these arguments. The sub-sections
provide an overview of the underlying theory linking PDD and peacebuilding across each
dimension, the critiques levied against the theories, and how empirical evidence either supports
or challenges the proposed links.
2e. Political Impacts
Deliberative democracy is both a mechanism for citizen engagement, as described
above, as well as a theoretical framework that centers on deliberation to increase public policy
legitimacy. The theory of deliberative democracy is political at its roots. Fishkin (2011)
describes the charge of deliberative democracy as “how to include everyone under conditions
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where they are effectively motivated to really think about the issues […] to fulfill two
fundamental values—political equality and deliberation” (p. 1). Deliberative democracy theory
details the manner in which dialogue should be structured to achieve these ends. Cohen (2003,
pp. 347-348) elaborates a theory of the deliberative ideal in which PDD procedures adhere to
four key conditions: 1) participants engage freely and are empowered to act upon the results
rather than by imposition of an authority, 2) deliberation involves reasoned debate in which all
parties advance their positions and rationale for their choices, 3) parties involved are of equal
standing, and 4) consensus should be the aim. Fung & Wright (2001, p. 24-25) outline the key
components of existing deliberative democracy mechanisms which are much more granular
and less grandiose than Cohen’s ideal. However, Cohen and Fung & Wright coincide on the
importance of dialogue and equitable power relations between participants as central to PDD
processes. A Discourse Quality Index has been proposed as a means of measuring how a
deliberative process adheres to these standards (O’Brien, 2007; Spörndli, 2003; Steenbergen
et al., 2003).
The highly rational conception of deliberative democracy has invited substantial
critique both normatively and on the basis of realism in practice. Mouffe (2000) suggests that
democracy should promote differences of opinion and provide a structure within which divided
communities can develop interest groups that respect the ‘other’ while maintaining their own
varied identities, a democratic ideal she calls “agonistic pluralism.” She argues, “Modern
democracy’s specificity lies in the recognition and legitimation of conflict and the refusal to
suppress it by imposing an authoritarian order. […] A democratic society makes room for the
expression of conflicting interests and values” (p. 756). The debate between those that
emphasize consensus-building versus identify politics has sparked a series of articles and
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books related to democracy and difference, often seeking a middle ground between political
equality and agonism (Dryzek, 2001, 2005, 2009; Niemeyer & Dryzek, 2006).
Realizing that deliberation rarely adheres to an ideal form, Bachtiger et al. (2010) have
developed a classification of deliberation into Types I and II (p. 33). Type I deliberation is
modeled after the ideal Habermasean consensus model of rational debate, while Type II
deliberation allows for emotional exchange and informal dialogue. With this classification, the
authors attempt to reconcile the two schools of thought regarding what should be recognized
as deliberative democracy by permitting storytelling and narrative as a form of deliberation
while still upholding the deliberative ideal of rational and sincere communication. Based on
these theoretical fundamentals and debates, PDD processes that are closer to the Habermasean
ideal are presumably more likely to be effective in post-conflict contexts, with the caveat that
an emphasis on equality versus difference may present a substantial challenge when two
populations have competing histories of conflict.
Various authors have explored both short-term and long-term civic engagement
impacts for the individuals directly involved in PDD processes. At the individual level, PDD
has been linked to increased citizen empowerment and self-confidence (Alsop, Bertelsen, &
Holland, 2006; Alsop, Dudwick, Bertelsen, & Nyhan, 2007; Pateman, 1970), improved civic
education and understanding of the political process resulting in attitude transformations
toward democratic governance (Blanco & Ballester, 2011; Daly, Schugurensky, & Lopes,
2009; Schugurensky, 2004), as well as a growth in community leadership among participants
(Kasdan, Markman, & Convey, 2014). As governments increase their level of transparency
and accountability through PDD processes (Avritzer, 2012; Cabannes, 2004; Wampler, 2012),
individual citizens respond by increasing public engagement and trust (Hagelskamp, Rinehart,
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Silliman, & Schleifer, 2016; Wampler, 2012). Font & Blanco (2007) outline three linkages
between participatory forums, in their case citizen juries in Spain, and political trust by:
“creating a sense of citizenship and engagement in public affairs; their influence in decision
making; and their capacity to produce outputs that more closely mirror citizens’ preferences”
(p. 559). While public acceptance of PDD and its ability to achieve these aims is still being
questioned and tested (e.g. Boulianne, 2019), the central argument here is that PDD can
enhance the likelihood that decisions made within the PDD forum will be upheld in future
policy implementation. Thus, as Cohen (2003) indicates, participants in deliberative
democracy “prefer institutions in which the connections between deliberation and the
outcomes are evident.” A logical extension of these findings for a post-conflict context implies
that individuals that feel politically empowered and heard by their governments are more likely
to pursue democratic resolutions to disagreements versus returning to violence.
Pateman (1970) has suggested that participation has effects not just for individuals
involved in PDD programs, but also for the community more broadly. In a qualitative study on
participatory budgeting, Abers (2001, p. 139-140) outlines how these “cascade effects” can
include increased civil society mobilization across neighborhoods and communities, improved
democratic skills, and greater concern for the needs of others. Long-term, dynamic interaction
between the government and citizens in PDD processes contributes to higher voter turnout in
traditional democratic venues, increased tax revenue collections, a stronger record of good
governance, and improved budgetary efficiency (Abers, 1998; Marquetti, Schonerwald da
Silva, & Campbell, 2012; Wampler, 2012; Zamboni, 2007). All these impacts would greatly
improve the capacity of communities to resolve conflicts in a sustainable fashion following
civil wars.
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One drawback to PDD is the shift it can create in traditional political power structures.
As ‘local ownership’ is promoted, the legitimacy of external or national-level actors may come
into question. For example, PDD mechanisms are thought to shift power to the mayor over
Municipal Councils or city officials, as was the case in Brazil (Souza, 2001). This can be
destabilizing, and thus PDD forums can be easily corrupted by local power struggles. It also
limits the sustainability of these processes long-term (Johnstone, 2007), both fiscally and
politically (Bland, 2011; Sintomer, Herzberg, Rocke, & Allegretti, 2012). Given the long
duration of peace and reconciliation processes, PDD may not prove effective as a durable
mechanism for addressing deeply rooted causes of conflict. Local governments can circumvent
this outcome by partnering with local community-based organizations (e.g. Kasdan, Markman,
& Convey, 2014) or building safe spaces for dialogue running alongside or parallel to public
decision-making arenas (e.g. Holt-Shannon & Mallory, 2014). However, these partnerships
can cause tensions between direct citizen voice and that of traditional civil society as outlined
by Ganuza, Nez, & Morales (2014) and Hendriks (2002).
PDD initiatives can also undermine their own attempts at building grassroots
legitimacy when organizers and volunteers are not adequately representative of the community
or fail to appropriately engage marginalized populations. Participatory forms of deliberative
democracy have been criticized for their potential to play too easily to the “tyranny of the
majority” (Benhabib, 1996). This can be particularly troublesome in divided communities
when parties to a dispute, or former dispute, do not perceive that they are on equal political
standing (Siu & Stanisevski, 2012). As Siu & Stanisevski (2012) describe, “Deliberation could
do more harm than good not only to the participants, but also to democracy; societal
inequalities are inevitably brought into deliberative settings and could exasperate intercultural
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conflicts” (p. 85). In a case study on Kosovo, researchers identified that inclusion and exclusion
in deliberative spaces tended to follow the norm of existing social structures, thus limiting their
exploration of true inter-ethnic deliberative governance (Delaney et al., 2017).
Polarization can bring out these inequalities even more in PDD forums. Ugarriza &
Trujillo-Orrego (2018, p. 1) have highlighted this dynamic as an “ironic effect of deliberation”
in which polarization can result in combative interactions and worsen perceptions amongst
groups within the deliberative space. In New Hampshire, school board participation became
hostile when religious conservatives achieved majority representation and sought to ban more
liberal education curricula (Holt-Shannon & Mallory, 2014). In Spain’s Basque Country,
several iterations of deliberative forums were attempted and ultimately failed because the elite
politicians controlling the participatory forums could not move beyond fixed, ideological
positions. As Jeram & Conversi (2014) shared, “the main actors with a stake in the Basque
conflict remained steadfast in their positions on how peace would be achieved, even if these
were not in line with public opinion” (p. 70). As these cases reveal, it is possible that PDD
creates more divisiveness in communities, which could have disastrous effects in societies
already vulnerable to conflict relapse. The political effects of PDD in post-conflict Guatemala
and El Salvador have yet to be explored, though the durability of the peace processes and
political systems instituted after both conflicts is suggestive of a promising connection.
2f. Economic Impacts
PDD can be associated with economic outcomes relevant to post-conflict peacebuilding
through Stewart’s (2000) theory on Horizontal Inequalities (HIs), which states that perceived
inequality running along identity lines between in- and out-groups is a key factor contributing
to conflict risk. The literature on the economic impacts of PDD suggests that there are two
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complementary ways in which PDD can influence economic circumstances: improving agency
over one’s economic conditions and increasing the effectiveness of local governments. If PDD
successfully achieves these aims, then it could be tied to conflict prevention by decreasing
perceived inequality between conflict parties.
First, PDD can enhance one’s capabilities to improve his station in life, a concept
stemming from the Capabilities Approach (Sen, 1999). Sen’s (1999) Capabilities Approach
considers economic factors such as income to be only a means to an end of being and doing.
Individual agency to act upon desires, rather than access or resources, is central to economic
development. Indeed, expanding one's agency or freedom to choose has been theoretically
linked to poverty alleviation (Leßmann, 2011). As individual capabilities are combined to
achieve a common policy goal, deliberative mechanisms develop “collective capabilities” that
“allow poor communities to create and seize new opportunities to collectively invest in their
financial, human, and social capital” (Ibrahim, 2006, p. 399). By allowing for public
participation in policy making, PDD gives individuals and collective communities the agency
to choose policy outcomes as they engage in empowered capacity building (Blanco &
Ballester, 2011; Schneider, 1999; Schugurensky, 2004). Therefore, resultant public policies
and services are more inclusive of would-be spoilers.
Fung (2015) and T. L. Cooper, Bryer, & Meek (2006) make similar cases for the value
of participatory deliberation via “participatory multisectoral problem solving” or “citizencentered collaborative public management” respectively, for improving the effectiveness of
government. Fung (2015) describes how multisectoral problem solving through mechanisms
such as dialogue circles can help to “identify the best solutions in terms of feasibility,
effectiveness, implementation timeframe, cost, and the need for coordination” (p. 6) as a means
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to improve governance effectiveness toward solving ‘wicked problems.’ T. L. Cooper, Bryer,
& Meek (2006) build a conceptual model to classify a range of citizen engagement approaches,
suggesting that deliberative approaches are more likely to positively contribute to improved
public management. In summary, PDD allows public officials to more efficiently and
effectively leverage local knowledge (Leßmann, 2011; Osmani, 2000, 2001; Schneider, 1999;
Speer, 2012). Thus, a second way PDD can contribute to improved economic conditions is by
enhancing public service management and delivery when bureaucrats actively listen to citizens
and subsequently direct resources toward felt community needs.
Returning now to how improving individual as well as collective capabilities and
improved government efficiency may influence peace, Stewart (2010) hypothesizes that “it is
a combination of cultural differences and political and economic inequalities running along
cultural lines that, at least in part, explain contemporary violent conflict” (p. 2). The theory
follows that “horizontal inequalities” develop when there are “severe inequalities between
culturally defined groups” (Stewart, 2002, p. 3), particularly “inequalities in access to, use of,
and ownership of assets” (Steward, 2010, p. 2). When this type of inequality is combined with
identity-based forms of exclusion, the population en mass is more likely to engage in conflict
as a form of rebellion. In a longitudinal study of fifty-five nations, Østby (2008) finds that
conflict is not influenced by political exclusion alone, though it is associated with increased
conflict when combined with asset inequality. In a post-conflict context, PDD spaces can
indirectly reduce participants perceived horizontal inequalities by increasing individual
capabilities, with the effect of improving procedural justice, and improving the effectiveness
of governance, with the possibility of influencing distributive justice. To achieve this aim,
public deliberation must be designed to promote procedural and distributive justice by way of
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giving access and opportunity to all groups to engage in public policy decision making and
following-through with implementation, especially when policies and services take on a redistributive nature.
While individual material wealth is not directly improved through participation in
PDD, HI theory highlights the value of improving relative deprivation (Gurr, 1993) or
perceptions of inequality between groups. Procedural and distributive justice are central to
altering perceived, horizontal inequalities. The psychology of procedural justice applies to
PDD as “decisions are more likely to be accepted when the procedure used to generate the
decision allows for the participation of those affected” (Lind & Tyler, 1988, p. 8). PDD can
influence distributive justice when it’s “concerned with the distribution of the conditions and
goods that affect individual well-being […] to include its psychological, physiological,
economic, and social aspects,” as outlined by Deutsch (1985, p. 31). As ‘horizontal inequality’
is one of the root causes of conflict, resolving inequity, even just the perception of inequity,
can greatly improve the sustainability of peace processes.
PDD mechanisms are not always set up to improve inequality, however. Abdullah,
Karpowitz, & Raphael (2016, p. 6) describe four reasons why public deliberation does not
always support an equitable distribution of resources, real or perceived. First, there is often
intentional exclusion of some voices. Second, marginalized voices are motivated just to be
heard versus make policy. Third, the poor may make claims to security or vulnerability rather
than principals to which all community members can relate. Fourth, misunderstandings in
deliberation are likely. Deliberative theorists often tie these outcomes to the importance of how
a deliberative space is structured. Arnstein (1969) describes how participatory spaces range
from manipulative to genuine citizen control, with several rungs on her “ladder of citizen
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participation” in between. The higher up the ladder sits a particular process, the more likely it
is that the final decision is rooted in the actual information exchanged. Leighninger (2016)
makes a case for designing process with both “thick” and “thin” deliberation, the former
“intensive, informed, and deliberative” and the later “faster, easier, and potentially viral,” as
they are complimentary means of encouraging engagement that have different strengths and
weaknesses in terms of balancing equal and equitable aims of public engagement in
government decision making.
An alternative explanation for divergent equity and redistribution outcomes presented
by Coelho & Waisbich (2016) is that political alliances and group mobilization outside
deliberative spaces hold greater sway than the priorities forwarded within PDD processes. In
Rwanda, for example, economic policies such as those surrounding land distribution instituted
following the genocidal war have made some inroads to resolving geographically-based
inequalities, but have not addressed the rural/urban divide which tends to separate ethnic
groups (Leander, 2012). The capacity of local-level leadership to facilitate these processes may
also be a contributing factor to the limits of PDD to improve economic inequality (Osmani,
2001, p. 129). Krenjova & Raudla (2013) outline several environmental factors within local
governance structures that can influence their administrative capacity to carry out a PDD
process including: financial autonomy, political will or culture of engagement by local
authorities, community size, population diversity, and municipal prosperity. While these
authors do not suggest an ideal formula for success, each of these factors is a valid avenue for
exploration of the underlying processes that can contribute to PDD impacts on peace. The type
of deliberation taking place within PDD processes, how communication outside the process
interacts with decision making within the space, and the capacity of local leadership to
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coordinate PDD are all key considerations making up the structural and contextual conditions
of success for PDD in post-conflict contexts.
In practice, PDD has had community-wide economic benefits. Leighninger (2016)
outlines numerous ways that PDD impacts economic outcomes including greater equality with
more voices at the table, more economic opportunities through increased social capital, greater
equity and fairness in distribution of public expenditures, and the generation of economic
growth overall. He compiles evidence from several developing nations suggesting that
“sustained patterns of engagement build social capital, which in turn has an impact on a range
of indicators, including economic inequality and the distribution of wealth” (Leighninger,
2016, p. 1). Indeed, long-term participatory budgeting programs have been associated with
addressing inequality by redistributing wealth to the poor and traditionally excluded (Abers,
1998; Marquetti et al., 2012). In her research on the evolution of deliberation in a poor rural
community outside Porto Alegre, the birthplace of participatory budgeting, Abers (1998, 2001)
describes citizens using complex prioritization or point systems to determine which
neighborhoods or groups should receive public funds. Schneider (1999) reviews case studies
on participatory engagement in Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Malaysia, and the Philippines with
links to poverty reduction by way of rooting policies in better information, ensuring that
decision makers are committed, and improving the effectiveness and efficiency of service
delivery. Citizen councils implemented in some developing countries are focused explicitly on
community dialogue and collaboration for economic development in rural areas of Uganda and
Cameroon (Kakumba, 2010; Njoh, 2011).
True to the warnings of critics of PDD as a means to address horizontal inequality, not
all evidence suggests that PDD can be advantageous for equity. Strongly noted in reports from
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the global North on PDD implementation, these programs have not always achieved a
prominent level of inclusivity across identity groups or socio-economic class. Hooghe (1999)
points out that participation in deliberative democracy requires substantial time. Thus,
individuals and groups already marginalized find it harder to participate, and the privileged
continue to have an advantage with regards to access and voice in PDD spaces. Though some
processes, such as those in New York City (Kasdan et al., 2014), have made successful inroads
to integrating traditionally marginalized demographics proportionally in deliberative
discourse, others such as those in Cambridge, Massachusetts have not (Mundt, 2017).
Challenges in the global South are similar, but PDD encounters greater difficulty in
municipal capacity levels and support of national and local authorities. In a study on
peacebuilding in post-conflict Nepal, Subedi (2012) points to the largely political and
institutional focus of the peace process as “leaving the economic dimension of peace at the
margins” (p. 314). The author, therefore, calls for future economic development and recovery
programs in the country to involve inclusive measures to address the vertical and horizontal
inequalities that are the root causes of the nation’s conflict. However, according to Osmani
(2001), Nepali efforts to decentralize democracy and bolster citizen participation have been
challenged by poor technical capacity at the local level and unclear lines of authority between
national and local administrations. This case suggests that PDD may not be an effective policy
innovation to address the economic elements of peacebuilding. These same obstacles to
participatory governance surface in case studies elaborated by Schneider (1999), Kakumba
(2010), and Njoh (2011) as well. In each case, good intentions have fallen short in execution.
Even in the birthplace of participatory budgeting, the flagship PDD model for public decision
making in Brazil, Boulding & Wampler (2010) find that “state-sanctioned participatory
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programs have made a small dent in the worst poverty, but these programs have not been able
to address the basic and underlying inequality that starkly divides Brazilians, or greatly
improve health, education, and income indicators” (p. 131). In Central America, the impacts
of PDD on participant perceptions of economic well-being across conflict-party lines remains
an open question.
2g. Social Impacts
Intergroup contact has been associated both theoretically and empirically with reduced
prejudice and enhanced trust between parties in conflict (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998). As
spaces in which citizens meet with their neighbors to discuss community needs and areas of
focus for government intervention, PDD forums may open a window of opportunity for
individuals impacted by conflict to address the post-conflict needs for trust-repair, forgiveness,
and reconciliation. In his seminal book, Allport (1954) describes the impact of various types
of contact between majority and minority groups specifically in the context of racial
desegregation in the United States. Though hesitant to define all types of human contact within
his theoretical construct, he outlines how contact and its effects differ as the degree and
intimacy of the contact increases from casual interaction to peer-to-peer coworker relationships
in pursuit of common goals. He concludes that contact between in- and out-groups can have
the effect of reducing prejudice when a set of three key conditions are met: 1) groups are of
equal status, 2) there is institutional support for the contact, and 3) all are cooperating through
dialogue to achieve common goals with implied common interests (Allport, 1954, p. 281).
Many of these conditions overlap with the Habermasean ideal of deliberation, particularly
equality and the use of dialogue with the goal of making collective choices.
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Intergroup contact is not a silver bullet for conflict resolution and peacebuilding,
however. For example, limited contact or mere proximity between two groups does not
produce the effects outlined above (Allport, 1954). In fact, proximity without contact can
exacerbate conflict (Stolle, Soroka, & Johnston, 2008). Additionally, intergroup contact has
been tied to deferring structural change as group members develop affective friendships that
may temporarily improve relations but fail to resolve the underlying causes of conflict that
may have been addressed through collective action (Al Ramiah & Hewstone, 2013; Dixon,
2006). Brown & Lopez (2001) suggest, in fact, that intergroup contact should emphasize
difference politics to encourage majority members to recognize their privilege in mixed
interactions. This is especially important in post-conflict contexts wherein historical legacies
of conflict differ depending on one’s group membership.
Various authors have set out to test intergroup contact theory with varying degrees of
adherence to the ideal conditions outlined by Allport (1954) and in a variety of in-/out-group
contact scenarios, many of which have been in post-conflict contexts. By and large, the theory
has been confirmed with substantial empirical evidence. Pettigrew finds that contact works to
reduce prejudice through affective friendship development and reduces anxiety between group
members even when individuals are only connected through a mutual friend (Pettigrew, 1998;
Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005). It also increases empathy and knowledge of other, which highlights
mutual similarities.
Scholars have tested intergroup contact theory in post-conflict and conflict contexts as
diverse as Northern Ireland (Tam et al., 2008), South Africa (Dixon et al., 2010; Swart,
Hewstone, Christ, & Voci, 2011), and Israel-Palestine (Maoz, 2000). In South Africa,
intergroup contact was associated with support for policies of redress amongst the white
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majority, indicating that the effects of contact can translate to policy outcomes (J. Dixon et al.,
2010). Studies have also shown that intergroup contact can reduce prejudice between groups
even when not all of the ideal conditions are met, such as in unstructured environments
(Everett, 2013; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006, 2008). However, intergroup contact is most effective
when Allport’s conditions are met, there is a balance of minority-majority group members in
attendance, and participants’ psychological triggers for empathy and anxiety reduction are
integrated in the interaction (Al Ramiah & Hewstone, 2013).
Evidence presented by PDD scholars indicates that enhanced community cohesion can
result from the development of a public sphere for deliberation (e.g. Baiocchi, 2003; Wampler,
2012). As Baiocchi (2003) explained following a long-term observation of participatory
budgeting in Porto Alegre, “Participants often mentioned a sense of belonging to a larger
community of citizens who [were] facing problems together” (p. 62). In a study on two
different forms of neighborhood councils in the Netherlands, participants reported that they
saw the participatory, deliberative councils as a “social meeting place.” Indeed, an explicit goal
of councils in one mid-sized town was to foster social integration and connectedness between
neighbors (Wagenaar, 2007, p. 20). Black (2012) writes about the value of discussion in
building and maintaining social relationships when participants have “equal adequate
opportunities to speak, understand and fully consider each other’s views, and communicate
respect for their fellow group members” (p. 69). Similarly, Warren (1999, pp. 340-343) posits
that deliberative processes can create trust within society by opening spaces for exchanging
perspectives, promoting face-to-face conversation, enhancing the transparency of trade-offs
among interests, and encouraging promises between community members. As shared by Offe
(1999), “Institutions, if appropriately designed, can enable us to trust persons whom we never
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had contact with and with whom we share no relevant communal allegiance” (p. 70). Though
theses authors have not cited intergroup contact theory directly as the mechanism underlying
these findings, I submit that contact mediates the association.
The possible negative impacts of intergroup contact on peace stem largely from the
extent and quality of the contact between groups and the importance of generalizing individual
behavior to the ‘other’ more broadly. Even though PDD can facilitate intergroup contact in
divided societies, there are those that warn of the possible negative impacts of PDD
introduction in post-conflict contexts. Deliberative spaces tend to favor either the majority or
the most powerful in cross-cultural or divided communities. As Siu & Stanisevski (2012)
describe, “Participants from marginalized communities, if included in a deliberation, would
not be treated fairly and would not be able to participate as equals” (p. 85). Indeed, a common
critique of PDD in any context is that the majority will overrun all other groups at the table, a
challenge also of import for deliberative democrats. Thus, Allport’s first criteria for the success
of intergroup contact could go unmet in PDD forums.
Additionally, given that PDD has not traditionally been designed with the goals and
recommended structure of intergroup contact in mind, it may exacerbate divisions between
conflict parties and their sympathizers by inciting debate rather than dialogue or simply being
too large to allow for meaningful contact and relationship building. Hewstone & Brown (1986)
have argued that “contact is not enough,” stressing the importance of group salience, or
identification of the individual with whom one is interacting with the ‘other’ group versus an
outlier, as a moderating factor for extending one’s interactions with an individual to
characterizations or generalizations about a group overall. Along a similar line, Black (2012)
warns that “participants could identify themselves as members of specific social groups and
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provide arguments that serve their own best interest rather than sharing a common concern for
their collective identity” (p. 75). In a post-conflict setting, unwavering identity politics may
exacerbate conflict.
This insight is brought to life in the case of the Civic Forum in Northern Ireland,
occasioned in the 1998 Peace Agreement. The Civic Forum was designed to bring together
civil society leaders from North and South twice per year to deliberate on policy issues, but
ultimately it became a “political football between unionism and nationalism.” Like the
Northern Ireland Assembly, it did not generate rational dialogue or reason-based debate.
Instead the forum circled around identity and interest-based politics stemming from the
Troubles (Hayward, 2014, p. 16-19). Thus, it is important that participants in any intergroup
contact setting be viewed as both individuals, to build affective friendships, and representative
of their respective identity groups, to promote generalization beyond the interaction itself
(Brown & Hewstone, 2005). Deliberation in post-conflict contexts should therefore be
designed with a sensitivity to conflict dynamics to avoid the possible risk of undermining peace
processes. It is not yet known if the PDD mechanisms instituted in Guatemala and El Salvador
were structured with contact quality and equitable conflict party participation in mind.
2h. Conceptual Framework
The above literature review describes how local-level peacebuilding and PDD may well
combine to create a more sustainable peace than top-down statebuilding models of
peacebuilding, but there has not yet been a study that empirically tests the impacts of PDD on
peace in post-conflict contexts. Participatory deliberative democracy has been shown to
improve political, social, and economic outcomes for individuals and communities, but with
the caveat that PDD implementation, structure, and context matters. To contribute to peace, I
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argue that PDD can facilitate structural changes across political, economic, and social
dimensions of peace that together combine to decrease violence—creating ‘negative’ peace—
and improve quality of life—building ‘positive’ peace. This conceptualization is rooted in
Galtung’s (1969) typology of peace, but takes the operationalization of peace one step further
than Anderson (2004) by suggesting three key levers that contribute to sustainable peace.
Common to the three interdisciplinary theories that I suggest link political, economic,
and social outcomes to peacebuilding is the use of discourse. Whether via deliberation to
develop policy, distributive discussions about public resource allocations, or dialogue that
builds empathy and relationships between participants; PDD opens a locally-defined space for
discursive discovery and action between conflict parties with implications within and beyond
the processes themselves. While systemic changes flowing from direct interaction between
conflict parties in PDD programs are likely to take many forms in practice, I posit that there
will be three key outcomes of PDD processes that link to the broader goals of building peace
in post-conflict contexts politically, economically, and socially. Along the political dimension,
increased confidence in local government will result from opening the policy-making process
to public participation. Economically, improved perception of economic well-being will result
from perceived or actual shifts in the distribution of resources as conflict parties listen to one
another’s felt needs. Socially, greater trust between neighbors will develop as PDD interactions
reduce anxiety and initiate friendships across conflict lines. Ultimately, these outcomes will
contribute to improved ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ peace.
The diagram in Figure 1 serves as a visual representation of the three-dimensional
effect that PDD may have on political, economic, and social structures in post-conflict
societies. It also shows the theory that I have drawn upon in each area to build this case
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alongside its stated conditions for success. Discourse sits at the center of the diagram as the
common element emphasized across theories. Demonstrated in Figure 1 as well, I
metaphorically model how political, economic, and social levers united by the common thread
of discourse in PDD forums can bolster ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ peace. Like a hot air balloon,
the greater the effect of PDD on these political, economic, and social dimensions, the higher
the level of peace.

Figure 1: Projected Political, Economic, and Social Impacts of PDD on Peace

Discourse has long been hypothesized to have favorable impacts on ‘negative’ and
‘positive’ peace in post-conflict contexts. Yet how discourse can make an impact can be seen
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through different lenses. This conceptual framework highlights three different paths from
discourse to peace. Deliberative democracy theory suggests that civic engagement via the
rational exchange of public policy ideas and arguments can improve government legitimacy,
promoting public official transparency and accountability and leading to greater trust in
government. Horizontal inequality theory suggests that discussion spaces that promote citizen
agency and public management efficiency while engaging identity groups equally in
distributive decision making can reduce relative deprivation between conflict parties.
Intergroup contact theory proposes that dialogue between conflict parties that equalizes status
between parties and addresses common interests can have the effect of reducing prejudice,
bolstering trust, and producing long-term affective friendships.
2i. Conclusion
In this chapter, I reviewed the literature on peacebuilding and the call for local-level
mechanisms to promote peace in post-conflict contexts. I suggest that participatory deliberative
democracy may well be an appropriate response to this call. I then outlined three theoretical
links between PDD and peace, making the case that discourse is an overlapping theme across
theories. I also highlight that there are caveats to PDD’s contribution to peace in deeply divided
societies and intractable conflicts, as outlined by theorists and empirical evidence on PDD as
applied in other contexts. Having explained the context and theory behind my research, I turn
in the next chapter to my research design to empirically explore how PDD has been
implemented in two post-conflict contexts in Central America and its effects on the multiple
dimensions of peace I outlined above.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH QUESTIONS, HYPOTHESES, AND METHODOLOGY

The above conceptual framework is suggestive of some of the structural elements of
PDD processes that may be important for building peace as well as possible PDD impacts in
post-conflict contexts. My hypotheses and approach to measuring these key concepts is further
detailed in the sections that follow. In section 3a, I share my primary and sub-research
questions. In section 3b, I discuss the literature-derived hypotheses and propositions guiding
my empirical investigation. I then describe a three-tiered research design which integrates an
international comparative and mixed methodology in sections 3c-3f. I conclude in section 3g
with a review of my research design.
3a. Research Questions
The primary research question for this study is: How, if at all, does the implementation
of participatory deliberative democracy in post-conflict contexts impact peacebuilding? This
question is purposefully broad to be inclusive of two sub-questions: 1) How do structural
design and contextual factors of PDD implementation in post-conflict contexts influence
peacebuilding effects?; and 2) To what extent and in what ways is PDD implementation in
post-conflict contexts associated with peacebuilding? Table 1 below links my research
questions with my proposed exploratory investigations and conceptual measures stemming
directly from my review of the literature and conceptual framework.
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Table 1: Conceptual Measures and Investigations by Research Question
Secondary Research Question 1

Exploratory Investigation

How do structural design and
contextual factors of PDD
implementation in post-conflict
contexts influence peacebuilding
effects?

Quality of Discourse
Equal Participation/Standing between Identity Groups
Institutional Support/Capacity
Distributive Decision Making for the Common Good
Community Demographics
Factors yet to be Identified

Secondary Research Question 2

Conceptual Measure
Confidence in Government

To what extent and in what ways is
PDD implementation in postconflict contexts associated with
peacebuilding?

Perception of Economic Well-being
Community Trust
Experience with and Perception of Physical Violence
Satisfaction with Democratic System
Perception of Peace

3b. Propositions and Hypotheses
The literature suggests several factors I should explore to understand the underlying
processes that produce, or fail to produce, effects on peace. Below I outline five propositions
for the exploratory portion of my study:
1. The quality of discourse permitted within a particular PDD forum will determine how
influential or transformative the process will be for building peace in a community.
The more closely the process adheres to the ideal Habermasean consensus model, the
more likely it is that the PDD process will positively influence peace.
2. Participant equality in terms of participation and standing within the space will also
influence the impacts of PDD on peacebuilding. The more closely the program design
adheres to the ideal conditions of intergroup contact and promotes procedural
justice, the more likely it is that the PDD process will positively influence peace.
3. Institutional support for and capacity to facilitate PDD spaces is central to creating
safe and productive spaces for dialogue and decision making, implementing policy
decisions made within the space, and sustaining the PDD process itself. The greater
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the buy-in and capacity of local administrators, the more likely it is that the PDD
process will positively influence peace.
4. As horizontal inequality has been identified as a cause of conflict, PDD processes
should consider and address the root causes of inequality to avoid conflict relapse.
The more consciously the municipality structures PDD processes to prioritize
distributive justice through public spending allocation, the more likely it is that the
PDD process will positively influence peace.
5. Community effects of PDD participation are often influenced by the demographic
characteristics of the community itself. Small communities can reach more of the
population through direct participation. Less ethnically diverse communities are
more likely to achieve consensus in public deliberation. The less populous and less
diverse the community, the more likely it is that PDD will positively influence peace.
The above factors listed as propositions are anticipated to be influential on the
associated effects of PDD on post-conflict peace. Bearing in mind the municipal variation in
PDD implementation and approach, the conceptual framework and theory outlined above
allow me to hypothesize several possible associations between PDD and multiple dimensions
of peace. I use indicators of confidence in local government, perceived economic well-being,
and neighbor trustworthiness as measures of the political, economic, and social dimensions
that theoretically facilitate peacebuilding and conflict transformation in post-conflict societies.
Given the complexity of measuring ‘positive’ peace, I operationalize self-reported satisfaction
with the democratic system as an indicator of satisfaction with the broader political structure
and therefore the “absence of structural violence” in alignment with Galtung’s ‘positive’ peace.
This selection notably aligns more with the democratic peace thesis, than it does with
transformative or social justice conceptualizations of ‘positive’ peace. As the “absence of
physical violence” is in alignment with Galtung’s ‘negative’ peace and a common measure of
peace outlined in the literature, I operationalize ‘negative’ peace using measures of one’s
personal encounter with violent crime and perception of violence in one’s neighborhood. I also
generate a ‘peace perception index’ which combines individuals’ subjective perceptions of
49

political, economic, social, ‘positive,’ and ‘negative’ dimensions of peace as an additive
measure of overall peace.
I hypothesize that the implementation of locally led PDD in post-conflict contexts will
build ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ peace by increasing confidence in local government, improving
perceived economic well-being, and bolstering neighbor trust. Though all individuals in my
case countries have been exposed to top-down liberal peacebuilding efforts through the macrolevel peace processes implemented in each nation, I anticipate that those who participate in
PDD will demonstrate divergent outcomes across multiple dimensions of peace as compared
to those that do not participate in PDD. Overall, I posit that PDD is positively associated with
peace among individuals with higher levels of PDD participation. Specifically, I propose six
hypotheses aligned with the dimensions of my conceptual framework:
•

H1: PDD is positively associated with increased trust in local political institutions,
as measured by perceived municipal government trustworthiness among individuals
with higher levels of PDD participation.

•

H2: PDD is positively associated with reduced levels of relative deprivation, as
measured by improvements in perceived economic well-being among individuals with
higher levels of PDD participation.

•

H3: PDD is positively associated with increased community trust, as measured by
perceived neighbor trustworthiness among individuals with higher levels of PDD
participation.

•

H4: PDD is positively associated with ‘negative’ peace, as measured by the
percentage of individuals reporting direct experiences with physical violence within
the last year and perceived level of violence in one’s neighborhood among
individuals with higher levels of PDD participation.

•

H5: PDD is positively associated with ‘positive’ peace, as measured by satisfaction
with the democratic system among individuals with higher levels of PDD
participation.

•

H6: PDD is positively associated with peace, as measured by a higher additive index
score across political, economic, social, ‘positive,’ and ‘negative’ dimensions of
peace.
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3c. Research Design
This study applies an integrated mixed methodology to a comparative case study of
two post-conflict Central American nations—Guatemala and El Salvador. While each of the
methods employed are further elaborated below in the methodology section, it is important to
note that I conducted this study at three complementary levels of analysis to gain a thorough
understanding of how PDD may influence peacebuilding, if at all. Table 2 below summarizes
the terminology I use to describe each level and the corresponding unit of analysis, method,
and function served by each component.

Table 2: Three Complementary Levels of Analysis
Level

Unit of Analysis

Method

Function

Macro

Country

Comparative
Case Study

Identify national level factors that may
influence peacebuilding more than PDD.

Qualitative

Explore how PDD is implemented in practice
and its community impacts from the
perspective of local government officials.

Quantitative

Link individual participation in PDD forums to
lived reality and perceptions from the
perspective of PDD participants.

Meso

Micro

Municipality

Individual

I opted for this multi-leveled approach to both strengthen my analysis of this complex
issue and to mitigate challenges in design and methodology present at any one level by
providing a validity check or control at another level. King, Keohane, & Verba (1994, p. 116)
suggest that in situations in which a researcher does not have a sufficient number of cases to
show all variation, which is nearly impossible to control for when historical conflicts and
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public policy are the dependent variables being used in case selection, then one should add
observations at different levels of analysis into the study design. I therefore took this approach
to manage case selection controls. Additionally, all methods have specific strengths and
weaknesses that I sought to mitigate to address my central research question. By using different
methods to guide my investigation at each level, I endeavored to play to the strengths and
minimize the weaknesses inherent in each methodology. The multiple levels of analysis and
integrated mixed methods approach strengthen my design.
While I am ultimately interested in how PDD has been employed in my two case
countries and the impact this public policy approach has had on peacebuilding, I cannot control
for dependent variable variation at the nation-state level. Additionally, I was only able to gather
rich original data realistically at the municipal and individual level. Thus, I use the case study
method at the macro-level to analyze the big picture factors that have influenced PDD
implementation and alter its effects in each country. Although municipalities are the central
policy actors implementing PDD at the meso-level, the number of possible municipal
observations is too small for a robust quantitative analysis and there is limited solid data to
guide case selection for variation on the type of PDD, or lack thereof, employed by each
community. Thus, an exploratory qualitative approach is most appropriate to understanding
PDD mechanisms in practice and associated community impacts. Finally, the individual level
dataset that I use is limited by the fact that it is from a secondary source with pre-determined
questions that I have operationalized to fit my dissertation research interests. Nonetheless, this
dataset boasts appropriate variation in my dependent variable, suitable controls, and enough
observations to allow for econometric analysis.
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In summary, each level of analysis alone cannot provide a holistic picture of how PDD
has influenced peacebuilding in my post-conflict case study nations. Only when used together
do they present a detailed and nuanced case to either confirm or reject the propositions and
hypotheses I outlined above. In the following section, I discuss the methodological approach I
take at each level of analysis in greater detail.
3d. Methodology
The empirical investigation I undertake to complete this dissertation combines both
qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis in an integrated mixed methodology.
Using both qualitative and quantitative techniques for data collection and analysis allows me
to answer the two secondary research questions implied by the central research question as
outlined above. While qualitative methods are used to answer the secondary question akin to
‘how does it work?’, quantitative methods are used to answer the secondary question akin to
‘does it work?’ (Starks & Trinidad, 2007; Yin, 2014). Combining methods in this fashion
allows for a more thorough investigation of PDD and its impacts on my two case countries
from the perspective of municipal officials and their constituents.
The qualitative and quantitative components used at varying levels of analysis are
logically linked to the main research question and sub-questions as outlined below in Table 3.
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Table 3: Linking Research Questions to Methodology
Primary Research Question

Research Method

Data Sources

How, if at all, does the
implementation of participatory
deliberative democracy in postconflict contexts impact
peacebuilding?

Comparative Case Study

Historical and
Administrative Document
Review

Secondary Research Question 1

Research Method

Data Sources

How do structural design and
contextual factors of PDD
implementation in post-conflict
contexts influence peacebuilding
effects?

Qualitative Interviews and
Observations

Municipal Officials, PDD
Forums, and PDD
Participants

Secondary Research Question 2

Research Method

Data Sources

To what extent and in what ways
is PDD implementation in postconflict contexts associated with
peacebuilding?

Quantitative Analysis of
Secondary Survey Data

LAPOP
AmericasBarometer
Survey

Broadly speaking, the mixed methodology approach used for this study combines a
macro-level historical case study of the conflicts and PDD policies implemented in Guatemala
and El Salvador; meso-level original qualitative interviews and observations to understand how
PDD is actually used in practice at the local level; and micro-level quantitative analysis of a
secondary public opinion survey. DeCuir-Gunby & Schutz (2017) call this an “explanatory
sequential design.”
However, the execution of my research did not necessarily flow sequentially from
qualitative to quantitative analysis due the timing of release and availability of the quantitative
data and feasibility of access to human subjects in each country. Thus, in implementation, the
design took on more of a multi-phased and cyclical structure. In spring of 2017, research for
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this study began with a quantitative analysis of AmericasBarometer data from 2008. From
summer of 2017 through summer of 2019, I completed qualitative interviews and observations
of PDD process. In all municipalities, I used municipal official interviews simultaneously for
data collection and to begin the process of building rapport with those individuals that would
later facilitate PDD process observations. In autumn of 2019, I completed the quantitative
analysis of AmericasBarometer data from 2018 as it was received.
Ultimately, the aim of this study is to compare PDD’s effects in two distinct cases
where it has been used alongside post-conflict peacebuilding efforts, versus making assertions
about patterns extant in PDD implementation across a large set of cases both with and without
former internal conflicts. Thus, this study seeks to replicate the investigation plan and sequence
at each of three levels of analysis separately, multiple times. As such, each case study country
followed the same step-by-step investigation. Data analysis was completed holistically caseby-case and comparisons were made across cases once all data collection and analysis on each
case was complete. I intentionally made no attempt to aggregate data across national
boundaries. My logic in taking this approach was that, if in each case the impacts of PDD were
similar, there would be compelling evidence to suggest that various forms of PDD had
comparable effects in multiple post-conflict contexts, perhaps even further afield than Central
America. Such a result would provide robust support for the conceptual framework outlined
above. If the impacts of PDD differed between the selected countries, it would be possible to
identify the structural elements that contributed to noted differences in PDD effects or indicate
that the theories driving the propositions and hypotheses outlined above require further
exploration and refinement in future studies.

55

3e. Macro-level Comparative Case Study
Yin (2014) defines the scope of a case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates
a contemporary phenomenon (the ‘case’) in depth and within a real-world context, especially
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident” (p. 16). In
the case of linking PDD to peace, it could well be that the historical context of the conflict and
peace process or national-level political systems in these real-world cases are more influential
factors than individual participation in municipal policy decision making. As is demonstrated
by the multiple theories employed to untangle the possible mechanisms at work in PDD forums
used alongside peacebuilding operations, post-conflict recovery is an incredibly complex
phenomenon in modern international relations. This comparative case study explores the civil
wars and post-conflict peace processes pursued by the two nations at a macro-level to paint a
picture in broad strokes of how peacebuilding has proceeded in each country.
The selection of the case countries for this international comparative study stemmed
from four primary considerations. First, I selected case study countries that had formally ended
an internal conflict within the last 20-30 years. Peacebuilding investments, just like any largescale initiative designed to effect behavioral change, take a substantial amount of time to
solidify; thus, the case countries needed to be ‘post-conflict’ for at least two decades. Second,
each case country selected had instituted at least one PDD mechanism in the post-war period,
though the format and commitment to implementation was expected to vary. Third, the case
countries selected shared a similar cultural heritage to eliminate at least one of several
mediating factors that could contribute to or shift the observed effects of PDD on measures of
peace. I also prioritized my case country selection according to my regional experience. My
Spanish language fluency and experience working and living in Latin America give me
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increased access and an improved understanding of these contexts, which I would not have had
in other areas of the world. In the following paragraphs, I speak broadly about the cases of
Guatemala and El Salvador and how each aligns with the stated selection criteria.
Several Central American countries experienced politically motivated conflicts starting
in the 1960s-70s and concluding in the 1990s. Two prominent conflicts in the region were the
civil wars in Guatemala and El Salvador. In both countries, military dictatorships were met
with left-leaning opposition groups fueling thirty-six-year and twelve-year conflicts,
respectively, between the paramilitary organizations and the national armed forces. These
politically motivated civil wars each ended in accordance with regional or national peace
agreements and entered a process of peacebuilding. While neither country has fallen back into
full-scale conflict, and both are touted as exemplary cases of successful liberal peacebuilding,
each country continues to struggle with the recovery process politically, economically, and
socially in the aftermath of war. A primary challenge for both nations has been the
transformation of war-time violence into criminal activity which, though less intense,
contributes to widespread anxiety about personal safety (Hume, 2007, 2008; Janzen, 2008).
As Pearce (1998) states, “If we take poverty and violence as indicators of what have
been called ‘positive’ (i.e. a more equitable society, free from want) and ‘negative’ peace
(absence of violence), it is evident that while Central America has ceased to be ‘at war,’ it
remains anything but ‘peaceful’” (pp. 589-590). Indeed, on the 2016 Fragile States Index, the
two nations were listed at the “high warning” or “elevated warning” levels relative to the 178
countries evaluated by the Fund for Peace (2016), which combines twelve social, economic,
and political indicators of risk and vulnerability to collapse and conflict. Additionally, both
countries are listed as having low levels of ‘positive’ peace on the 2016 Positive Peace Index
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by the Institute for Economics and Peace based on eight factors that contribute to the presence
of “the attitudes, institutions, and structures that create and sustain peaceful societies” (Institute
for Economics and Peace, 2016, p. 4). As these facts and data suggest, these countries fit the
aforementioned definition of post-conflict nations provided by Junne & Verkoren (2005).
Peace has been achieved to the extent that no country has returned to war, but neither ‘negative’
nor ‘positive’ peace has been secured. Both liberal peace approaches and locally led PDD have
not been fully successful in achieving a sustainable conflict termination or structures to uphold
peace and prosperity long-term, though both countries have made substantial gains since the
end of their internal conflicts.
Each nation approaches peace under different circumstances and continues to build
peace today via alternative measures. With peace agreements signed across the region as the
Cold War thawed, Guatemala and El Salvador introduced decentralized governance and locallevel deliberative democracy mechanisms as their civil wars came to an end (International
City/County Management Association, 2004c). Specifically, these two nations implemented
forms of asociaciones de desarrollo comunal/comunitario or consejos de desarrollo
(community development associations or committees), cabildos abiertos (open Town Hall
meetings), as well as presupuestos participativos and/or planificación participativa
(participatory budgeting and/or planning), often with the support of international assistance
programs (International City/County Management Association, 2004c). Suitably for this study,
each of these PDD mechanisms were designed to elicit the participation of community
stakeholders in government decision making, they were widely applied, and they spanned all
rungs on the ladder of citizen control (Arnstein, 1969).
In Guatemala, PDD implementation was heavily driven by the peace accords and laws
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calling for citizen participation avenues to be established in the post-war era, but progress
toward realization of these goals was hampered when the initial laws were declared
unconstitutional (Bland, 2002; Muñoz & Velásquez, 2010). In the early 2000s, the proposed
citizen participation structure of Development Councils was finally passed into law
(International City/County Management Association, 2004b). A couple of academic studies
have been published on the success of these councils, which were occasioned directly by the
peace agreement and subsequent laws compelling their creation, citing little (if any) success in
terms of their functioning capacity alone (Goldfrank, 2007; Speer, 2011). I did not come across
any empirical research prior to embarking on this investigation connecting Guatemala’s PDD
mechanisms to peace-related effects.
In El Salvador, implementation of these processes was heavily supported by
international actors like the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
both before the war ended and after the peace agreement was signed. Various forms of PDD
saw significant adoption in government policy and practice over time (Bland, 2011, 2017;
International City/County Management Association, 2004a; RTI, 2005). Two academic studies
have been completed on El Salvador’s integration of PDD initiatives as it related to the peace
process, specifically presupuestos participativos, both of which were written by the project’s
former technical manager as a five- and ten-year follow-up on the sustainability of the program
post-intervention (Bland, 2011, 2017). While several nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
have also conducted their own evaluations of the PDD mechanisms they facilitated or
supported in El Salvador, I did not come across an evaluation linking PDD process outputs or
outcomes to impacts related to peace.
Each case country’s conflict history and national peace process differed greatly, and
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the way that each country embraced participatory deliberative democracy is widely divergent.
Each case, therefore, illuminates a different aspect of the conditions and contextual factors
necessary for the implementation of PDD in a post-conflict context. A more detailed
description of each nation’s experience with conflict, peace process, and PDD implementation
is provided in the full case studies presented in Chapters 4 and 5.
Even though an in-depth historical and administrative document review can suggest
broad-based differences and similarities between PDD in Guatemala and El Salvador, a case
study only at the macro-level and based solely on secondary sources does not provide enough
empirical evidence to answer my research questions. Peace agreements, laws, municipal codes,
and project reports may look great on paper, but they could fall short in implementation. There
was certainly evidence to suggest that, in both Guatemala and El Salvador, the national
governments required the adoption of participatory policies at the local level in law, if not
always in practice (International City/County Management Association, 2004, p. xi).
Additionally, those that previously collected empirical evidence or evaluation data about PDD
processes in these countries were not asking the same research questions. For these reasons,
additional empirical data needed to be collected and analyzed at the meso- and micro-level.
3f. Meso-level Qualitative Interviews and Observations
For each case country, I began my qualitative data collection by completing interviews
with municipal officials with the aim of understanding how PDD processes worked both in
and across communities alongside the stated aims and outcomes of PDD for local government
officials. These interviews were conducted with either the mayor, a designated Municipal
Council member, or the coordinator responsible for PDD processes or transparency initiatives
in each community. In several cases, I was invited to interview multiple officials within a
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municipality, resulting in a higher number of interviews than selected municipal sites. Across
all case countries and their selected municipalities, I completed a total of sixty-eight public
official interviews. Municipalities were selected using three criteria based on my integrated
mixed methodology and tied to theory: 1) inclusion in the AmericasBarometer dataset; 2) urban
vs rural composition; and 3) a post-war conflict party proxy including political party as well
as indigenous population in the case of Guatemala and just political party in the case of El
Salvador. If proper data was available about PDD implementation across all municipalities in
each country, I would have also selected municipalities to interview based on this criterion.
However, such a database of municipal PDD strategies did not exist in either country.
Regarding the first criterion, I began the selection process by identifying those
commonly surveyed during the AmericasBarometer survey cycles. There were two reasons for
this initial selection. First, it was beneficial for me to have access to both qualitative and
quantitative data for each municipality to cross-check my findings across levels of analysis and
methodologies. This helped to ensure that the qualitative analysis could truly inform and
integrate with the quantitative component. Second, even though approximately 60-80
AmericasBarometer municipalities are selected at random each survey round, there is a core
set of municipalities that appear frequently given their particularly representative nature as
determined by community characteristics included in the LAPOP sampling strategy. Thus,
selecting from this pool ensured that I had a more representative sub-set of municipalities for
interview. For this selection, I compiled a list of all municipalities surveyed starting in round
2004 through round 2016 in each country to identify the oft-surveyed communities. I was also
provided a provisional list of municipalities scheduled for participation in the
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AmericasBarometer survey in 2018 from LAPOP in the summer of 2018, which further
narrowed my focus and selection to municipalities surveyed in the 2008 and 2018 cycles.
Majority urban versus rural composition of the municipality was the second criterion
in my theoretical sampling strategy because the composition of the communities involved in
participation can either facilitate or detract from PDD effectiveness as shown in the literature.
For example, Conover, Searing, & Crewe (2002) test whether cultural biases and institutional
arrangements differ by community type in the US and the UK, including in their analysis
separate variables for urban, suburban, and rural communities. They find that community type
impacts the issues discussed in deliberation, private versus public setting choice, and the
amount of contested discussion, all at statistically significant levels. In the context of Central
America, rural communities tend to have much lower levels of development and education.
They also tend to be located further away from municipal offices. These factors were
considered possible limitations on participation as compared to urban dwellers. Therefore,
urban versus rural majority was the second selection criterion in my municipal site selection
matrix.
Conflict party was my third municipal selection criterion, but the approach was slightly
different in each country due to the history of conflict in the two case countries. Though both
Guatemala and El Salvador experienced internal political-ideological conflicts between leftand right-leaning parties, the conflict in Guatemala is now widely considered to have been as
much ethnically motivated as political (Eckhardt, 2005). As Eckhardt (2005) poignantly states,
“The state actually didn’t fight the insurgency – it fought the Mayan community” (p. 34). Thus,
in Guatemala, it was important for me to design my sample to account for both political
ideologies that could be traced back to the war-time era as perpetrators of violence and
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indigenous communities targeted as victims. I therefore ensured that both political parties (leftand right-leaning) and ethnic populations (ladino/mestizo and indigenous) were represented
equally in my selection of municipalities in Guatemala.
However, achieving this balance was more difficult in practice than in theory.
Guatemala’s post-conflict transition of war-era conflict parties into everyday politics and
society was quite different from El Salvador, where tracing back a politician’s ideological
views to the war era was no more complex than asking their party affiliation. Guatemalan
political parties were both numerous and notoriously short-lived during the period of my
research. From one election cycle to the next, more than half of the existing parties were
eliminated and a new set took their place. It was commonly said that political parties were
merely a vessel for the rich and powerful to become a candidate for political office. Thus, only
one party could be traced back directly to the war-era, and that was the Guatemalan National
Revolutionary Unity or Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) party, the
opposition to the military-led government during the war.
Whereas other parties have come and gone over the years, the URNG continued to exist
after 20 years post-war, albeit with limited numbers. Indeed, only three sitting mayors and just
13% of Municipal Council members were URNG party affiliates nation-wide as of the 2015
elections. Thus, while it was not possible to get a good-sized sample of municipalities led by
the URNG to represent the modern-day left-leaning municipalities, I developed a creative
solution. Digging a bit deeper into election records allowed me to see which municipalities ran
a URNG candidate in the 2015 election, and I found that 34% of municipalities still maintained
a URNG political presence. This was a large enough group to select from to ensure
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representation of the war-ear revolutionaries in my sample, and I was easily able to identify
parties representing the modern right-leaning equivalent of military and business elite.
While post-war party politics were weak and transitory, making that selection criterion
a true puzzle to discern, my matrix was further complicated by the need to somehow
incorporate a third conflict party: the indigenous population, the war-era victims. In the postwar era, Mayan populations held steadfast to their identity and rights as indigenous peoples, a
fundamental pillar of the peace accords negotiated in 1995 (Jonas, 2000). Additionally,
indigenous groups were specifically called out as the target beneficiaries of the primary PDD
mechanism in Guatemala as outlined in Congressional Decree 11-2002, which mandated the
creation of consejos de desarrollo or Community Development Councils “to constitute a
permanent instrument of participation and representation of the Mayan, Xinca, and Garífuna
peoples and of the non-indigenous population, as well as of the various sectors that constitute
the Guatemalan nation.” As such, percentage of indigenous population residing in each
municipality, greater than or less than 50%, was my selected conflict party proxy for this
population. I was unsure at first how I would be able to manage a matrix with this added
criterion, but it turned out, perhaps not surprisingly, that the municipalities falling into the leftleaning quadrant of my matrix aligned almost exactly with those in the majority indigenous
quadrant of the matrix. To ensure I had three municipalities in each quadrant–whether I used
political party or indigenous population as my third criteria–I simply over sampled where the
alignment was not exact.
In El Salvador, the left-leaning Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN)
guerillas transitioned into a well-established political party in opposition to the conservative
and neoliberal Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA). Also, unlike the case of Guatemala,

64

El Salvador is largely homogeneous in terms of ethnicity. Thus, political party was the sole
proxy for conflict party for post-conflict El Salvador. It is important to note, however, that leftleaning parties tended to be more receptive and supportive of PDD than right-leaning parties
in El Salvador, as was the case historically in Latin America. In Brazil, for example, the leftleaning Workers Party was the first to develop and implement participatory budgeting. In El
Salvador, therefore, I selected my sample from municipalities led by either left- or rightleaning mayors seeking to understand the perspectives of both conflict parties.
After making the first cut of possible municipalities to include in my samples in
Guatemala and El Salvador, I then applied the two additional selection criteria including urban
versus rural composition and political party proxies. These two criteria relate directly back to
theory and historical experiences with PDD in the region. My initial intention was to create a
two-by-two matrix as shown in Table 4 below; however, both Guatemala and El Salvador have
a high number of “mixed” municipalities, with a nearly 50/50 split between rural and urban
composition. As such, a third stratum had to be added to the selection matrix. In Guatemala,
majority urban municipalities with majority Mayan/left-leaning populations did not exist
within my dataset. Majority Mayan municipalities and left-leaning municipalities are all either
mixed or majority rural, but never majority urban. Thus, I selected only fifteen municipalities
to complete the matrix in Guatemala. In El Salvador, I set out to complete a higher number of
interviews because at least eighteen municipalities needed to be included in the revised sample.
Multiple back-up cases were identified and recruited for each interview slot in case the
first selected municipality declined participation. Only two municipalities, one in Guatemala
and one in El Salvador, declined participation due to scheduling challenges. However, due to
my extended time in the field and simultaneous recruitment strategy, I ended up interviewing

65

more municipalities than initially planned. In Guatemala, this was purposeful as I tried to
ensure I achieved a good mix of all three conflict party proxies along both ethnic and political
sway dimensions. In El Salvador, municipal elections in between my research stays and the
evolution of my site selection criteria over a period of three years resulted in an even higher
number of interviews as I needed to build relationships with new administrations to facilitate
later observations and participant interviews. In the end, these factors meant that I interviewed
thirty-one municipal officials across eighteen municipalities in Guatemala and thirty-seven
municipal officials across twenty-six municipalities in El Salvador. The final sampling matrix
for each country is shown in Tables 5 and 6 below.
Table 4: Initial Municipal Interview Sampling Strategy
Case Selection
Matrix
Left-leaning
Municipal Leadership
or Majority Mayan
Population
Right-leaning
Municipal Leadership
or Minority Mayan
Population

Majority Urban
Municipalities

Majority Rural
Municipalities

x3 sites

x3 sites

x3 sites

x3 sites

Table 5: Guatemala Municipal Interview Sample Matrix
Case
Selection
Matrix
Majority
Mayan
Population
Minority
Mayan
Population

Majority Urban
Municipalities

Mixed Urban/Rural
Municipalities

Majority Rural
Municipalities

Not available

x3 sites

x4 sites

x4 sites

x4 sites

x3 sites
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Table 6: El Salvador Municipal Interview Sample Matrix
Case
Selection
Matrix

Majority Urban
Municipalities

Mixed Urban/Rural
Municipalities

Majority Rural
Municipalities

Left-leaning
Municipal
Leadership

x3 sites

x3 sites

x5 sites

Right-leaning
Municipal
Leadership

x6 sites

x4 sites

x5 sites

Recruitment took place in three waves, and the strategy employed was highly effective
in both case countries. Although I had few prior contacts established in each country when I
first arrived, I completed the majority of the municipal level interviews over the course of two
short trips to Central America, one in the summer of 2017 and the second in the fall of 2018.
First, I mailed a formal letter of request for an interview approximately 1-2 months in advance
of my arrival. Second, I followed-up with a round of emails and phone calls to confirm interest
in participation and interview details. Third, I directly visited those municipalities that did not
respond to either former communication to deliver a formal interview request. Having formerly
served as a Peace Corps Volunteer and exchange student in Latin America with several years
of experience living in the region, I suspected that the third recruitment strategy would be the
most effective. Indeed, nearly 75% of my interviews were secured upon dropping off a formal
interview request.
Development of the semi-structured interview protocol followed three phases. First, I
participated in PDD programs in Cambridge, Massachusetts including the local participatory
budgeting cycle to understand how these programs work in a North American context. Second,
I conducted informal conversations with key informants from Mexico and USAID contractors
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in Central America to get an initial understanding of how Latin American programs were
designed, implemented, and evolving. Third and finally, I completed cognitive interviews with
the key informants with the final set of questions to ensure they could be answered and
understood by municipal officials. Interview questions focused on the role of the interviewed
official with regards to citizen participation efforts, the implementation of PDD mechanisms,
and the impacts of deliberation and participation on the community. Some interviews lasted
for twenty minutes, while others took over one and a half hours. The average interview length
for municipal officials was approximately forty-five minutes. The interview protocol is
included in Appendix I. Given that the interviews did not involve the collection of personally
identifiable information on human subjects, an expedited review of the Institutional Review
Board (IRB) was completed and approved.
All interviews were transcribed during my time in the field, with the assistance of a
transcription service as funding allowed. Interview recordings and transcripts were stripped of
any personally identifiable information to ensure confidentiality of the informants. Coding and
analysis also took place throughout the fieldwork period. Coding was facilitated through
MAXQDA, a software for qualitative research analysis, and proceeded from low-inference to
higher-inference meaning reconstruction to develop cross-cutting themes (Carspecken, 1996,
pp. 97-102). Abductive analysis was used to link identified themes back to literature in an
iterative process of developing speculative theoretical hunches from unexpected findings and
then checking for variation across the data (Tavory & Timmermans, 2014). In practice, this
involved bucketing quotes as examples or counter examples of the information shared during
interviews to delve into the nuances of cases in which PDD had been successful toward
building peace and where it had not.
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While qualitative and quantitative methods each have their weaknesses, qualitative
researchers have developed some checks and balances from within the subset of qualitative
approaches to strengthen results. For example, interviews are often used in tandem with
observations as complementary qualitative data collection techniques. Participant observation
is thought to be a better technique for eliminating the added subjective filter of the interviewee;
however, interviewing is better for recounting past experiences and gaining access to the
subjective realities of participants (Jerolmack & Khan, 2014; Lamont & Swidler, 2014). While
I did not have sufficient time in the field or resources to complete observations of every PDD
mechanism in each of the municipalities selected for interviews, especially given that some
PDD processes take place on annual or multi-year cycles, I sought out at least one opportunity
for observation per sample matrix quadrant as a validity check on my municipal interview
findings. In total, I conducted sixteen observations across seven municipalities in El Salvador
and seventeen observations across seven municipalities in Guatemala. I also observed several
PDD projects in execution.
Observations helped me to understand the quality of discourse and contact in these
spaces, PDD program design and its influence on participation, and institutional capacity to
facilitate these processes overall. Observations nearly always followed municipal interview
data collection, as only through these contacts was I able to gain entrée to these spaces.
Although PDD is by its nature open to the public, thus allowing me to enter the space with
little logistical difficulty outside of travel to the site, my status as an obvious outsider precluded
my ability to observe without disrupting the space. In terms of ethical research practice,
personal safety, and entrée, it was necessary for me to attend PDD meetings with the support
and approval of the municipal government. As a result, I was often introduced to participants

69

for the first time by a municipal official, although I made a conscientious effort to emphasize
in my own introduction and follow-up narrative that I came to the space as an independent
researcher.
Observations I completed were guided with the use of a fieldnote-taking tool I
developed in the fall of 2017 while conducting participant observations of four types of PDD
processes in New England. The notetaking instrument I developed was largely from a guide to
writing fieldnotes by Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw (1995). The four practice observations I
completed were in open and official Town Hall meetings, participatory planning, and
participatory budgeting processes. Observations in Central America were completed over the
course of seven months, divided into three months in Guatemala and four months in El
Salvador. Throughout this period, I kept detailed observation notes and typed up postobservation memos with the aim of describing interactions, participant dynamics, and my
initial interpretations. As with the municipal interview data, I coded and analyzed observation
memos using Abductive Analysis.
Additionally, I adapted the Discourse Quality Index (DQI) from the literature on
deliberative democracy to see if the tool could help me link what I was seeing back to a central
theory in my field. The DQI was developed by Steenbergen et al. (2003) as a quantitative
measure of discourse based on Habermas’ discourse ethics and ideal principles of successful
deliberation. The authors used it to measure the quality of deliberation in videotaped UK
parliamentary debates, and I adapted it for use in live observation. The tool is like a scorecard
with seven categories including participation, level of justification, content of justification,
respect between groups, respect for the demands of others, respect for counterarguments, and
constructive politics. Under each category, a deliberation is given a higher number of points

70

the closer the exchange gets to Habermas’ ideal. Designers of the DQI (Steenbergen et al.,
2003) do not propose one single way that the DQI should be calculated. In their demonstrative
use case, two coders tagged each speech act in the debate with a score in each of the seven
categories. They then averaged the scores and suggested that an index could be created by
adding up the average scores by category or creating factor scores to form a scale.
There were several challenges to applying these exact same procedures in my own use
case. First, I did not have a second coder. Second, I could not reasonably videotape or record
each PDD interaction as I did not want to disrupt the natural proceedings within the space,
which is difficult to avoid as an obvious foreigner. Third, though I took detailed notes, it was
not reasonable to assumption that I caught every word or exchange during my observations to
code by individual speech act afterward. Thus, I opted for a simpler method of tagging and
quantifying discourse quality in my field observations. After each observation, I wrote up
detailed fieldnotes, and tagged the speech acts reaching the highest score in each of the DQI
categories, if any. I then added up the high scores across all categories to calculate my adapted
DQI. The range of this adapted DQI was 0-13.
I also used the DQI as a model to create my own Contact Quality Index (CQI) and
observation tool to gauge the quality of intergroup contact based on Allport’s (1954) conditions
for success. The tool was designed to mirror the DQI scorecard with four categories in
alignment with Allport’s conditions and Hewstone & Brown’s (1986) extension on those
conditions indicating that social identities as in-group or out-group members should be
capitalized on in contact situations so that interpersonal interactions are then generalized to
intergroup relations. The four categories included on the final scorecard included equal status,
represented by treatment toward majority and minority group representatives; institutional
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support for the contact as demonstrated by the role of government officials in facilitating
contact; cooperation towards common goals through appeals to mutual interests; and group
salience shown by clear identification of participants as group representatives in the
interaction. Under each category, speech acts I observed were allotted a higher number of
points the closer they approached Allport’s ideal intergroup contact conditions. Just as with
the DQI, I tagged the speech acts reaching the highest score in each of the CQI categories, if
any. I then added up the high scores across all categories to calculate my adapted CQI. The
range of this adapted CQI was 0-8.
A copy of my fieldnote-taking tool, including my scorecards for the DQI and CQI is
included in Appendix II. This pre-tested set of tools was useful for helping me to link my
observation data back to theory as I wrote up formal memos. The DQI and CQI were also
helpful as I looked for trends across PDD mechanisms used by multiple municipalities in each
country. In the chapters to follow, I share the average DQI and CQI score for several types of
PDD mechanisms by case country to capture and quantify the difference in discourse and
contact quality I observed depending on the type of PDD forum observed.
Having developed a relationship with both the municipality and community through
the local official interviews and observations, I was then able to set up interviews with
individual participants to better understand lived experiences, perspectives, and perceived
impacts of PDD. Typically, an observation was followed by semi-structured, in-person
interviews of between 3-10 PDD participants. I used a purposive sampling strategy to select
participants to the extent that it was possible, and a snowball sampling strategy where it was
not possible. My aim was to speak with at least one citizen leader or facilitator of the PDD
process observed and two participants representing different demographic qualities (such as
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gender or age) and conflict party (represented by political party or ethnicity depending on the
country). Though my relationships with officials and community members certainly took on a
full spectrum of interactions, I developed a rapport sufficient to be invited into additional PDD
forums not explicitly coordinated by the municipality, neighborhood and community events
like soccer club games or Mother’s Day festivals, and individual PDD participant homes. In
many cases, interviewees would invite me to join them for lunch or dinner, introduce me to
their family and community members, or provide tours of their communities as we talked about
their PDD projects and experiences.
Recruitment was conducted within the PDD space itself either just after or just before
the observation, depending on the preference of the municipal officials or leadership of the
process. Each person was asked to ‘sign-up’ if they were willing to be contacted for an
interview. The sign-up slips had columns for name, phone number, address, age, gender, and
languages spoken for Guatemala, as a proxy for ethnicity, or party identification for El
Salvador. After my observations, I reached out to the recruited individuals directly via phone
to coordinate either in-person or phone interviews. If this procedure was not possible due to
meeting size or logistics, I coordinated contact via the municipality. In these cases, I asked to
speak with individuals in leadership roles and that would ideally represent different ethnic or
political perspectives. I then had them complete the sign-up slip during the interview itself to
ensure I had been introduced to a diversity of participants. In cases in which I had a higher
level of interest in interview participation, I reached out to all those that had expressed interest.
It was quite common to receive interest in participation, but to not receive a response to the
formal invitation to interview. In four cases, participants declined the interview invitation once
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they were provided with the informed consent. In total, I interviewed 58 participants in
Guatemala and 36 participants in El Salvador.
In Guatemala, my interviewees were 58% male and 42% female, the vast majority of
which were adults (79%) with a few youth (9%) and elderly (12%) participants. Those
reporting participation in PDD processes during the 2018/19 AmericasBarometer survey cycle
were 58% male and 42% female with an average age of 39 years, so my interview sample
aligns well along these demographics with the nationally representative sample of the same
period. In line with my overarching municipal sampling strategy, 50% lived in rural areas, 2%
in “mixed or suburban” areas, and 48% in urban centers. This distribution intentionally does
not align with the nationally representative sample of PDD participants from the
AmericasBarometer, as 61% of PDD participants nationally live in rural areas while 39% live
in urban areas. The ethnic background of participant interviewees, which I opted to ask rather
than political party given my sampling strategy for this country, was 55% ladino/mestizo or a
white/indigenous mix and 45% indigenous. Within the nationally representative
AmericasBarometer sample, 47% of PDD participants identified as ladino/mestizo and 53% as
indigenous. Thus, though slightly over-weighted toward ladino/mestizo respondents, my
participant interviewee sample was within 8 percentage points of the nationally representative
sample.
In El Salvador, I interviewed 54% female, 41% male, and 5% other gender identity
participants, of which again the majority were adults (64%) with more youth (33%) than
elderly (3%) individuals. Those reporting participation in PDD processes during the 2018
AmericasBarometer survey cycle were 53% female and 47% male (no “other” designation was
recorded in this dataset), with an average age of 42 years. Thus, my sample interview aligns
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well along these demographics with the nationally representative sample of the same period.
In alignment with the sampling strategy employed, 49% lived in rural areas, 5% in mixed or
suburban areas, and 46% in urban zones. My participant interview sample is quite like the
nationally representative AmericasBarometer sample of PDD participants in this case, which
shows that 46% live in rural areas and 53% live in urban zones. Given the political tension in
the country, not all participants were willing to provide their political party affiliation (28%).
Of those that did report their party, 31% affiliated with FMLN, 13% with ARENA, 10% with
Nuevas Ideas or the Gran Alianza por la Unidad National (GANA) the party(ies) of the newly
elected president, and 18% specifically noted no affiliation or a-political. Within the nationally
representative AmericasBarometer sample, 7% of PDD participants affiliated with FMLN,
11% with ARENA, 14% with Nuevas Ideas or GANA, and 63% either did not respond or
replied “not applicable” when questioned. In this case, there is a clear oversampling of
individuals in my sample affiliated with FMLN.
Given that I needed to rely on my municipal contacts to gain access to PDD processes
for observation and PDD participants themselves, there was bias introduced into my overall
sample of participants. While I feel quite confident that I achieved a balance of voices amongst
PDD participants in Guatemala, my sample of participants in El Salvador is clearly weighted
toward the FMLN perspective. This was not an intentional over-sampling on my part; indeed,
I interviewed an equal number of PDD participants in ARENA-led and FMLN-led
municipalities. This skew instead represents a challenge I faced in the field in gaining access
to ARENA PDD participants. There are two reasons, I hypothesize, that I encountered this
dynamic.
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First, I had to make a concerted effort to find ARENA participants in communities led
by an FMLN administration. In one municipality, for example, I had to make explicit contact
with an ARENA Municipal Council member serving under an FMLN mayor so that I could
speak to ARENA PDD participants. I should note, my municipal contact hired by the mayor
helped me to make this connection when I noted the emerging sample skewness. This could
be because PDD spaces were set up just prior to the end of the civil war specifically in response
to calls for increased spaces for political participation by the FMLN. Second, individuals living
in municipalities run by ARENA administrations often declined to identify with a particular
party. In two of the three ARENA-led municipalities that I observed for an extended period,
the mayor had only recently taken office, which may have been a contributing factor because
newer administrations have less time to influence local PDD leadership and participation than
long-term incumbents.
I do not believe that I encountered this skewed distribution in my participant interview
sample due to modern conflict dynamics specifically, however. Although the national
government was led by ARENA party members and the military during the war, local
government officials are not often associated with or considered culpable for past violence
now, over two decades after the war. I did not encounter a single mayor or official that had
held their office or position since the war-era. However, some modern public officials are wellknown decedents from elite families that were key actors in the war or peace process.
Regardless of the specific reasons for the skew toward FMLN participants in the PDD
processes I was able to access and observe in El Salvador, the fact that my interview sample
includes more FMLN participants than in the PDD participants found in the nationally
representative AmericasBarometer sample has one key implication for my conclusions. As
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further detailed in the El Salvador chapter below, the PDD process in this country was
established with the aim of opening political spaces for FMLN participation during the final
years of the civil war. Thus, PDD participants that I interviewed identifying with the FMLN
political party may well be more enthusiastic than others about these processes than those I
was not able to access. As I discuss my findings in this case, readers should note that I attempt
to balance the narrative by sharing quotes from both party members about PDD impacts even
though I interviewed more FMLN representatives than I did ARENA representatives. I also
make note of times when I was challenged to find ARENA PDD participants.
Development of the semi-structured interview protocol for PDD participants followed
two stages to ensure a core consistency of information collected across cases and alteration for
case-specific variation. The first stage of the participant protocol development was completed
in the fall of 2017. In this phase, I created and tested an initial interview protocol with two
individuals that had participated in two forms of PDD, one Spanish-speaking participant in a
participatory budgeting program in Mexico and one English-speaking participant in an open
Town Hall meeting in New England. After both interviews, I took feedback and
recommendations on other questions to add and areas of hesitation or confusion for the
interviewees. All recommendations were incorporated in the final interview protocol as seen
in Appendix I. The second stage of protocol development involved updating the terminology
for each case. As municipal interviews had been conducted prior to participant interviews, the
municipal officials acted as a type of ‘key informant’ about how PDD processes worked and
relevant terminology used in each country. Once municipal interviews had been conducted, I
updated the protocol terminology to fit the local context. In practice, the interviews were semistructured and included approximately 30 questions about the participants’ experience with the
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PDD mechanism observed, participation in other PDD processes as relevant, personal and
community impacts of these processes, and overall perceptions of PDD. Interviews lasted from
fifteen minutes to two hours, the average interview lasting approximately thirty-five minutes.
Participant interviews were completed during the same period as process observations,
over the course of seven months divided into three months in Guatemala and four months in
El Salvador. Throughout this period, I kept a series of voice memos on each set of interviews
with the aim of describing interview context and dynamics as well as noting my initial
perceptions of how their stories either supported, refuted, or added additional nuance to
municipal interviews and observations.
Limitations of this portion of the study included access and sample bias. The municipal
officials interviewed in both countries were all open to future follow-up, observations, and
participant interviews. The only request from two municipalities was that I avoid visiting
during the height of election season. This was an unexpectedly warm reception. However,
when it came time to observe and conduct interviews with participants, some municipal
officials were less enthusiastic about facilitating my entrée to the field. Although I was able to
overcome this barrier with persistence in many cases, I sometimes had to swap out one preplanned observation site for an alternative observation site to achieve my aims.
There were two other issues with access: site location and safety. Especially when
arranging observations of rural locations, site location was a major challenge. In one
particularly notable case, the only rural community engaged in a PDD pilot program I could
observe was located high in the mountains off a very steep, mixed dirt-and-cobblestone road.
Though I arranged to have a 4x4 truck for most of the time spent in the field, I fully lacked the
necessary driving experience to access this site. While my municipal contacts in this case, and
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others like it, were quite happy to bring me along to the PDD event in a municipal vehicle with
an experienced driver, I was then reliant upon their time and availability to stay in the field
long enough for me to conduct interviews. To complicate matters further, individuals in these
sites often did not have internet, email access, or smart phones to enable me coordinate and
conduct virtual interviews in alignment with my IRB protocols. A related access issue, both in
cities and in rural areas, revolved around high crime and gang violence. To access some areas,
I simply could not go alone without risking my own personal safety. One PDD observation site
was located right in the middle of three rival gangs’ territories. Crossing through one territory
get to the other, with US license plates, was not recommended. Thus, due to site location and
security issues, the number of interviews I could complete following some observations was
limited by the time my contacts or their colleagues could dedicate to staying out in the field.
Indeed, as discussed in greater detail in the case studies to follow, municipal officials
often exerted more control than I had hoped over which processes were observed and the
individuals with whom I spoke. While local governments were inherently interested in the
topic of PDD, they were not an unbiased partner. The views and perspectives of municipal
officials were politicized and, especially when cross-referenced with participant interviews,
frequently involved self-aggrandizement. It is certainly possible that PDD processes were
manipulated to appear in ways untrue to the real processes prior to my arrival. Indeed, in some
cases, I am sure that my access was facilitated to some spaces versus others specifically to cast
the municipality in a better light. However, these cases were easy to identify through
participant interviews, and often highlighted the more challenging aspects of the PDD
implementation in the two post-conflict settings. I consciously sought out access to a diversity
of observation spaces with a mix of individuals from across the political and demographic
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spectrums. Though this dynamic certainly introduced bias into my sample in each
municipality, the fact that I was guided to participant interviews through the municipal
selection matrix and its balance of key characteristics meant that biases across municipalities,
or case study wide, were less pronounced. As a result of this effort and the multiple validity
checks built into this meso-level qualitative portion of my study, I am confident in saying that
I completed my period of fieldwork with a full, if not always balanced, account of PDD
processes, experiences, and perceptions of impact in both case study countries.

3g. Micro-level Quantitative Analysis of Secondary Survey Data
The final micro-level component of this dissertation sought to quantitatively analyze
the association between PDD participation at the individual level and peacebuilding outcomes
measured by the political, economic, and social factors contributing to ‘negative’ and ‘positive’
peace. The data I used in my analysis came from the AmericasBarometer, a secondary dataset
collected by the Latin American Public Opinion Project at Vanderbilt University. The LAPOP
AmericasBarometer survey has been conducted biannually across Latin American countries
from 2004/05 - 2018/19 with a core set of questions and revolving country-specific inquiries.
Survey questioning takes place in 3-to-4-month intervals in all Central American nations each
survey cycle. The full round of surveys across all the Americas tends to take closer to two
years versus one year to complete, using teams of local survey enumerators. The unit of
observation for the survey is one respondent per household. The average annual sample size
for each of the case study nations is ~1,500 individuals.
Although representative only at the national and departmental or regional levels from
2004-2010, the survey cycles conducted since 2012 employed a sampling design that reflects
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population fluctuation and standardizes the sample size collected from each municipality.
Specifically, data collected after 2012 is based on a multi-stage cluster sampling design that
takes into consideration municipality size, urban/rural areas, and region (LAPOP, 2014, p. 2).
The survey sample in both El Salvador and Guatemala is self-weighted each year given the
sampling strategy employed. Technical information from earlier years provides further
information on pretesting and question validity, available publicly at the Latin American Public
Opinion Project website. Survey questions are asked face-to-face in Spanish and some
indigenous languages depending on those most commonly used by country.
The survey cycles I used for the quantitative portion of this study were conducted in
2008/09 and 2018/19. Using the AmericasBarometer survey to compare data collected 10 years
apart allowed me to test associations between PDD and peace over a finite period when both
countries were engaged in post-conflict peacebuilding. In 2008, for the first time, individuals
in Central America were asked about their participation in comités o juntas de mejoras para la
comunidad (a proxy for community associations), cabildos abiertos (open Town Hall
discussions), and the elaboración del presupuesto (a proxy for participatory budgeting and
participatory planning initiatives) at the local level. Each of these questions were thus used
individually as independent variables for various forms of participatory deliberative
democracy and then combined into a single 0/1 indicator of participation in any form of PDD.
While most of these questions were asked in a similar format in more recent cycles, I worked
with LAPOP to re-introduce the survey question related to participation in municipal budget
elaboration again on the 2018/19 cycle of the AmericasBarometer survey for a complete tenyear comparison. I started analysis on the 2008/09 survey data as of spring 2017. Cleaned
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datasets from the 2018/19 survey cycle for each country were released in fall of 2019, at which
point I was able to begin my multi-year analysis.
With the aim of identifying the associations between PDD and peace, indicators of
multiple dimensions of peace (Galtung, 1969) were selected from within the 2008/09 and
2018/19 AmericasBarometer survey. The table in Appendix III provides each question,
translated by the author, and operationalization of the key dependent variables. For the
identified key levers or dimensions of peace from the conceptual framework, one’s confidence
in local government, perception of the economy, and neighbor trustworthiness were used as
indicators. ‘Positive’ peace was measured by satisfaction with the democratic system, and
‘negative’ peace was measured via one’s experience with violent crime and perception of
violence in one’s neighborhood. I also created an additive ‘peace perception index,’ both a
count and percentage version, which sums up the subjective indicators of ‘positive’ and
‘negative’ peace alongside political, economic, and social dimension indicators. All indicators
in the index were scaled to a 4-point scale (range 0-3) so that each had equal weight in the final
index. The equation I used to create the additive ‘peace perception index’ is shown below:

𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑒_𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
= 𝑀𝑢𝑛𝑖_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛_𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡
+ 𝑆𝑎𝑡_𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 + 𝑉𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒_𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛/15

As my focus was on the individual-level impacts of PDD on peacebuilding, the key
variable transformation I made beyond cleaning the dataset for analysis was to create three
types of independent variables for PDD participation. First, I created a dummy variable (0=no
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participation, 1=participation) for each type of PDD separately. Second, given that there are
three distinct types of PDD participation represented in the dataset, I created a new variable
representing participation in any of the three forms of PDD as a simple dummy variable (0=no
participation, 1=participation). Third, I generated an additive discrete variable for participation
in all three forms of PDD participation. The equation I used to create the additive, discrete
PDD variable is shown below:

𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡 = 𝑇𝑜𝑤𝑛_𝐻𝑎𝑙𝑙 + 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚_𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐 + 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡_𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡

Respondents’ calculated PDD participation variable ranged from 0=no participation, to
3=participation in all three forms of PDD included in my analysis. Using this variable
construction, I was able to test for the extent to which participation in multiple forms of PDD
influenced the hypothesized outcomes versus those reporting only one form of PDD
participation.
Beyond the measures specifically operationalized and linked back to the theoretical
outcomes of PDD on peace for this study, each cycle of the survey included data on key
community characteristics and individual demographics used as control variables in my
statistical models. Community characteristics included in my models were urban versus rural
setting, running water, and internet usage as a proxy for development level. Individual
demographics included in my models were age, education level, gender, race, religion, and
news/media consumption. I also included three types of theoretical control variables for each
of my proposed outcome measures along political, economic, and social dimensions: political
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party, monthly income, and participation in other types of community groups such as parent’s
groups, women’s groups, or religious organizations.
My analysis began with a set of descriptive statistics of the key dependent, independent,
and control variables to be included in the regression model. Quantitative interval (and ordinal)
variables were described by reporting the mean data points within the sample. Boxplots and
histograms were employed in Stata to visually inspect each variable for outlier cases, skewness,
and tendency to fall along a normal distribution. Qualitative categorical variables were
described with the use of frequency distributions shown as both the number of cases in the
sample and by percentage. Outliers were not removed. Appendix IV includes a full set of
descriptive statistics for each variable included in my statistical models.
Following on from the descriptive analysis, I proceeded with two types of inferential
statistics to gauge the impact of PDD on my selected peace-related indicators. Given that PDD
participation was operationalized as a 0/1 categorical variable or a 0-3 discrete variable, I
started by running an analysis of variance (ANOVA) model to analyze the difference of group
means between individuals reporting participation in one or more PDD programs and nonparticipants. Completing these tests for each combination of dependent variables and
independent variables provided initial insights into the relationships that might result in
statistically significant associations in the final regression model. I then built five sets of six
statistical models that included one of the five measures of individual participation in PDD as
my independent variable and the aforementioned indicators of political, economic, social,
‘negative,’ and ‘positive’ peace as dependent variables. Ordinal multiple regression, or logit
(*) for the sole binary dependent variable, was utilized for each set of models. Inserting each
of the six dependent variables into the same model in turn, I determined the association
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between each dependent variable and PDD participation, if any. Each model equation by
dependent variable is depicted below:
𝑀𝑢𝑛𝑖_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒I
= 𝛽K + 𝛽L 𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡L + 𝛽M 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠M
+ 𝛽O 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠O + 𝛽P 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑡_𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦P + 𝛽Q 𝐴𝑣𝑔_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒Q
+ 𝛽S 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠S + 𝜀
𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛_𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔I
= 𝛽K + 𝛽L 𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡L + 𝛽M 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠M
+ 𝛽O 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠O + 𝛽P 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑡_𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦P + 𝛽Q 𝐴𝑣𝑔_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒Q
+ 𝛽S 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠S + 𝜀
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡I
= 𝛽K + 𝛽L 𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡L + 𝛽M 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠M
+ 𝛽O 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠O + 𝛽P 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑡_𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦P + 𝛽Q 𝐴𝑣𝑔_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒Q
+ 𝛽S 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠S + 𝜀
𝑆𝑎𝑡_𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦I
= 𝛽K + 𝛽L 𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡L + 𝛽M 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠M
+ 𝛽O 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠O + 𝛽P 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑡_𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦P + 𝛽Q 𝐴𝑣𝑔_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒Q
+ 𝛽S 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠S + 𝜀
∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝_𝑉𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒I
= 𝛽K + 𝛽L 𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡L + 𝛽M 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠M
+ 𝛽O 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠O + 𝛽P 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑡_𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦P + 𝛽Q 𝐴𝑣𝑔_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒Q
+ 𝛽S 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠S + 𝜀
𝑉𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒_𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛I
= 𝛽K + 𝛽L 𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡L + 𝛽M 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠M
+ 𝛽O 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠O + 𝛽P 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑡_𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦P + 𝛽Q 𝐴𝑣𝑔_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒Q
+ 𝛽S 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠S + 𝜀
𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑒_𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 I
= 𝛽K + 𝛽L 𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡L + 𝛽M 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠M
+ 𝛽O 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠O + 𝛽P 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑡_𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦P + 𝛽Q 𝐴𝑣𝑔_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒Q
+ 𝛽S 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠S + 𝜀
These models estimated the impact of PDD participation on the selected measures of
‘negative’ and ‘positive’ peace as well as the three identified political, social, and economic
key levers underlying peace for each case country. To interpret my results, I reported
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coefficients for ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models and odds ratios for logit
models. To test my hypotheses, I looked for statistically significant associations between the
variable for PDD participation and the variables measuring social, political, economic,
‘negative,’ and ‘positive’ peace outcomes. When using the 0/1 categorical variable for PDD
program participation, I expected to see that participation in any form of PDD would show
positive associations with the dependent variables. Upon inserting the discrete additive
variable for PDD program participation, I anticipated that participants in more forms of PDD
would demonstrate stronger associations with my outcome indicators. Based on theory,
associations would be stronger for political and social cohesion variables and weaker for
violence and economic variables. Appendix IV includes a table with the anticipated sign of
each independent and control variable in the models. The result of these tests provided
evidence to either reject or accept the hypotheses outlined above.
There were two primary limitations related to my quantitative analysis. First, as with
any proposed quantitative methodology, there was a possibility of multicollinearity or
confounding variables, a threat to internal validity (Yin, 2014). To manage this limitation, I
used standard tests such as bivariate correlations in early analyses and various tests of model
fit for my regressions. I also added several contextual variables related to community
characteristics as well as individual demographics in my regression models to help identify
and control for potential sources of multicollinearity. This is why I specifically identified and
included three theoretical controls—political-ideological sway, household monthly income,
and participation in other types of community groups—which are hypothetically just as likely
as PDD to impact each of the variables for the political, economic, and social dimensions of
peace included in the models. Each theoretical control is further elaborated and justified below.

86

While PDD participation can potentially increase trust in local government, political
party affiliation that either aligns with or goes against the mayor may influence the
effectiveness of PDD if participation in these spaces is either intentionally limited or curtailed
due to a self-selection bias related to affiliation. Similarly, PDD participation can theoretically
influence horizontal inequality, but it is possible that one’s income has a greater influence on
perception of economic well-being more so than PDD. Finally, it is likely that individuals
involved in PDD are also more socially engaged in general. Thus, participation in other types
of groups may influence neighbor trust more than PDD. Even though the inclusion of these
three theoretical control variables improves the stability of my models and lends support to my
findings, there are still other macro-level factors I cannot control for completely in my model.
As such, merely an association between economic, political, social, ‘negative,’ and ‘positive’
peace indicators and PDD participation can be suggested.
Second, each of the variables selected for operationalization are not perfect measures
of the multiple dimensions of peace. As with any study conducted using secondary data,
creativity was employed to select the variables that most closely aligned with the proposed
theoretical constructs. For example, Allport’s theory of intergroup contact is largely supported
by evidence using psychological laboratory experiments and quasi-experiments in the field
with interviews and surveys that directly ask participants in contact scenarios about their views
of a defined ‘other’ (white Americans rating their feelings toward black Americans, Israeli
students asked about Palestinian students, etc.) rather than their trust of ‘others’ generically
(Pettigrew, 1998). Additionally, researchers that study trust (e.g. Lewicki & Tomlinson, 2014)
have identified a difference in calculus-based trust, granted when the ‘other’ faces
consequences for breaking with agreed upon expectations, versus identity-based trust, in which
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one grants trust due to affinity with the ‘other’ over time. It could be that municipal trust is
interpreted on a calculus-based spectrum whereas trust of ‘others’ in general is interpreted on
an identity-based spectrum in the minds of respondents. In short, given that the
AmericasBarometer is a secondary dataset, the measures are not as precise as they could be in
an original survey. A survey tool modeled after those used by subject-matter experts exploring
these theories directly may produce more consistent and comparable results with former
studies, though such an endeavor is outside the scope of this dissertation.

3h. Conclusion
In this chapter, I stated my main research question and two related sub-questions which
lend themselves to different research methodologies. I proposed several hypotheses about the
possible links between PDD and peace and suggested a set of propositions about the factors
that may influence the outcomes. I then described my research design, which combines an
international comparative case study and mixed methods to explore the macro-level context of
PDD implementation, meso-level structure and impacts of PDD from the view of
municipalities and their constituents, and micro-level impacts for individual participants. I
employed this multi-layered and mixed methods design to strengthen my analysis of this
complex issue and to mitigate challenges and weaknesses at any singular level. Ultimately, I
used each level of analysis as a validity check or control for the other levels. In the following
two chapters, I discuss my findings in Guatemala and El Salvador.
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CHAPTER 4
GUATEMALA: PARTICIPATORY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
FROM THE TOP-DOWN

Los consejos comunitarios tienen que existir, no hay vuelta de hoja.
Community Development Councils must exist, we cannot turn back the page.

Antes, mucha gente no conocía ni la municipalidad, hay mucha gente que era muy tímida. La
daba miedo para hablar. Mucha gente que venían, se quedaban paraditos en la puerta, eran
muy tímidos para entrar ¿Verdad? Ahora, cuándo vienen, directo para adentro.
Before, most people did not even know the municipality, many people were scared. They
were scared to speak up. Many people would come, standing in the doorway, but they were
scared to enter, right? Now, when they come, they come right inside.
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In Guatemala, participatory deliberative democracy was implemented from the topdown as a component of the peace accords following the country’s thirty-six-year civil war.
While the implementation of new PDD mechanisms, which sometimes clashed with traditional
leadership structures in local communities, was slow and at first did not show strong effects, it
has gradually come to play an integral role in sustaining and advancing peace. Impacts of PDD
participation were limited, and even troubling, in 2008 when new mechanisms for citizen
participation were still being introduced across the country’s municipalities. By 2018, the
positive effects of PDD on peace have emerged.
Modern day PDD in Guatemala has a positive influence on political and social domains
associated with peacebuilding, contributing to a boost in overall perceptions of peace. PDD
participants demonstrate higher levels of trust in the municipal government than those that do
not participate, fueled by improved communication, transparency, accountability, and citizen
empowerment engendered in these forums. Though there is certainly a long way to go to
improve quality of life in Guatemala, PDD is reportedly helping to improve services, bolster
investment in local labor markets, and hasten the pace at which development projects are
achieved. Socially, participants build trust and cohesion through cross-community
relationships, and they increase their individual social capital in PDD forums. While
participants themselves were exposed to increased vulnerability to crime when PDD was first
introduced, my interviewees indicated that the benefits outweighed the costs. In 2018, there
was no greater risk of falling victim to crime for PDD participants versus non-participants. The
ambitious deliberative project in post-conflict Guatemala provides a persuasive case for an
intentionally hybrid approach, one that combines top-down statebuilding efforts and with
participatory deliberation from below.
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In the sections to follow, I outline the macro-, meso-, and micro-level implementation
of PDD in Guatemala and its impacts on various dimensions of peace in this post-conflict
context. In section 4a, I discuss how PDD was propelled forward as key component of the
peace accords that brought Guatemala’s civil war to an end. I then outline, in section 4b, how
PDD implementation was experienced as a clash of old and new participatory systems with
gradually building acceptance by municipalities and participants on the ground. Next, I discuss
the various forms of PDD that are used in present-day Guatemala in section 4c, focusing on
the prominence of the mechanisms occasioned in the peace agreement. Section 4d provides an
in-depth look at the impacts of PDD using both quantitative and qualitative data analysis at the
individual level. I conclude in section 4e by summarizing the key lessons from this case study.

4a. Context: PDD as Integral to the Peace Accords
Beginning in 1960 with an insurgent movement seeking to overthrow a US CIAinstalled autocratic administration, Guatemala endured a thirty-six-year civil war characterized
by military repression and gross human rights violations. The two main warring parties to the
conflict were the URNG, a conglomerate of four guerilla groups, and the military-backed
Government of Guatemala. As the site of a proxy war in the Cold War era, the United States
played a predominant role in the conflict to protect its political and economic interests,
specifically through the provision of military assistance to its backed regime. Jonas (2000)
describes the evolution of the civil war in four phases, the most repressive and violent episodes
taking place in the early 1980s. By the end of the war in 1996, the death toll of the civil war
surpassed 200,000. Ninety-three percent of the recorded human rights abuses were attributed
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to the Guatemalan Government by the United Nations Truth Commission established
following the peace accords, earning the internal conflict the label of genocide (Janzen, 2008).
As a country with a large indigenous population, Guatemala’s conflict was fought along
ideological and ethnic lines. Most of the indigenous population identified as Mayan, speaking
one or more of the twenty-two Mayan languages used in the country, although other indigenous
ethnicities and languages are also present in the demographic mix. Between 1964 and 2002,
Guatemala’s indigenous population ranged from 41-44% of the nation’s total population.
Though often described as a political war between left- and right-leaning ideologies like many
Cold War-era internal conflicts, most of the violence and systemic repression targeted the
Mayan population (Eckhardt, 2005). Eighty-three percent of the recorded victims during the
civil war were indigenous, and although the guerillas were largely defeated in the early 1980s,
oppression and outright violence against indigenous populations continued throughout the
remainder of the war (Clouser, 2009).
While US intervention in Guatemala’s domestic affairs certainly sparked the war, a
history of colonization, inequality rooted in land rights and economic structures, and poor
governance fueled the conflict long-term (Cullather, 2006; Viscidi, 2004). By the time the
peace accords were negotiated, the state had largely defeated the resistance and only 3,600
individuals were outwardly affiliated with the URNG (Clouser, 2009; Janzen, 2008). In 1996,
the conflict ended with the Guatemalan Agreement on Definitive Ceasefire. The peace process
in Guatemala was largely driven by the United Nations, at first a mediator during negotiations
and, after the accords, the organizer of the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala
or the Misión de Verificación de las Naciones Unidas de Guatemala (MINUGUA).
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However, as highlighted by Steinberg & Taylor (2003), little had changed since the
war began in the 1960s with a continuation of the same power structure the rebels had fought
against. For the first six election cycles following the end of the nation’s thirty-year succession
of military dictatorships, the right maintained power over the executive. Over ten years after
signing the peace accord, in 2007, President Álvaro Colom was the first left-leaning social
democrat to be elected to the executive office. However, even as of 2019, the country struggled
with a corrupt and elitist political system in which the role of political parties was seen merely
a vessel to become a candidate for political office, while money and circles of elite influence
were the keys to getting elected. Indeed, in 2016, several electoral reforms were passed to open
elections to a greater diversity of candidates and parties, with a focus on ensuring that
government officials would be truly representative of their constituencies. Unfortunately, the
reforms appeared to have little positive impact on the 2019 national election cycle as the
general public in Guatemala expressed ever-more disillusionment. Only 42% of the population
voted in the August 2019 presidential runoff election (Cuffe, 2019).
Decentralization of state power began during the war-time era. In 1985, municipal
autonomy was re-established after many years of mayors being directly appointed by the
executive with a new national constitution. To finance municipal operations, various national
funding mechanisms were established. Specifically, a national Value-Added Tax, which
provided a set percentage of funds to municipal governments, and a Single Real Estate Tax at
the municipal level were both proposed in 1994. Municipalities in Guatemala generated a
minor percentage of their own revenues through taxes; most funds coming through these
transfers. Only education and health functions were at first decentralized to the municipal level
in addition to existing service delivery functions such as water management, waste disposal,
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and permitting. As of the 2000s, parks and recreation, police, and libraries were added to
municipal responsibilities, often still shared with national government (International
City/County Management Association, 2004).
Local Community Development Councils or Consejos Comunitarios de Desarrollo
(COCODEs), the base unit of Guatemala’s present-day PDD system, were initially proposed
in the late 1980s under the Councils for Urban and Rural Development Act (decree 52-87), but
they were declared unconstitutional in 1988 as they were considered a threat to municipal
autonomy (Muñoz & Velásquez, 2010). The 1996 peace accords themselves included several
provisions on decentralization such as the creation of an Association of Municipalities and
recommendations to allow municipalities to collect their own resources. Most importantly, in
terms of PDD, the first article of the peace accords called for local-level participation in “how
funds are designated, the way projects are executed, and the priorities and characteristics of
governmental programs and actions.” A full decade and a half after their initial introduction in
law, the creation of COCODEs was finally permissible by law with the renovation of the
Councils for Urban and Rural Development Act in 2002. Despite this gain for PDD, onlookers
were not hopeful about the prospects of participation for indigenous populations. As the United
Nations reported in 2002, “Although recent approval of the Urban and Rural Development
Councils Act may strengthen the capacity of indigenous peoples to engage in dialogue with
the State, there are, as yet, no mandatory consultation mechanisms guaranteeing participation
by indigenous peoples” (United Nations, 2002).
Many other PDD mechanisms were introduced following the war. Cabildos abiertos,
open Town Hall meetings, were a traditional mechanism for public engagement, though rarely
used. This mechanism was strengthened and additional PDD processes were introduced with
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the Municipal Code in 2002 including: community associations, recognition of indigenous and
community mayor’s offices, mandated consultation upon community or indigenous authority
requests, municipal planning offices, and a hierarchical system of Development Councils
scaling from local COCODEs to a national CONADUR. A successful mechanism from early
in the implementation process was the creation of planning offices to engage citizens in
“coordination roundtables,” effectively participatory planning processes in which citizens
prioritized their needs and created investment proposals for the mayor. As of 2000, around
40% of municipalities had such a offices in operation (International City/County Management
Association, 2004, p. 22). However, as of 2004, the rest of these mechanisms were still not
fully operational at the local level (International City/County Management Association, 2004).
Goldfrank (2007) wrote about the relative success of Guatemala’s local Community
Development Councils, which he classified as a form of participatory budgeting given their
role in making municipal spending recommendations, arguing that this post-conflict nation had
experienced the “least success with participatory budgeting” (p. 26) of the five countries whose
participatory budgeting processes he compared across Latin America. He indicated that the
top-down nature of its implementation and the requirement that municipalities have councils
to receive funding transfers from international partners were factors contributing to little
commitment or real engagement by mayors or the public at large. Speer (2011) cited a weak
civil society, low level of education, and poverty as reasons PDD had been difficult to
implement in rural Guatemala. Given its administrative track record and largely negative
reports in academic literature, I came to the case of Guatemala with tempered expectations
about PDD’s potential impacts on peacebuilding, although the nation’s laws related to
decentralization and PDD were comprehensive and numerous at the macro-level.
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4b. Implementation: The Evolution of Nation-wide PDD from the Field
In 2018-2019, over twenty years after the conflict in Guatemala ended, I interviewed
thirty-one officials across eighteen of the country’s municipalities and fifty-eight PDD
participants across seven municipalities to get a better understanding of how PDD was
implemented, how it was functioning across the country, and the impacts of mechanisms
created to engage citizens in policy decision making. Table 7 below shows the number of
municipalities I interviewed, and Table 8 provides the number of municipalities that I observed
in each box of my case selection matrix at the meso-level.

Table 7: Guatemala Municipal Interview Sample Matrix
Case
Selection
Matrix
Majority
Mayan
Population
Minority
Mayan
Population

Majority Urban
Municipalities

Mixed Urban/Rural
Municipalities

Majority Rural
Municipalities

Not applicable

x3 sites

x4 sites

x4 sites

x4 sites

x3 sites

Table 8: Guatemala Municipal Observation Sample Matrix
Case
Selection
Matrix
Majority
Mayan
Population
Minority
Mayan
Population

Majority Urban
Municipalities

Mixed Urban/Rural
Municipalities

Majority Rural
Municipalities

Not applicable

x1 site

x2 sites

x1 site

x2 sites

x1 site
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In Guatemala, my participant interviewees were 58% male and 42% female. The vast
majority of participants were adults (79%), with a few youth (9%) and elderly (12%)
represented as well. As stated previously in the research methods chapter, these demographics
largely align with the nationally representative sample of PDD participants from the 2018/19
AmericasBarometer data. In my sample, 50% lived in rural areas, 2% in mixed or suburban
areas, and 48% in urban centers, an intentional oversampling of urban areas by design.
Likewise, with regards to ethnicity, I sought to recruit an evenly distributed sample of
ladino/mestizo and indigenous PDD participants, at 55% and 45% respectively. This resulted
in a slight over-sampling of ladino/mestizo participants (8 percentage-points) as compared to
the nationally representative AmericasBarometer sample, which is not surprising given that
the construction of my sampling matrix included one extra quadrant for majority urban centers
home to majority ladino/mestizo populations because there are no large urban centers with
majority indigenous populations in this country.
Each municipality I interviewed employed one or more PDD mechanisms with minor
innovations in structure and implementation to adapt to the local context and build upon the
participatory and deliberative trajectory of citizen engagement established in the peace
accords. In Guatemala, municipal officials I interviewed confirmed that the introduction of
PDD was tied directly to the call for greater citizen participation in the Guatemalan Peace
Accords signed in December of 1996. Indeed, seventeen of the thirty-one officials I
interviewed referenced the 2002 Councils for Urban and Rural Development Act as having
occasioned the creation of local COCODEs with hierarchical participatory forums linked
through the broader national system of Development Councils that now scale from each
neighborhood COCODE to municipal COMUDE, departmental CODEDE, regional
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COREDE, and national CONADUR levels. Though municipal officials and participants noted
that the implementation of PDD at all levels took several years, COCODEs emerged as the
primary PDD mechanism in use across all municipalities I interviewed. In some, though
certainly not all municipalities, traditional forms of participation were also still in use or had
been formalized in the post-war era.
As officials and participants in PDD processes mentioned, Guatemala did not enter the
post-war era devoid of experience with PDD mechanisms. This theme came up in five majority
indigenous communities and two majority ladino/mestizo communities. Decades before the
civil war, they explained, indigenous communities across the country already had a system of
community mayors, often a role passed down via lineage within a family or appointed within
a small village community. Community mayors were more common in rural areas because
urban areas were largely governed by Spanish conquistadors with Western-style representative
democracies. Over time, the patriarchic way power was passed down through the community
mayor system became less common as local ordinances established the requirement that these
community leaders be elected. During the war itself, the community mayor system stayed
intact in many communities and it continued to exist throughout my time in field.
A second community participation mechanism also existed during the war era called
the Pro-Improvement Committees. This mechanism came up in three majority indigenous
communities, but never in ladino/mestizo communities. Engagement in these forums typically
revolved around a petition for a single community project or a thematic issue. Thus, when the
COCODEs were introduced in 2002, it was not an entirely new concept to the Guatemalan
public. However, as municipal officials pointed out, the COCODE mechanism was far more
formalized and democratic in nature than either of the two traditional PDD mechanisms. As
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one municipal official described succinctly, “Now they are elected … before they were
named.”
Given that the COCODE system grew out of traditional indigenous leadership
structures but was also in competition with existing mechanisms in terms of legal status and
power, two local-level implementation challenges immediately influenced the dynamics
surrounding their introduction in the post-war era. First, COCODEs were seen as a threat to
the community mayors and Pro-Improvement Committees because they took their place as the
highest community-based authority in most municipalities; indeed, in all but one that I
interviewed. COCODEs either needed to distinguish their role from that of the, largely rural
and indigenous, community mayor system or integrate with them. COCODEs became the only
PDD mechanism in majority ladino/mestizo communities because, in all but one case I
encountered, indigenous citizen participation systems did not exist previously. In one
indigenous community I interviewed, COCODEs replaced every other PDD mechanism
including the existing community mayor and Pro-Improvement Committees. In the remaining
six communities, COCODEs had to carve out a place at the table, often competing, with
traditional community mayors. Second, both Pro-Improvement Committees and community
mayors were targets of violence during the civil war as leaders within the indigenous
community. Thus, although the post-war COCODEs offered a new brand for PDD, there was
substantial fear initially that involvement risked a future resurgence of violence. As one
municipal official recounted:
With the incorporation of the Development Councils Law [Councils for Urban
and Rural Development Act], and even in the years prior to signing the peace
agreements, there were some years where we tried to change the system but
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always within the Pro-Improvement Committees. In those years, what we saw
here was that the role was no longer imposed or handed down, we promoted
instead that they be elected. But it did not work. It didn't work because nobody
dared to assume this kind of leadership because everything had a cost…
everything had a cost. For us here, the cost was in lives—as in many parts of
the country—those who assumed those leadership roles ran the risk.
Unfortunately, the war years of Guatemala are now etched in time, but the
consequences continue. So still to date many people still feel some suspicion,
resentment, and fear because what they had to live through was not easy. So
then, we were all marked by it.

Given the historical roots and conflict dynamics so intimately tied up with PDD in
Guatemala, communities rolled out PDD on varying time scales over the years in the post-war
era. In my interviews, it was rare to come across someone who had been working with the
municipality since before COCODEs had been introduced. However, some participants were
able to provide me with a detailed account of the implementation of the Councils for Urban
and Rural Development Act in their communities. The following two implementation stories
stood out as particularly vivid examples of how COCODEs arrived on the scene in divergent
ways during the post-war era.
In one largely ladino/mestizo community with an existing pre- and post-war system of
community mayors, I spoke with the founder of the very first COCODE of his village, which
began as of 2006-2007 as he recalled, around four years after the law was passed. At that time,
a local business owner sparked community member interest in forming COCODEs, “People,
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yes, were interested in the COCODE. They were interested in the COCODE because they knew
that it brought many benefits for the villagers, there’d be development, supposedly.” However,
the participant shared that the original enthusiasm for the COCODEs was dampened because
the local mayor at the time, who would later go to trial for corruption, would only allow
COCODEs to form if they were supporters of his political party, going so far as to offer
monetary bribes to COCODE leadership for public support and votes. In this local leader’s
case, he refused the bribe, but his community paid the price. One year for Children’s Day, an
important day of recognition for kids and youth throughout Latin America, the municipality
handed out gifts to be distributed to the children of each village, but his village only received
a small portion of the gifts designated. This was viewed as a political stunt by the participant
and his neighbors, compelling him to act. He described, “I talked to my sister and some
acquaintances and I told them: ‘Let's celebrate Children's Day ourselves because this
happened,’ and they said ‘Yes.’ And we celebrated it the following week. I even had 50 toys
left over! We gave them to the children and celebrated everything. Then I decided to get into
this, so that those things no longer happened.”
Eventually, this leader became the elected deputy mayor for his village, a position with
greater power than the COCODE president in this particular municipality. Interestingly, once
in this position, he opposed the next evolution of PDD in the community approximately four
years later in 2010-2011 as they formed the first municipal-wide COMUDE. He explained,
“Well, it was said there that they were making rules, set down in an article, that said that the
projects that the deputy mayor requested in the municipality had to be reviewed in the
COMUDE for approval. I got up and told them a lot of things because for me, there’s money
from the [departmental] CODEDE for that, and the municipality money is for the deputy
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mayor. Why are they going to approve the projects that I request as deputy mayor?” Ultimately,
the COMUDE was formed, and in this community as of 2019, it had substantial precedence
over municipal-wide budgetary and policy decision making despite the continued opposition
of the deputy mayors. This is in large part because of the leadership of urban COCODE leaders.
They developed a COMUDE Board of Directors and Pre-COMUDE forum in 2014-2015
specifically to leverage the collaborative voice of the people to influence municipal action. As
this vignette demonstrates, the system of local Community Development Councils evolved
slowly; however, it gained increasing power, even when faced with the challenge of
confrontation with the traditional community mayor system.
In a second majority indigenous community in the northern mountains, I spoke to the
founder and co-founder’s son of a suburban COCODE, formerly a Pro-Improvement
Committee, who presented an alternative story of how the Development Councils developed
in their municipality. As we sat down in the usual meeting place of the COCODE, overlooking
an ongoing community development project requested and overseen by the COCODE
leadership, the two men shared their story. “You are going to meet, in other communities, those
that still use the figure of deputy mayors. There is the COCODE, and then there is the deputy
mayor ... he is the one who will act on behalf of the municipal mayor, say within his
community. However, right now and here, because we are close to the municipal capital, we
stopped using the term deputy mayor and focused only on Community Development
Councils.” Pulling out their meeting minutes, dating back to the mid 1990s, they described
how eventually the deputy mayor system was phased out in this municipality:
What happened here with my colleagues, was there was always a deputy mayor,
but now came the COCODEs, which since ’95 according to the dates there,
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were the Pro-Improvement Committees that we had before. We had a certain
recognized place, but we did not have the legal basis as in the case of COCODEs
now, which are recognized in the Development Council Law. So that is the
difference, which came from the creation of the law. The mayors before loomed
large over the community, they felt they had all the power in their hands and
began to abuse it over anything. So that's why they were left behind. The
neighbors said: ‘how awful it is what the mayors are doing,’ and everywhere,
not only here, for any problem, the mayors would beat them. The neighbors felt
humiliated; that's why they all changed. If we had not, right now still with those
mayors, then there’d be more problems because they only wanted to command,
and sometimes their ideas did not mesh with ours. So, we did not agree. That's
why we changed, we created COCODEs, to make our ideas equal… the change
was for us to be united. All the neighbors understood that it is easier that way
because we all have participation, and we’ve stayed that way since.

As I learned in several interviews in this community, the system of appointed deputy
mayors fell out of favor as participation increased. Both deputy mayors and Pro-Improvement
Committees slowly morphed into one coherent system of COCODEs represented in the
municipal COMUDE. However, only within the last three years had the COMUDE in this
municipality become more organized under the leadership of a young visionary in the
municipal Planning Office who set out to ensure that rural villages and urban center
neighborhoods had equal voice and vote at the table. At the time of our interview, the
COMUDE had organized into allied regions based largely on geography. I witnessed their
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impressive ability to apply pressure on both municipal and national level government in one
meeting during which they jointly wrote up and compelled signature on a municipal state of
emergency when an environmental project to clean up an important water source, the river
flowing through the municipal center, went unfulfilled by authorities.
While the evolution of the local Community Development Councils looked different
for every municipality as it negotiated the new laws introduced following the peace accords
with traditional leadership systems, it was remarkable to find that the top-down imposed PDD
mechanism had been applied in near uniformity throughout the country just over twenty years
after the war ended. All the municipalities I interviewed were implementing a functional
COCODE system, which scaled from the local to the national level. Likewise, in most
municipalities, the municipal level COMUDE meetings were also the forum for budget
hearings and participatory decision making. Other mechanisms, however, including
community mayors and thematically-focused associations or committees, participatory
planning, civic engagement trainings, open Town Hall meetings, open Municipal Council
meetings, and land rights mediators were implemented in a diversity of ways from one
municipality to the next.
4c. Structure: Uniform, Monitored, and Incentivized
Municipalities and PDD participants in Guatemala revealed that the top-down way
PDD was implemented resulted in a highly uniform structure for citizen engagement in public
policy decision making at the local level. While there was certainly room to be innovative in
style and conduct within each PDD forum, one central mechanism was used across all
municipalities in largely the same manner. The following sub-sections describe how this
central mechanism functions as well as less frequently used PDD forums.
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Community Development Councils
In every municipality interviewed, I found that community members were organized
in COCODEs by neighborhood. During my time in the field, I observed two COCODE
meetings, both of which involved an election of the COCODE leadership, and three COCODE
project implementations. I also interviewed fifty-one COCODE leaders. Each COCODE was
run by a Board of Directors consisting of a President, Vice President, Treasurer, Secretary, and
a series of lower-level members up to twelve in total. To form a COCODE Board, assemblies
were held at least once every two years by the neighborhood, overseen by a municipal official,
in which the board members were elected to their posts for one- or two-year terms. All
community leaders in COCODEs were unpaid volunteers. COCODEs therefore functioned as
a type of community association or committee with direct oversight by local and national
government as well as an elevated legal status. Given that they were formally recognized as
representatives of their local communities, COCODEs were able to request, raise funds, and
manage community development projects and events both in coordination with the
municipality as well as with third parties such as NGOs or international governments.
In my observations and interviews, I noted that the quality of deliberation and contact
in COCODE meetings varied widely. In one of my observations of a COCODE meeting and
Board of Directors’ election, the meeting was well attended and representatives of every street
in the neighborhood were there. When I arrived, men and women had naturally divided by
gender into groups, laughing and exchanging local gossip amongst one another even though,
as I learned later, they did not necessarily even know each other’s names prior to the meeting.
The president of the COCODE, re-elected during the meeting to serve a second term, made it
a point to ensure that the Board of Directors was comprised of a geographically dispersed team
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from across the neighborhood. The nature of the community projects and proposed municipal
budget investments discussed and deliberated in the space involved presentations with pictures
of the neighborhood highlighting emergent needs and proposed developments, feedback from
the community, and several question-and-answer rounds. Though project proposals were
ultimately approved by vote, votes were nearly always unanimous because the deliberation
leading up to the vote had resolved any outstanding questions or issues.
In the second observation of the same PDD mechanism, only three people from the
rural community showed up to the meeting, and the COCODE president told me it was the
third time they had tried to call a meeting with the same level of turnout. The COCODE
president told me that the local deputy mayor would likely become the default COCODE
president simply because they could not get anyone else to take the job. Updates on previously
submitted project proposals were still discussed with the handful of us in attendance, and a few
questions were asked by the one at-large community member present, but true deliberation or
contact between community members was limited by lack of participation in general. Across
my interviews and project execution observations, I noted the strength and quality of
COCODEs as a PDD mechanism was largely predicated on the charisma and organizational
skills of the local leaders on the Board of Directors.
Given this wide-ranging diversity of experiences with COCODEs, the average DQI
score for this mechanism across my observations was only 6.5/13, and the average CQI score
only 2.8/8. This is because the first observation was scored at 13/13 and 5.5/8 on each index
respectively, whereas the second observation scored zero on both scorecards. In the first
observation, it was the emphasis on equal participation and explicit mention of working for the
‘common good’ that resulted in such a high DQI score. At one point, one of the former leaders
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of COCODE stated directly, “We all want what is best for the common good here. Let’s be an
example for all. We need more people to come to our next meeting.” Indeed, as noted
previously, the COCODE president made an overt request that all groups within the
community be represented on the incoming Board of Directors to promote diversity of voice
and inclusive project proposals. This PDD process lost points on the CQI because of the
limited, ‘rubber stamp’ role of the local government in the process; they only came to observe
and sign off on the results versus taking an active facilitation role during the COCODE Board
elections. In the second observation, there really were not enough people present to have any
discourse or contact between groups.

Municipal Development Councils and Beyond
In each community I interviewed or observed, COCODE leadership from across a
municipality came together for monthly Municipal Development Council meetings over which
the mayor presided. COMUDE meeting size was directly tied to the size of the community. In
small towns, 40-50 COCODE leaders attend, while in larger cities participation could reach up
to and over 200 individuals. The COMUDE was like a participatory version of the Municipal
Council, in which policy decisions were debated for the entirety of the municipality. While the
Municipal Council, a representatively elected governing body, held the ultimate decisionmaking power, the COMUDE had substantial influence over which local development projects
would be approved and implemented. As explained in one municipal official interview:
People come here to the meetings and give some follow-up on how the projects
they have requested are going. For example, a village requested help with flood
problems. So, you must do a project, investigate where the streams come from,

107

resolve issues with the drains, etc. And that is put to a vote and everyone will
say: ‘Well, we agree that so much is invested, a certain quantity of Quetzals
[Guatemalan currency] for a certain project’ then they raise their hands and say:
‘Yes.’ And all proposals are received and are prioritized according to the
resources available.

For this reason, the COMUDE structure was both a space for deliberation as well as budgetary
decision making akin to a participatory budgeting mechanism.
In addition to a public forum for policy and budgetary debates, most municipalities I
spoke with reported that they held trimesterly public budget hearings within the COMUDEs
as well. I observed budget hearings in two COMUDE meetings during my fieldwork. As one
official reported, this practice was technically required by law, “The rules state that we should
present in these meetings a minimum of three times in a year our financial statements.”
However, not all municipalities complied with this law. In one community I observed over the
course of a month, COCODE presidents complained in interviews and publicly about the lack
of transparency from their municipality about how local funds were being spent. When I sat in
on a COCODE leader training program in this municipality, a pro bono lawyer from an NGO
working to improve compliance with the Public Access to Information Law indicated that there
was a formal process for submitting compliance complaints for unrealized budget hearings,
but few cases were successful nationally.
Many COMUDEs also developed a set of internal committees that worked on thematic
and cross-cutting matters relevant to neighborhoods and villages within the municipality. The
most commonly referenced committees formed around violence prevention, women’s
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participation and economic empowerment, and children and youth programming. The two
most common structures for these local thematic committees were one-member-per-COCODE
or one-COMUDE-member-per-committee. These entities were responsible for guiding
decision making and even developing local ordinances and policies on issues within the
thematic area of focus. In one community I observed, committees were asked to present reports
at the monthly COMUDE meetings and policies they created were voted upon in these spaces.
The explicit aim of policy making in these spaces, as explained to me by the COMUDE
president for this municipality, was to ensure continuity of priorities and administration of
certain types of programming, e.g. for youth or women groups, despite changes in municipal
administrations. In a second observation of one of these committees focused on women’s
issues, I was invited to join in the festivities of an event coordinated for Mother’s Day.
COMUDEs, like COCODEs, had an internal leadership structure, though it differed
slightly depending on the size of the municipality and the number of COCODEs therein. Larger
cities tended to have a ‘second level’ COMUDE in which a sub-set of COCODE leaders,
limited to 20 or fewer individuals, were selected to speak on behalf of the COCODEs for their
region. The selection process differed and was designed sometimes by the mayor and other
times by the COCODE leaders themselves. In most cases, COCODEs within a larger
geographic area formed micro-regions and elected their own representative COMUDE
member from the COCODE presidents in the area. As one municipal official outlined, “We
have divided into micro-regions because we have many communities. We have 474
COCODEs, it’s a lot. […] This ‘second level’ has more, well it’s more by region. For example,
if we talk about the city, the COCODE at the ‘second level’ includes zones 1-7, to give you an
example, and he who holds the role represents the seven.” Smaller towns often did not have a
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separate leadership structure within the COMUDE, so each leader simply represented his or
her community concerns and interests to the full assembly. In the most organized
municipalities, the ‘second level’ COMUDEs held Pre-COMUDE meetings in which they met,
often without municipal officials present, to debate and decide upon the projects or issues they
collectively wanted to lobby for in formal COMUDE meetings with the mayor. In some
COMUDEs, the ‘second level’ COCODE leaders had developed even more sophisticated
leadership systems. Some, for example, had formed a COMUDE Board of Directors or selected
a COMUDE President and Vice President to parallel the leadership role of the mayor in
COMUDE meetings from the community side.
I had the opportunity to observe eight different COMUDE meetings, one of which was
a Pre-COMUDE meeting. I also interviewed twenty-eight COMUDE participants, whom by
their nature were also COCODE leaders. In nearly all my observations of COMUDE meetings,
I was in awe of both the high quality of deliberation and cross-community contact engendered
by these PDD forums. I saw citizens hold their public officials to account for budget
discrepancies, request and even demand project implementation status updates, and engage in
vibrant debates about important policy issues such as whether or not to invest in education
versus environmental or infrastructure projects as a priority in the coming year. Furthermore,
COMUDE meetings were often followed by a community lunch or dinner, during which
leaders from different neighborhoods and villages connected to share stories, talked about their
community development projects, and shared strategies about how to push their priorities
through the bureaucracy. As such, COMUDE meetings had an average DQI score of 11.6/13
and an average CQI score of 6.4/8.
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Not all COMUDEs were created equally, however. Drawing from my observations and
interviews, it was clear that COMUDEs with some form of internal leadership structure were
more organized and more effective at holding local mayors and administrations accountable.
There were three reasons that I drew this conclusion. First, these COMUDE leadership
structures ensured that at least one individual was responsible for communicating with the
mayor and other local officials. When communities did not have a leadership structure in place
to manage communication, there tended to be unclear lines of conversation or small-circle
communication between the mayor and his most natural, politically aligned supporters. In one
COMUDE meeting, for example, only one community leader spoke up during the entire
proceeding. While most other COMUDE meetings I observed lasted for 2-4 hours with
considerable time dedicated to community member questions or project proposal discussion,
this meeting lasted just under an hour and a half and a full nine minutes of the meeting was
dedicated to singing the national anthem. I learned in follow-up interviews with participants
that the mayor in this municipality frowned upon active COMUDE participation and penalized
leaders that asked too many questions with public shaming and by withholding funding for
their community project proposals. Second, these structures helped to organize, prioritize, and
mediate disputes between communities. As each COMUDE member represented a COCODE
as well, it was hard to separate out neighborhood aims from municipal-wide objectives. When
COCODE leaders selected their own mediators for these disputes in the form of Boards of
Directors, they were more likely to collaborate versus compete for benefits. Third, COCODE
leadership structures often opened additional meeting spaces like the Pre-COMUDE, in which
communities came together to deliberate and make choices about their collective needs and
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priorities. This allowed local leaders to control, or at least hold substantial sway, over the topics
that made the agenda when meeting with officials.
Just as the COCODE leadership fed into the COMUDE and its leadership structure,
COMUDE leadership fed into departmental CODEDE, regional COREDE, and national
CONADUR councils. Though these higher-level councils were often briefly mentioned in my
interviews, few of the individuals I spoke with at the municipality or in each community were
able to discuss the function or relative power of these higher-level venues for citizen
participation and deliberation. Additionally, these spaces were less ‘participatory’ in that
community representatives in these bodies were elected public officials, such as the mayor,
versus citizens at large.

Civic Engagement Trainings
Also integrated into COMUDEs, or pulling from their membership, were civic
engagement trainings. Though I had not initially considered civic education to be a PDD
mechanism, I realized during my interviews with municipal officials that civic training spaces
were also sites of policy debate between citizens, though less often decision making. This is
because civic education trainings often engaged both COCODE leaders and deputy mayors (as
relevant) and were frequently facilitated within COMUDE meetings themselves. The beauty
of these spaces, versus the other PDD mechanisms, was that they encouraged question-answerstyle discussion between citizens and municipal leadership, involved small groups discussions
or practice exercises, and were not tainted by the pressure to make a policy or budgetary
decisions. One official described a civic training delivered by a third party as such:
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[The trainer] was here often, almost five months helping us collaboratively,
helping us to understand what to do, how to do it, right? She was the one who
gave these monthly trainings to the COCODEs, including after our [COMUDE]
meetings. She would give us the trainings after the COMUDE, she’d stay
directly with the presidents or if they couldn’t come with their representatives
to do her job. She helped us immensely, for us the support was essential.

These trainings often came with a separate pool of funding from the regional and national level
Development Councils, international governments, or a variety of international
nongovernmental organizations. For those running the trainings themselves, the benefits were
touted with equal enthusiasm, “We go out to the communities, and we explain their
[COCODE] functions, the project cycle, how to create a project plan, prioritization of projects.
When the community gets a project from municipal planning, we sit down and write-up the
project, complete the profile, we look at what is an urgent need and what is not, and with them
we construct the theme and profile of the project.” Thus, municipalities that engaged in civic
trainings either in tandem with or as an addition to other PDD mechanisms tended to have
more frequent participation and a higher level of capacity amongst community leaders.
While several COMUDE meetings I observed included a training element, I had one
opportunity to observe a civic engagement training organized by USAID and the municipal
government apart from the COMUDEs but engaging COCODE leaders from across the
municipality. In this city, the COMUDE meeting I observed prior to the training event was not
very deliberative. However, in the training space, community leaders came alive with
questions, suggestions, ideas, and challenging discussion about how to best improve their own
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neighborhoods and hold their municipal officials accountable. Participants in the space were
still considered representatives of their groups and communities, but the space equalized
individual’s status. Thus, even when the COMUDE did not score particularly high on the DQI
or CQI scorecards, these training spaces allowed for meaningful exchange. This stand-alone
training space scored 12/13 on the DQI and 6.5/8 on the CQI. One DQI score that stands out
in this training was in the category of respect for counter arguments. In this case, municipal
officials, community leaders, and a public information advocate debated what data should be
available for request by the municipality per transparency laws. This hit a chord with the group,
especially when they went to their own municipality’s website to find that budget data that was
supposed to be available was several years out of date. Rather than squash the discussion and
frustration, counterarguments were accepted and embraced by the facilitator and municipal
officials present. Within the training space, the participants drafted written requests for updated
municipal budgets to be published online.

Beyond the hierarchical Development Council structure, municipal governments
adapted alternative PDD processes to their local context. Table 9 below lists the full spectrum
of PDD mechanisms that were shared during my interviews. It is important to note that the
table below was developed from an inductive analysis of semi-structured interviews from each
municipality, not deductively or via a survey tool. While I certainly pushed each municipal
official to generate an exhaustive list of PDD mechanisms in our conversations, it is quite
possible that additional municipalities use more or different mechanisms than those reported
in my interviews. I outline the characteristics of the less commonly reported mechanisms in
the sub-sections to follow.
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Table 9: PDD Mechanisms Employed by Municipalities in Guatemala
PDD Mechanism

Percent of Municipalities
Reporting Use (#)
100% (18)

Field Observations by
Author (#)
10
(2 local, 8 municipal)

Participatory Budgeting*

78% (14)

8

Budget Hearings*

61% (11)

2

Community/Deputy Mayors

61% (11)

1

Thematic Local Committees
(e.g. Women’s Committees,
Youth Groups, Conflict
Prevention Committees,
Business Committees)*

44% (8)

2

Participatory Planning

39% (7)

0

Civic Engagement Trainings
with PDD Components*

39% (7)

1

Open Municipal Council
Meetings

11% (2)

3
(all in same
community)

Hierarchical Development
Councils (local, municipal,
regional)

Open Town Hall Meetings
11% (2)
0
*These mechanisms are typically integrated into the municipal-level Development Councils
Community/Deputy Mayors
The traditional community mayor structure morphed into three related, though
different, leadership structures that ran parallel to the COCODE system. The terminology
differed slightly from one municipality to another. Some municipalities had community
mayors either appointed or elected by the citizens in their villages per local tradition. Other
municipalities instituted a deputy mayor structure, which was either an elected role by citizens
or appointed by the mayor. Though often unpaid, some municipalities established these roles
as (low) paid positions. With two community leaders in place, the nine municipalities I
interviewed with such parallel citizen participation and leadership structures distinguished the
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role of the community or deputy mayor as responsible for efficient service provision whereas
COCODEs oversaw community development projects. A slight spin on this distinction
established the role of the community mayor as a land rights mediator, which was the case in
two municipalities, one of which ‘elected’ individuals into the role for life-terms. In practice,
however, the role distinction was not always clear and could lead to conflict between
community leaders. This was especially a challenge when one citizen participation system had
existed longer than the other. For example, this interview exchange took place in one
municipality in which COCODEs entered the scene where deputy mayors had already existed
prior to the war:
Municipal Official: There are always conflicts between the deputy mayor's
office and the COCODEs but ...
Researcher: Why?
Municipal Official: Because let's say, one would think that COCODEs can
participate in many activities but let's not forget that the deputy mayor is the
local authority.
Researcher: Oh so, it's not the COCODE?
Municipal Official: No, the COCODE can propose, make proposals for plans,
programs for young people, but the local say ‘leader’ is the deputy mayor.
Right? So, the COCODE is part of the population and trying to manage projects
for the development of the community, but the deputy mayor has to ensure that
they have water, that the drains are fine, that the environment is fine, problems
say of public services, and they also manage the community for the mayor. If,
for example, the COCODE comes here to request something from the
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community, we can follow up on it, but we must always take the proper
communication channels, and the deputy mayor is like the community leader.

In another instance, COCODEs were established before the system of deputy mayors with a
similar result:
When we passed… divided into districts, we made a segmentation like the
micro-region, only we called it district. The deputy mayor, as this is something
new, was a novelty. This created a pressure; [COCODEs] felt territorially
threatened and felt displaced. We must also recognize that some arrived with a
lot of authority. Then they began to question the legitimacy of decisions.

Thus, even though COCODEs were more widespread and enjoyed a greater level of national
authority and recognition, the traditional (and sometimes new) community or deputy mayor
system continued to present a challenge to their effectiveness and influence over policy and
budgetary decision making in many municipalities.
During my fieldwork in Guatemala, I was able to observe only one community mayor
meeting and interviewed just four participants in this PDD mechanism, two of which were of
the land conflict mediator type and two elected deputy mayors. This low sample size, compared
to my observations and interviews of COCODEs and COMUDEs, stems from the fact that this
mechanism was used far less frequently and therefore harder to catch in action. Though I do
not feel confident speaking to all community mayor structures or systems, the observation and
interviews I did complete suggested that these PDD forums were quite similar in quality to the
parallel COCODE/COMUDE mechanisms.
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The DQI score for the observation I completed was 12/13, and the CQI score was 7/8.
Community mayors put forth just as many questions, if not more, than COCODE leaders in
the meeting and made several suggestions to improve the outreach of existing public policies
and proposed projects. In my interviews, both varieties of community mayors I spoke with
were secure in their level of power and influence over local decision making. In fact, when I
asked one community mayor who had more power within the community, he replied: “The
community mayors, because of the duration of our [lifetime] term. Yes, we can change out the
COCODEs, but they can’t do that to us. […] If the COCODE isn’t functioning, we change
(vote) them out.” They were also a clearly tight-knit group. Although they came from diverse
geographies and backgrounds across the municipality, they all knew each other’s names and
hung around long after the meeting to exchange stories and enjoy one another’s company. In
speaking with the deputy mayors in an alternative community, their meetings were reportedly
of a similar nature and the relationship between leaders of different communities was quite
strong as demonstrated by their elevated level of knowledge about one another’s projects,
community concerns, and each other as individuals.

Participatory Planning
Participatory planning was a rather new mechanism for Guatemalan municipalities,
largely implemented in municipalities close to the capital in Guatemala City. The National
Association of Municipalities (ANAM), established in 2009, was the main driver behind the
initiative to develop participatory strategic plans in each municipality. This effort was also
frequently supported by external, international funders. As described by one official: “First,
what we had to do was make a municipal plan, because there wasn’t a municipal plan, so we
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made the plan with the participation of the COCODEs, the institutions, and the support of
USAID. […] It’s the first year that we are executing the plan.” However, some individual
mayors started this process of their own volition. As another official, only in his post for three
years, shared from his own context, “I developed a paper for the Municipal Council, with the
municipal government and citizen participation, to generate a sustainable development plan,
socialize the same, and construct our administration’s platform from this for the future. We are
in this now.” While the degree to which citizen participation and leadership of the process
varied, a common theme amongst municipalities creating such plans was that the process
included several round table discussions and community meetings to both debate and present
the plan amongst community leaders.
Through I tried to catch a planning process for observation, I had no success during my
time in the field because the process was both new and rare. In the one community I observed
launching this process in a COMUDE meeting, community leaders asked to get involved were
quite resistant, arguing that the initiative was a “waste of time” when they had already
prioritized projects in the local COMUDE meetings. In another community, a COCODE leader
had been involved in participatory planning for his municipality, but his assessment of the
mechanism was not positive. He shared, “Yes we were there, but we only went to get a better
understanding of the process because we perceived it to be negative. […] The urban
development of the municipality right now is in serious danger. Primarily, we have a severe
problem with garbage, the water distribution networks are bad, not to mention our drains, the
rivers are polluted, the roads are totally bad. And if we are going to make new developments
in the city, it will make it even worse. So, we were against this development [plan].” When I
mentioned these planning processes in most of my interviews, even in towns I knew to have
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an extant participatory plan, I found that very few community members remembered the
process or were invited to be involved. Thus, even without direct observation data, I estimate
that participatory planning would not score very highly on my DQI or CQI assessments.

Open Municipal Council Meetings
Though only two municipalities mentioned open Municipal Council meetings as a PDD
mechanism, the right of community members to participate in Municipal Council meetings
was written into the Municipal Code under Title IV, Articles 63 and 64. This PDD forum is
not particularly ‘open,’ as permission to observe must be requested by formal petition and
approved by the Municipal Council. It was also rare to see participants exercise this right. As
one official shared, “Here we do Municipal Council meetings, which are public, open to people
who want to come, listen to what we debate, but we almost never have a request or someone
say, ‘I want to be there.’ It’s exceedingly rare.” I observed this mechanism in use over a series
of three meetings in one municipality, and I interviewed three different community members
about their experience with this PDD forum. In my observations and interviews, most meetings
had no public participation or at most a handful of citizens in attendance. These meeting spaces
also tended not to be participatory as much as an effort to improve transparency, if that. The
first open Municipal Council meeting I observed, for example, started at 9pm. I was not even
sure the meeting was happening because the building was appeared dark and closed off from
the outside at that hour. These environmental factors suggest that, although observation or
participation is possible, it is not well advertised or openly invited.
Nonetheless, the second meeting of the series I observed, despite being rescheduled on
short notice and again scheduled for late evening, was well attended. Citizen consultation on
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the issue of the town’s unruly market district and transportation terminal became practically
the sole focus of the meeting. Citizens in this case had engaged a local lawyer and formed an
informal neighborhood association to petition for a market clean-up. They were successful at
negotiating a redistribution of municipal police forces to the market district and shuffling the
position of local vendors to ensure neighbors could make use of the roads and sidewalks in the
area. In my interviews with one individual that regularly attended these meetings, I came to
learn that the community had only recently started using this mechanism to exert influence
over decision making when a politically-motivated stalemate in the Municipal Council
threatened the community losing a bid on expanding its local trade school with an increase in
national funding. Through a series of sit-ins at the Municipal Council and protests in the main
plaza outside the municipal offices, the community eventually prevailed. Thus, when utilized,
open Municipal Council meetings could be a powerful space for citizens to exert influence,
even if they were not controlled by the public. The average DQI score for this PDD mechanism
was 8.8/13 and the average CQI score 4.5/8 possible points. Points were lost on both scales
because the deliberation between municipal officials and participants was limited to certain
times on the agenda and often did not involve a collaborative dialogue to resolve a problem as
much as an exchange of viewpoints.

Open Town Hall Meetings
Open Town Hall meetings and open Municipal Council meetings overlapped in law,
but not always in practice. Article 38 of the Municipal Code outlines, “When the importance
of a matter calls for listening to the opinion of neighbors, the Municipal Council, with the vote
of two thirds of the total of its members, may agree that the session be held openly… the
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neighbors who attend will have a voice but no vote.” Thus, in law, open Town Hall meetings
and open Municipal Council meetings were one in the same. However, municipalities that
specifically referenced their use of open Town Hall meetings made an important distinction
between the two. Open Town Hall meetings, in practice, did allow citizens to vote on the issue
at hand. As such, they were higher up on the PDD spectrum of citizen control over decision
making. One municipal official shared that only twice in his twelve-year history at the
municipality had such an event taken place, but on both occasions the mechanism was used
specifically to resolve community-wide conflicts. In one case, the debate and eventual vote
taken in the open Town Hall meeting settled a high-profile land rights dispute, and in the
second case it facilitated the closing of several establishments in the city’s former red-light
district. As the mechanism was very rarely employed, I did not observe it in practice, nor did
I encounter any participants with memory of such an event. Given the limited data on this
mechanism, I cannot speculate on the DQI or CQI scores for this PDD forum. Yet, it did sound
as through the forum could be a powerful tool for citizens to influence policy making if utilized.

In summary, I encountered nine different PDD processes in use in post-conflict
Guatemala, some of which existed before the war and some of which were introduced
following the peace agreement. The Development Council system was by far the most robust
and prominent of the PDD mechanisms in use, and it was structured in nearly the same way
from one municipality to the next. This was a direct result of the fact that this process was
written into the peace agreement and subsequent national law, and because monitoring and
incentivization systems were installed to ensure compliance. While other PDD processes were
used from one municipality to the next, design and implementation of these processes differed
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widely. In the subsequent section, I discuss the impacts of this top-down approach to
institutionalizing PDD in Guatemala’s post-war context.

4d. Impacts: Improving Neighbor Trust, Increasing Satisfaction with Democratic System
Descriptive Statistics
Before diving into a quantitative analysis linking PDD and its impacts in Guatemala, I
begin by outlining some key demographic and community characteristics of the country in
both 2008 and 2018. The statistics presented below were developed from the
AmericasBarometer data utilizing the full nationally representative sample in both years. I
provide a quick-glance view of these descriptive statistics in Table 10, which are elaborated
upon in prose below. Additional summary statistics for my key model variables are included
in Table 11 further below.
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Table 10: AmericasBarometer Control Variable Descriptive Statistics for Guatemala
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AmericasBarometer survey respondents in 2008 reported an average household income
of Q3301-4300 Guatemalan Quetzals per month or the USD equivalent at the time of $134202 per month. Just over 1/10 of families receive remittances from abroad as part of their
monthly income. In 2018, the average household income stayed within the same general range,
now $141-162 per month. Note, the income brackets used by the AmericasBarometer shifted
from 2008 to 2018 to include more brackets. The country gender distribution is split near
evenly with 49.8% women and 50.2% men, but in 2018 there are slightly more women than
men at 51.3% and 48.7% respectively. As a country with significant ethnic diversity, 55.9%
percent of survey respondents identify as ladino/mestizo or indigenous-white mix, 42.7%
percent report as indigenous, and 1.4% percent report as other in order of cumulative
percentage in 2008. As of 2018, there are more individuals reporting as ladino/mestizo at
49.8% and a substantial decrease in those reporting as indigenous at 36.4%. This is likely due
to the social trend away from individual association with these ethnic categories and their
accompanying stereotypes. In 2008, only 2.5% of respondents responded with “I don’t know”
or opted out of the ethnicity question, but this group increases to nearly 6% by 2018.
In both years the community demographic split is nearly 50/50 urban versus rural
within the sample, but the percentage of rural residents increases from 2008 to 2018. On
community development, the majority of respondents report access to clean drinking water,
but less so in rural areas. In 2008, 75.3% of respondents overall report having access to a safe
water source, and that number increases substantially to 82.9% in 2018. Internet access
increases as well over time from 20.5% reporting occasional usage in 2008 to 23.8% stating
they have regular internet access in their home by 2018.
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Politically, the country leans rather heavily to the right (42.9%) as of 2008, which is a
particularly interesting revelation given that 2007 was the first time a left-leaning president
was elected since the war-time era. However, there is a substantial portion of sample
respondents in 2008 that opt not to respond to this question, a full quarter of those questioned.
Voter turnout was only at 60% in the first-round election in 2007, and leftist president Alvaro
Colon with the National Unity of Hope (UNE) party won in the runoff election by a narrow
margin of just over 5 percentage points. This large ideologically undecided group likely
explains this distribution. The political sway trend reverses by 2018, with 53.4% leaning to the
left. Only 10% opt out of responding to this question in that year. Again, this is an interesting
and somewhat unexpected outcome as right-wing candidate Alejandro Giammattei won the
presidency in a run-off election in 2019. Again, turnout was quite low at the polls, coming in
at 42% of registered voters. It’s worth noting that Guatemalan disenfranchisement with the
national political scene has been getting worse year upon year (Cuffe, 2019).
Crime is considered the top concern in both 2008 and 2018 for AmericasBarometer
respondents. Seventeen percent of respondents in 2008 report having personally experienced
an incident of violent crime in the past year, with the trend worsening to 20% by 2018. Twentyfour percent of the population reports that their perception of violence in their neighborhood
is “high,” and an additional 26% of the population report their perception of violence as
“medium” in 2008. In 2018, the AmericasBarometer included many more questions on
violence levels than in prior survey cycles to further expand upon this narrative. Respondents
report that they know of a murder in their neighborhood or village within the last year in 44.7%
of urban areas and 27.2% of rural areas in 2018. Also, 52.5% of respondents share that they
feel somewhat or very insecure in their own neighborhoods when they consider their chances
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of assault or robbery. Overall, violence is reported more commonly, and perceived as a greater
threat in larger cities versus smaller towns across both years.
Distrust of those outside one’s circle of acquaintance is high; 75% of respondents say
that one should have no confidence or little confidence in others when meeting for the first
time in 2008. Despite these negative perceptions, 62.3% and 46.3% of respondents indicate
that they find people from their neighborhood to be very or somewhat trustworthy in 2008 and
2018 respectively. Eighty-six percent of the sample says they are satisfied with their life, and
79% are satisfied with the place they live in 2008. Unfortunately, these questions about
satisfaction were phased out of the survey questionnaire in 2018, so no comparative data is
available over time.
Importantly for this investigation, I find that many Guatemalans are engaged in one or
more types of PDD processes in both 2008 and 2018, with a two-percentage-point uptick in
participation over time. In 2008, the AmericasBarometer in Guatemala asked only about
participation in open Town Hall meetings and community improvement committees, with
participation rates of 13.7% and 39% of respondents respectively. When in the field, I
confirmed that these AmericasBarometer questions do indeed trigger affirmative responses
from PDD participants involved in open Town Hall or Municipal Council meetings, in the first
case, and historical Pro-Improvement Committees or modern-day COCODE committees in the
second case. Enumerators did not ask about participation in developing the municipal budget
in 2008, and my interviews in the field suggest that participatory budgeting and planning today
facilitated through the COMUDEs was still in its infancy or nonexistent at that time. In 2018,
I coordinated the addition of the participatory budgeting and planning question to the survey
questionnaire with the LAPOP research team, and I confirmed in the field that this question
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triggered affirmative responses from COMUDE participants. In this later cycle, I found that
14.8% of respondents reported participation in open Town Hall meetings, 40% in community
improvement committees, and 8.4% in participatory budgeting and planning. In the following
paragraphs, I outline my key findings related to the impacts of PDD participation in these
processes on my selected indicators linked to the multiple dimensions of peace.

Regression Analysis
I developed six models to determine the association between PDD participation and the
peace-related outcome variables from my conceptual framework. The econometric
specification for each model by dependent variable is listed below. Models are either OLS
regression or logit, selected depending upon the format of the dependent variable (*=logit).
Additional details regarding the model construction and each of the variables operationalized
therein can be found in Chapter 3, Section 3f. Table 11 below provides a set of descriptive
statistics by independent and dependent variable in the models.
𝑀𝑢𝑛𝑖_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒I
= 𝛽K + 𝛽L 𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡L + 𝛽M 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠M
+ 𝛽O 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠O + 𝛽P 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑡_𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦P + 𝛽Q 𝐴𝑣𝑔_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒Q
+ 𝛽S 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠S + 𝜀
𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛_𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔I
= 𝛽K + 𝛽L 𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡L + 𝛽M 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠M
+ 𝛽O 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠O + 𝛽P 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑡_𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦P + 𝛽Q 𝐴𝑣𝑔_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒Q
+ 𝛽S 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠S + 𝜀
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡I
= 𝛽K + 𝛽L 𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡L + 𝛽M 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠M
+ 𝛽O 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠O + 𝛽P 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑡_𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦P + 𝛽Q 𝐴𝑣𝑔_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒Q
+ 𝛽S 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠S + 𝜀
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𝑆𝑎𝑡_𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦I
= 𝛽K + 𝛽L 𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡L + 𝛽M 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠M
+ 𝛽O 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠O + 𝛽P 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑡_𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦P + 𝛽Q 𝐴𝑣𝑔_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒Q
+ 𝛽S 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠S + 𝜀
∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝_𝑉𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒I
= 𝛽K + 𝛽L 𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡L + 𝛽M 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠M
+ 𝛽O 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠O + 𝛽P 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑡_𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦P + 𝛽Q 𝐴𝑣𝑔_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒Q
+ 𝛽S 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠S + 𝜀
𝑉𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒_𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛I
= 𝛽K + 𝛽L 𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡L + 𝛽M 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠M
+ 𝛽O 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠O + 𝛽P 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑡_𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦P + 𝛽Q 𝐴𝑣𝑔_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒Q
+ 𝛽S 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠S + 𝜀
𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑒_𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥I
= 𝛽K + 𝛽L 𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡L + 𝛽M 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠M
+ 𝛽O 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠O + 𝛽P 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑡_𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦P + 𝛽Q 𝐴𝑣𝑔_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒Q
+ 𝛽S 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠S + 𝜀
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Table 11: AmericasBarometer Model Variable Descriptive Statistics for Guatemala
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Upon running the models for each dependent variable, the effect of PDD on peacerelated outcomes in 2008 reveals that participation in any form of PDD, using the binary 0/1
measure to compare those that participate with those that do not, has a small positive effect at
the p<.10 level on trust of others in the neighborhood. There is no discernable effect of PDD
participation on trust in government or economic well-being.
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There is no association between PDD participation and ‘positive’ peace either,
operationalized as satisfaction with democracy in the country. The same is true of the additive
‘peace perception index.’ Interestingly, community improvement committee involvement
appears to be more impactful than open Town Hall meetings when running my models for each
mechanism on its own, showing positive and statistically significant (p<.10) associations with
both increased trust in neighbors and higher levels of satisfaction with the democratic system.
With regards to ‘negative’ peace, there is a statistically significant (p<.10) and positive
association between PDD participation of experience with direct personal acts of violence. The
odds of falling victim to violent crime for PDD participants is 1.38 times that of nonparticipants controlling for all other demographic and community characteristics in the model.
Using the post-estimation command mfx in Stata, which calculates the marginal probabilities
for each variable at the means of the independent variables in the model, the marginal effect
of participation in PDD on personal experience with crime is a .043 (4.3 percentage points)
estimated change in the probability associated with those that participate versus those that do
not. Participants in open Town Hall meetings seem to be driving this association with a
statistical significance of p<.01 for this group. However, the more types of PDD processes one
is involved in, the stronger the association (p<.01) between PDD participation and diminished
levels of ‘negative’ peace.
As of 2018, much has changed. PDD participation is associated with several promising
effects across several variables and dimensions of peace and is no longer associated with
‘negative’ peace. PDD participants show a statistically significant higher level of trust toward
the municipal government (p<.01) and their neighbors (p<.01) than non-participants, and they
are more satisfied with the democratic system as well (p<.05). When these individual effects
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are combined in the ‘peace perception index,’ there is a strong association between PDD
participation and peace overall. While all types of PDD appear to have positive effects on the
political dimension, trust in neighbors is driven by community improvement committees while
satisfaction with the democratic system is driven by both community improvement committees
and participatory budgeting or planning processes. Interestingly, there is a weak, but still
statistically significant relationship between open Town Hall meetings and more positive
perceptions of the national economy. Importantly, PDD participants no longer report a higher
incidence of experience with violent crime.
Table 12 below shows the coefficients and standard deviations across all OLS models,
or odds ratios and standard errors for the one logit model, by independent variable (PDD) and
dependent variable (dimensions of peace). The following two tables show the same models run
with each type of PDD process as an isolated binary variable. The sample size for the final
models included just over 1,000 observations in 2008 and 1,300 in 2018 due to missing data
points in one or more variables included in the models.
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Table 12: Model Results by Independent and Dependent Variable for Guatemala
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Qualitative Findings
The quantitative results of the statistical models linking PDD participation with the
multiple dimensions of peace that I outlined in my conceptual framework went from largely
null or negative to extraordinarily positive over time, in the case of Guatemala. The benefit of
a mixed methods approach is the ability to better understand the outcomes of my quantitative
findings by cross-referencing them with qualitative data from the field. Having processed the
2008 data before commencing with my fieldwork in Guatemala and reflecting on the work of
other researchers exploring the implementation of the Development Council system in the
post-conflict era, I went into the field with admittedly low expectations. However, I sought to
gain a better understanding of how PDD was working and why results from the 2008
quantitative analysis were so underwhelming. Speaking with thirty-one municipal officials and
fifty-eight PDD participants provided important background, context, and examples to
illuminate the ‘why’ underlying my quantitative findings. Furthermore, the opportunity to
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observe seventeen PDD processes across seven of my sample municipalities gave me firsthand insights to the promise and shortcomings of Guatemala’s participatory deliberative
democracy mechanisms at the time of my fieldwork.
Broadly speaking, I found that participants in Guatemala’s PDD processes reported a
higher level of trust in local officials because they felt they had more involvement and control
over decision making and a way of holding officials accountable. Only three of the fifty-eight
PDD participants that I interviewed in Guatemala reported that their level of trust and
confidence had not changed or had worsened because of their participation. Economically,
participants saw the connection between PDD and outcomes as indirect, if present at all.
Nineteen PDD participants and six of the thirty-one municipal officials I interviewed said there
was no economic impact on their own lives or their communities via PDD. A lack of sufficient
funding for development projects and long, bureaucratic processes undertaken to implement
projects were frequently cited as barriers to economic development via PDD by participants
and municipalities alike. Socially, participants reported a mentality change within their
communities as well as improved community organization as a result of PDD participation.
PDD spaces, particularly the monthly COMUDE meetings, encouraged new relationships and
alliances across traditional, even war-time, divides. In the case of ten of the participants and
one municipal official interviewed, PDD was not reportedly impactful on community or social
relationships.
Direct physical violence experienced by participants was only noted in two participant
interviews and three municipal interviews. The examples provided spoke to the increased risk
run by PDD participants given their leadership role in the community. Interestingly, a far more
frequently reported case having to do with neighborhood violence was that COCODEs could
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engage in projects to prevent violence. This perspective was shared by nine municipal officials
and sixteen PDD participants. Despite the increased risk, ten participants and six municipal
officials made explicit links between PDD and improved quality of life. Across all my
interviews, I did not encounter a single informant that suggested that PDD should be
discontinued in Guatemala. While many suggested ways to improve the system, all agreed that
it made a valuable contribution to Guatemalan society. Below I expand upon this overview of
my qualitative results and how they enlighten the quantitative findings presented above.

Political Dimension
The quantitatively derived influences of PDD were strongest in 2018 with regards to
government legitimacy within the political domain and satisfaction with the system of
democracy linked to ‘positive’ peace. Likewise, within the qualitative data I collected, positive
political influences were widely reported by municipal officials and participants across all but
two of the municipalities I interviewed. In one case, a regular participant in open Municipal
Council meetings had become frustrated with the political infighting he observed in the
meetings, often gridlocking key decisions for the community. In the second case, the local
government maintained COMUDE meetings to be in compliance with national laws but did
not actually devolve any decision making to the forum participants or comply with
transparency laws requiring trimesterly budget hearings. Thus, individuals in this community
felt disillusioned with the process.
While I coded over twenty different ways that PDD influenced government legitimacy,
the three most prominent direct linkages between PDD and trust in municipal governance
related to improved communication with citizens in PDD forums mentioned across twenty-
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nine of eighty-four interviews, participation as an accountability measure on municipal
administration brought up in nineteen interviews, and satisfaction with project completion and
service improvements achieved through PDD petitions as shared by fourteen and thirteen
informants respectively. Twelve individuals noted a boost in participation over time. Two
mutually reinforcing phenomena spun out of these direct links: first, participants reported
increased trust because they could see the impact of their influence on municipal works;
second, municipalities noted a shift amongst community leaders from clientelism to
cooperation.
Improved communication between the municipality and citizens was regularly reported
as an outcome of PDD. For participants, this theme often manifested as “feeling heard” or
engaging in “open communication” with officials. After sharing that she felt confident in the
municipality, one participant explained, “because we work with them, we have gotten closer
and become confident that we will fix the issue… we fix it, with communication and the trust
we have built with the administration.” For municipal officials, communication with
community leaders was their primary approach to improve transparency. One official shared,
“It’s all about public information, it’s transparency. If I buy two bags of cement, it appears in
the [national procurement] system. Whoever comes and looks can say, ‘And where did that
cement go?’ Well, talk to the president of the COCODE; for me to authorize something I have
to have the petition from the COCODE in hand.”
As the last quote demonstrated, for both participants and municipal officials, this
increased communication and transparency acted as a check on the administration. One regular
attendee of open Municipal Council meetings sat down with me after an observation during
which he and I had exchanged a critical glance as a subset of Council members chatted loudly
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over the meeting proceedings. He noted, “At one point a municipal staffer told me, ‘Since you
came to these meetings, we’ve seen better behavior in these meetings’.” Every meeting, this
participant would visually set out his phone in recording mode on the meeting table. During
my last of three observations of this PDD space, a political debate about the upcoming elections
broke out, and the Municipal Council became quite nervous about his recording to the point of
asking him to stop. Clearly, his presence influenced the intensity and content of debate. In
another instance, a COMUDE participant remarked after a meeting, “I criticize the good with
the bad… I told the mayor ‘this [project] is failing because your technical personnel are not
there, they don’t do any work’ and yesterday when he told the engineer to do his job, I thought
there may yet be a chance.” Yet another COCODE president shared that the relationship
between the community and the municipality was improving “because the municipality has
oversight to ensure they come out to the community, that they come view our water well, that
it is clean. So, people say, ‘Yes, the municipality has reached out to us, they haven’t forgotten
us’.”
Municipalities noted this effect as well. As one official outlined, “Here they come and
ask: ‘I need to know about a project, how is it?’ And we can share the answer and if it’s not in
order, they can say, ‘I submit a complaint.’ Today there’s no problem [with this].” While the
pressure of public participation certainly does not fix all ails, it does make a difference in how
municipal administrations communicate and deliver services, which in turn influences public
perception.
This increased oversight of municipal operations afforded through PDD forums was
tied to a feeling of greater empowerment for the individual participants. One participant
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provided this example of how the COCODE system empowered her to make a difference in
her community comparing pre- versus post-COCODE introduction:
Before we had to get everyone together to put pressure on the municipality, and
we’d go with over 100 people… now we have the experience of getting
beneficial projects for the community sometimes without even any paperwork.
[…] Before they [COCODEs] existed, or when we had the regional councils,
the COCODEs did not know how to get funds from the government, they just
didn’t know. The money was always there, but it was always lost because the
councils did not demand it. Now, COCODEs make demands, we’ve learned
how to demand. If not with documents, with words; if not words, then law. So,
it’s helped to bring beneficial projects.

In several communities, COCODE leadership was given an official identification card, which
allowed them to solicit funds or services from institutions and support systems they would not
otherwise have access to. As such, PDD – specifically the COCODE system – had increased
the ability of community members to place pressure on the municipality and opened new doors
to collaboration. It also meant that participants could see progress more readily, in the form of
project completion and service improvements.
Over time, this led to increased participation in PDD forums. As shared by one
COMUDE participant, “When we started in 2012, we had a situation, this fear that we would
begin COMUDE meetings without much of a crowd, not much participation. And people didn’t
participate much in COCODEs because they were poorly managed… but little by little we
gained the confidence of every leader, of every community mayor, and now thank God there
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is a high level of trust.” One of my participant interviewees shared that there was a marked
increase in participation from the first to the second ‘second level’ COMUDE election amongst
COCODE leadership in his municipality because people saw they had influential power. He
reflected that the municipal leadership itself started to see the value in participation, and
therefore increased its support for the forum over time: “It has been said that the eyes of the
municipal mayor are those of the members [of the COCODE]… because the municipality
cannot explore or see every problem in each community. That’s why they came to value the
help of the community.” Many municipalities reported that COCODEs and community mayors
had become the best source of information to improve their services.
Communication, oversight, and citizen empowerment ultimately translates to policy
decisions better rooted in community needs and monitored by community members, increasing
legitimacy. When I asked one participant if she trusted in the municipality, she said simply,
“Yes, we have received help, and we have been heard by the municipality.” Another shared,
“For our community celebration, we created a petition on the part of the COCODE and went
to hand it in, and we were blessed with the response ‘yes, of course’ when we submitted. So,
it was in process. But if we were outside, a criminal let’s say, they wouldn’t say anything. To
me they give help … that’s why it’s good to have this group … whether it’s a COCODE or
community mayor, it works because we translate information from below to the top.” With
better information about community needs, municipalities are better poised to respond
appropriately. As a municipal official shared, “It’s about having better communication with
them because now they report a water pump that is burnt out. We could go years without
changing it, but now they report it, and we pass the report to our coworker to schedule a time
to change it. So, it’s about addressing these situations, as small as they may seem.” One
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COCODE president proudly reported, “Things are getting better because we can see the
change. Over time, you see the change happen. For example, we used to have big potholes all
over the place, and now it’s better.”
PDD participation had another, more indirect, effect on how municipalities and citizens
collaborated. Several municipalities discussed the challenges associated with the historical
client-patron model that still lingers in Guatemalan political and policy arenas today. However,
they also regularly shared that PDD processes contributed to a shift in this mentality to one of
greater collaboration. Increased spaces for participation through PDD mechanisms and followthrough on project implementation were the central links between PDD and this shift. “Initially
it cost us a lot,” one official reported, “Like I said, there wasn’t participation before, the few
COCODEs that came only came to confront, and fight, and insist, and say that it was ‘our
obligation,’ and whatever else. With the passing of time, it changed, we achieved the goal of
integrating more entities, more participation in the development actions of the municipality.”
Participants likewise supported this account, “When one is not organized, the municipal
authorities do not receive [a petition] as easily. It is through organization that one manages to
be received in the municipality, only through organization. If one goes on their own or with
two or three neighbors without any representation of the community, the petition is not
received, there is no communication, there is no relationship.” COCODE leaders not only have
a hand in selecting development projects and approving budgets for their communities, they
also help to execute those projects, which further enhances collaboration. During one of my
interviews, the COCODE president took me on a tour of all the community projects they had
completed as a group including an active drainage project being completed by a combination
of municipal workers and local community members during our visit. PDD had certainly not
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overcome clientelism in Guatemala, but it had opened new avenues for citizens to engage with
municipal officials to this end.

Economic Dimension
PDD’s influence on economic well-being was a point of disagreement across
interviews, though a slight majority (just over 60%) of municipal officials and participants
interviewed associated the project development work of COCODEs—at least indirectly—with
improved quality of life for the citizens impacted by the projects. Overall, however, the
economic influences of PDD were much harder to tease out of interviews, largely because the
economic conditions of Guatemala continued to be so poor even twenty years post-civil war.
One official summed up this argument succinctly, “Before giving them the benefits and after,
the economic problems are the same.” This sentiment was echoed by PDD participants. One
shared, “Well, it’s poverty. We continue to have an extreme level of poverty, malnutrition too
for all that we say about caring for one’s children and giving them adequate food. There’s no
change, we continue with the same.”
Additionally, even though COCODEs specifically focus their efforts on community
development, the process for getting a project through the bureaucracy was reportedly slow
and complex. In my interviews, most participants recounted projects taking approximately two
years just to get approved. In some cases, the project approval process took more than ten
years. Given these contextual factors, I was not surprised to find that there were no statistically
significant quantitative impacts of PDD participation on economic perceptions of well-being
in 2008 or 2018. However, my interviews did highlight three connections between PDD
processes and economic well-being that should be noted: directing resources toward reported
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community needs as shared by fifteen individuals, directing resources toward individual needs
as outlined by sixteen interviewees, and improving the infrastructure of the community overall
indicated by eleven informants.
First, both municipal officials and participants referenced improvements in directing
municipal resources toward real needs within communities. Public participation in budgetary
decision making helped to ensure funds were not wasted on useless or ego-driven projects or
lost to corruption. One mayor talked about how a community near his own had built two
separate sports complexes in the past, each attributed to a different politician for purposes of
bolstering their reputations. This type of spending was now more tightly controlled. An official
reflected: “Before the mayor would say, ‘I am going to make a highway’ but the highway
wasn’t a priority, the priority was drinking water. However, I ask them [the public], ‘what
needs do you have, what is your priority? So, the decision is made from their opinion and it’s
what they want. I can’t impose, or say, ‘this is what I am going to do’.” Thus, the PDD structure
in Guatemala helped to ensure that resources were being distributed toward reported needs.
This very much echoed the point made above with regards to the legitimacy of policy decisions.
As citizens participated in PDD forums, citizens legitimized decision making and the funding
for development was better directed.
Second, individual’s economic well-being was sometimes directly improved by the
projects requested and implemented by COCODEs. This unfolded in two ways. First, several
municipalities worked within the COCODE system to provide and direct job training to the
individuals within their communities. Two participants I spoke with provided strong and
detailed examples of their involvement in job training projects. In one case, the COMUDE
leader talked about how the COCODE-member-comprised violence prevention committee put
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on a job fair for youth to decrease crime. Citizens were engaged in finding a time and place for
the event and getting community members to attend. Another COCODE president talked about
how he organized a local artisan fair to promote small business with the support of the
municipality. Across all communities, COCODE leaders and community mayors were the
primary means of getting messages to the community about municipal events. In several cases,
the municipality had all COCODE leaders in a shared WhatsApp group to disseminate
information more quickly. Second, COCODE members applied pressure to the municipality to
buy local. One COMUDE president remarked, “We have been fighting now, and we are still
in the process of having all businesses that work in the municipality from the municipality. So
that the money stays here.” By using tax dollars to pay for projects led by local contractors,
municipalities could improve livelihoods. As explained in one municipal interview, “the
municipality generates income [for local contractors], and there’s income for them to maintain
their families. There’s an economic impact.”
However, this impact came with a counterpoint brought to the forefront by PDD
participants. For those that participate, there was relatively high personal cost in terms of time
and resources. This challenge to participation was reported by nine participants and four
municipal officials. Individuals that were in leadership roles in COCODEs or the COMUDE,
specifically, were tasked with attending monthly meetings without renumeration, paying for
transit to and from those meetings, and taking on key responsibilities in their communities such
as reporting streetlamps that had gone out or even deaths within their village or neighborhood
to local authorities. “One of the sacrifices is the family, right?” remarked one participant. He
attributed his recent divorce to participation in the COCODE. In just two communities,
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residents had started to pool a small amount of resources to pay for travel and per diem for
their community representatives at the COMUDE.
Third, PDD processes in Guatemala were largely focused on community development
projects, and when completed, everyone’s quality of life improved. Development funding for
both health and education was specifically facilitated through the COCODE system and
frequently referenced as making an impact on overall community development and well-being.
As one community participant shared, “We as COCODEs bring medical assistance, that we
find and we manage, and we bring it to communities with fewer resources or those a little
poorer than in other places.” In all my observations, health center and school construction
projects were always presented as part of the CODEDE funding portfolio for the year. In
several sites, the municipalities had started to use their own administrative funds to pay for
additional local teachers above and beyond those paid for through the national Ministry of
Education. While some of these types of projects could have been delivered without the
influence of PDD participants, their selection and execution were made easier with organized
citizen participation. One official reflected on how PDD had made development “more fluid”
and that those neighborhoods that participate had far fewer needs today.

Social Dimension
As my quantitative findings from 2018 suggest, social influences were regularly
reported in my interviews. For ten participants and one municipal official, PDD was not very
impactful on community or social relationships. In these instances, the common refrain was
“we always got along” or “we’ve always been organized.” Forty percent of participants
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interviewed, however, cited improved organization and relationships amongst community
members through COCODE-initiated meetings and projects.
While COCODEs tended to encourage better neighborhood relations, increased crosscommunity understanding and social capital gains amongst leaders were primarily linked to
COMUDE meetings. In one community, the municipality had chosen to rotate COMUDE
meeting locations between rural and urban sites. The official from this municipality explained
how this altered the way the communities perceived one another:
We have had COCODE leaders here from the urban area, when people from the
countryside, say to them, ‘Take off your shoes before you come in the kitchen,’
and that’s a form of discrimination. But why? That person never walked in his
shoes. However, when the people from the city arrive out there, they realize that
the people in the countryside live together, they share. […] When one arrives
out there, the people from the countryside have this special way of inviting in
everyone, they bring you coffee and soup, the give you a chicken, they make a
stew and treat you well. So, what happens with those people that work in
[urban] institutions? When they see this, all the sudden it sticks in their mind,
the names and the faces. They come back to visit and say, ‘How are you? Please
go ahead.” They remember that they were treated well there. This has helped
us to change the mentality, the way that people think, and more than that, the
way that they prioritize the needs ahead.
In this community, I was moved by this initiative because the rural community was largely
indigenous, but the ladino/mestizo population was concentrated in the municipal urban center.
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This case offered an insight into how traditional ethnic divisions in Guatemala can indeed be
improved through PDD forums.
In another case, I interviewed a current COMUDE president and former member of the
national military who had fought on the side of the government during the civil war.
Recognizing this unique opportunity to talk to an individual that could truly reflect on the role
of the COCODEs in facilitating reconciliation, I inquired directly about his perspective. His
eyes lit up and he smiled, “It makes me laugh to talk about this because I remember one day
in a training, someone said, ‘I remember when I used to go around with my rifle as a guerrilla.’
He didn’t stop looking at me. Well, you know what I said? ‘I was in the army, I took up arms,
I was a marine. It’s painful to remember, but here we work for the common good.’ And, yes,
today we are friends.” He went on to explain that the keys to reconciliation are tolerance and
a focus on the common good. After having met in the COMUDE, they now work side-by-side
and even maintain a regular text chat to share community information. Indeed, Guatemala’s
PDD system, particularly the COMUDE forum that brings together leaders from across the
municipality can develop greater cross-community cohesion and can even promote friendships
between former war-era enemies.
COMUDEs also offer a space to expand community leader social capital. Thirteen
individuals that I interviewed shared that meetings offered them a space to make connections
and learn from one another’s experiences. Nearly all meetings include a time for participants
to sit down and eat a meal together after the proceedings. As one official described:
Everyone usually knows each other, right? Everyone knows each other, they
greet each other. Some, maybe because of the little things that only they know,
they don't talk to each other, but that’s just a few people. When they meet in an
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assembly or municipal activities where all the COCODEs meet, one looks
around at all the leaders greeting each other with everyone there. They help
each other too because information is passed on. If someone is doing a project
on the side or something, right? How they received some benefit. They
themselves pass on the information there.

A community mayor from a separate community corroborates this account. She gave two
concrete examples in our interview of times when community mayors came together to resolve
problems. In one case, she talked about how the community mayors shared information on
how to raise funds for local festivals. The norm in the community had been to sell fireworks
to fund celebrations, but with new laws on firework sales due to forest fires sparked throughout
the country’s long summer months, this was no longer an option. As leaders, the community
mayors brainstormed innovative fundraising ideas together such as food, parking, or concert
ticket sales. In a second case, a rural community was cut off from their local water service, and
a coalition of community mayors went out to help. In two days, a relatively short period of
time for such an outage in Guatemala, the issue was fixed through their efforts.
Participants too talked about the social connections they gained through participation.
A COCODE president from a large town expressed this sentiment saying, “I feel happy
because I have learned, and every time I come to a training it helps me to engage with others.
I am showered with new information. I know how to manage now, I know how to help youth,
I know how to help the elderly. I feel as president I don't work just to manage projects, I work
for children, youth, and the elderly. I work with everyone. I do not leave anyone out because I
want development for my community.” A municipal official I interviewed highlighted the
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unique quality of COMUDE meetings as a space to meet people with influence in the
community. “At that meeting we gather all the COCODEs to attend, and there is discussion.
At that table there are representatives of government institutions, there’s health, education, the
hospital, the army, the police, and the municipality … And any COCODE can ask a question
to get clarity, and we have the obligation to tell them about our budget, our projects.” During
a COMUDE meeting break in one mid-sized town, I sat between a government official in
charge of women’s participation and a COCODE president as they exchanged ideas about
bringing a women’s job training program to the community. This participatory deliberative
democracy mechanism offered considerable opportunity for building one’s social capital.

Positive Peace
Though I rarely asked participants directly about their satisfaction with their own
quality of life or the system of democracy in Guatemala, I spent considerable time talking with
PDD participants in interviews about their satisfaction with their communities and how PDD
made them feel. Ten participants and six municipal officials made explicit links between PDD
and improved quality of life. For municipal officials, the satisfaction of their constituents was
often linked to the outcomes of community development projects. Participants, on the other
hand, emphasized how service to their communities made them feel, and in most cases, they
expressed a sense of satisfaction knowing that they were making a positive impact on the lives
and circumstances of their neighbors. One elderly participant that had been the president of his
COCODE since the PDD mechanism was launched in his small rural town sat with me for
nearly two hours talking about his work with the community. His biggest accomplishment yet
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was bringing electricity to his remote village on the outskirts of the municipality. As we neared
the end of the interview, he summed up his experience as such:
We bring benefits for all so that all are happy, we all can take advantage of the
help, wherever it comes from, so that we all have a benefit. As I emphasize
again, I do not think of a personal benefit or just for my family because that
wouldn’t do any good. I feel that the greatest satisfaction one can have is to
have a joyful heart. The conscience of one feels most happy when something is
done for everyone, one feels happy for the opportunity that our lord gives us to
achieve a project, through the authorities, but one that is for all. […] Personally,
I am compelled to continue fighting so that we all benefit, not to be selfish with
my neighbors from other communities. So, we all have what we need, even if
it’s just a little, so we have it, so that the sun rises for everyone.

Another participant, though not as enthusiastic about the impacts of citizen participation on the
community, expressed a sense of hope about the future. He stated, “I believe that the day will
come when people will wake up and all of this will be for the benefit of the population, and
they will be grateful. They won’t know how it all started or who was fighting for it, but there
will be a better quality of life for our children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren, for all. And
that brings me satisfaction.”

Negative Peace
Armed with the 2008 quantitative analysis results indicating that PDD participation
was associated with increased experiences with physical violence, and therefore less ‘negative’
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peace, I went into my interviews determined to uncover the possible factors contributing to
this finding. In my conversations, only two participants referenced firsthand experiences with
direct violence because of their participation in PDD spaces, though may did share that they
butted heads with other community members from time to time. In most instances, participants
talked about heated discussions or “throwing around words” in the course of disagreements. In
just two cases did disagreements escalate to threats of personal violence.
It wasn’t always that way, however. One participant shared how, in the early days of
COCODE formation (such as when the 2008 quantitative data was collected), a municipal
official threatened him “even to death.” The military at the time stepped in to support the
participants. He recounted, “They told him: ‘Look, measure your words, don't mistreat them
[the COCODE leaders]. This is about dialogue. You are not going to impose things on them
that they don't want.’ So, it’s opened up, and many people come together now. Every day the
COCODE is stronger in this regard. You could see it yesterday [in the meeting], young people
participating, women participating together.” Another rare youth COCODE president talked
about having to navigate present-day gang violence as he worked for his neighborhood; but
having grown up with the kids in the gangs, his strategy to avoid escalation was to involve
them in the process. Only in one case did a participant indicate that the potential for physical
violence or crime increased for participants, but the information he had was second-hand. He
shared, “In other places, some leaders have even been killed, there are threats, even deaths
because of being involved in these organizations. Because there is a lot of jealousy, there are
people who are very envious. It’s like what we say here: they ‘neither do, nor let do’.”
Municipal officials told a different and more inspiring story. They made a compelling
case for how PDD participants were actively improving security and preventing violence. This
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argument was fashioned in two ways. First, many of the infrastructural projects solicited by
citizens in PDD forums directly addressed the need for better security in this still volatile postconflict county. Municipal officials noted that streetlamps, gate construction, and security
camera installation were commonly requested projects, which all helped to decrease violence
levels in their towns and cities. Second, social projects including health and sports activities,
job training, and police interventions were all requested by and filtered through community
mayors and COCODEs. In many municipalities, COCODE members had formed Committees
for Violence Prevention specifically for this purpose. In one of my observations, citizens
mobilized within an open Municipal Council meeting specifically to increase police presence
in the local outdoor market where crime was on the rise. This case was not unique. One official
told me about the experience in his community with this type of request:
Municipal Official: [In our city] there was an increase in the incidence of
assault and theft, and then we had to launch a proposal that the municipal police
take to the streets to provide citizen security in support of the National Civil
Police. Right?
Researcher: And people from the community asked for that, did they want
that?
Municipal Official: Yes, yes. There was demand in social networks, posts to
the mayor's fan page, requests to the community mayors. They approached the
COCODEs demanding: “Look we want a police presence.”

In this community, one of their largest costs was labor and maintenance of the large municipal
police force. “But we do it for the neighbors,” he went on to explain, “with them we have
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succeeded in saving lives.” I did encounter one municipality, one of the most notoriously
violent satellite cities to the capital, that reported one of their COCODE leaders had been
murdered just a few blocks away from where we sat the year prior to our interview. Thus, while
there certainly were challenges and physical risks to participation in some cases, my interview
data suggested that the potential risk did not outweigh the value and impact of citizen
participation on ‘negative’ peace.
4e. Conclusion: Moving the Needle toward Peace
Whether based on quantitative or qualitive data, PDD is associated with positive
influences on peace, both ‘positive’ and ‘negative,’ in Guatemala. Furthermore, if one
considers the evidence provided above linking PDD participation with impacts on political
trust, economic well-being and development, and neighbor trust and community cohesion,
there is a common theme. The top-down nature of PDD implementation emerges as a key
driver behind the long-term success of these policy initiatives. The Councils for Urban and
Rural Development Act and the Municipal Code were referenced forty-three times in my
thirty-one municipal interviews as the impetus and basis of these developments. As one official
noted, “Through all of the peace accords, the new laws, principally the law of the Community
Development Councils, I have seen truly that communities are organizing, and we will not
easily return to the 80s, the most conflictive time of the internal war.” Another mayor
commented, “[In the accords] perhaps there was a little freedom that [the rebels] did not have,
they needed pure democracy, citizen participation, to get involved in development, to not be
just a few developing and with everyone else only a little affected. But a development that wins
all… that's why COCODEs fulfill this function, of being able to share that authority and as a
whole achieve national development and citizen participation.”
155

In one of my participant interviews, a COMUDE president brought a copy of both laws
to the interview. He emphasized their importance in carving out this system of deliberative
forums:
Our existence is based in the Councils for Urban and Rural Development Act
… it gives us the opportunity as citizens to participate in the development and
well-being of our neighbors, it is in this we are based. And we also have the
Municipal Code, in an article that gives us the freedom to organize as neighbors.
So, it allows us to have better citizen participation. We also have the
Constitution of the Republic of Guatemala, where it says we have the freedom
to organize for the benefit of our neighbors and our communities. […] Before
we weren’t considered, it wasn’t permitted, we were not educated. Today, the
people fight for their rights and participate more continuously, and they help
with the development of their communities.

Overall, Guatemala’s PDD mechanisms and their implementation during the postconflict peace process had a positive influence on peace and reconciliation looking across
political, economic, social, ‘negative,’ and ‘positive’ dimensions of peace. I would be remiss
to continue my discussion here about the links between PDD and peace without noting that
Guatemalan’s are generally not pleased with the overarching results of the peace process or
the national political system. This assessment has been documented in far greater detail in the
news and by other academics before me. To summarize this point from my own interviews:
the peace accords ambitiously overpromised and woefully underdelivered. As the
implementation of the peace accords themselves was not the focus of my study, I did not
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directly ask about this in my interview protocol. However, because Guatemalans have rather
strong feelings about the accords, I had to bide my time and strategically introduce questions
about reconciliation via PDD during my interviews. Even then, I often needed to refocus
respondents as conversation veered in this direction. By no means has the road to relative peace
been easy, and there are still many challenges. However, even if some people did not feel the
accords had achieved their purported aims, participants and municipalities reported a variety
of positive effects stemming from the PDD mechanisms launched after the war.
As with any PDD mechanism, whether it is integral to a peace process or not, there are
challenges. In Guatemala, the greatest challenge with PDD was a lack of funding to fulfill the
requests and petitions coming out of participatory deliberative processes. Additionally, though
the new laws and structures supporting citizen participation had many positive impacts, an
increase in bureaucracy and a slower pace of policy and budgetary decision making also
resulted. Finally, even where PDD made some strides, it failed to influence others. PDD had
not fully addressed some of the long-standing root causes of the conflict such as land rights,
the poor national economy and widespread poverty, or the (complete) inclusivity of political
processes. Even though more people were involved in policy decision making than during the
war, women were less engaged in PDD processes than men and political corruption and
clientelism continued to be challenges. For this reason, my informants recommended
additional investments in civic education, clearer rules and structures to manage and monitor
participation, and increased participation of a more diverse demographic.
Although I began my research anticipating that Guatemala’s suite of PDD mechanisms
would not produce promising results for peace, I concluded my fieldwork feeling quite the
opposite. Guatemala’s beautifully conceived, if not always artfully implemented, Development
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Council system was built upon a long-standing, locally rooted mechanism for citizen
participation in policy making. It took nearly twenty years to start paying dividends for peace,
but the trajectory has been upward. Having observed and met with the people engaged in these
processes, I have no doubt that this trajectory will continue.
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CHAPTER 5
EL SALVADOR: PARTICIPATORY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
FROM THE BOTTOM-UP

Honestamente, acá el poder casi siempre es político. Los espacios políticos y los espacios empresariales, por
decirlo así, son los que llevan el control de todo. Entonces, si uno quiere incidir directamente o buscar un
espacio para cambiar una cierta situación, o que se le escuche y se tome alguna precaución, algo pues, debe de
ser alguno de esos dos: político o empresarial.
Honestly, here power is almost always political. Politics and business, as you say, are in control of everything.
So, if one wants to directly influence or find a space to make a change, or to be heard and under consideration,
anything really, he should be one of the two: a politician or businessperson.

Hay una dificultad también que a veces los partidos políticos se meten al arco con las estructuras. […] Voy
para 6 meses de estar acá alcalde, pero el jefe de policía de toda esta zona nunca se reunió conmigo. Porque es
de otro partido.
It’s difficult too, sometimes the political parties get in the middle. […] I’ve been a mayor for six months, but the
police chief of the zone has never even met with me. Because he is with the other party.
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In the years leading up to the end of El Salvador’s twelve-year civil war, participatory
deliberative democracy opened new avenues of political participation for individuals otherwise
excluded from the elite-led and largely authoritarian political system prior to and during the
war. Implementation of early PDD mechanisms evolved over time as each municipality, often
through development programs funded by international aid, experimented with new ways to
engage the public in decision making. PDD mechanisms in El Salvador were numerous as of
2019, and every municipal administration had its own preferred approach. Thus, the impacts
of PDD from one town or city to the next were inconsistent. My findings suggest that as of
2008, early forms of PDD showed a mix of both positive and negative impacts across the
peace-related dimensions from my conceptual framework. The positive associations become
stronger and the negative associations become weaker by 2018.
The strongest and most consistent effect of PDD over time, often paired with various
initiatives to improve transparency and communication with the public, was an increase in trust
of local government. PDD participants demonstrate higher levels of trust in the municipality
than those that do not participate. Although municipal leaders and community members saw
improvements in economic development through projects proposed via PDD spaces, progress
was both slow and often tied to political party affiliation between the mayor and citizen
leadership within a neighborhood or village more than through mixed affiliation PDD forums.
Socially, participants expressed that they come to know their neighbors within their, often
already tight-knit, communities better in PDD forums. However, there were few opportunities
within the structure of extant PDD mechanisms to build cross-community relationships or trust.
My findings indicate that participants in PDD processes as of 2008 experienced an increased
incidence of direct personal violence than those that did not participate. ‘Negative’ peace was
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diminished rather than improved by PDD participation. A decade later in 2018, though violent
crime continued to be a challenge for El Salvador nationally, the risk to PDD participants had
normalized to the same level as non-participants. The case of El Salvador demonstrates the
promise and challenges of implementing a bottom-up approach to PDD, which encourages
innovation but is easily overshadowed by the deep divides stemming from war-era ideological
conflicts.
In the sections to follow, I describe the macro-, meso-, and micro-level implementation
of PDD and its impacts across multiple dimensions contributing to peace in El Salvador. In
section 5a, I discuss how PDD was initially introduced alongside decentralization in El
Salvador in the years leading up to the peace accords. Following, in section 5b, I outline how
PDD implementation was experienced by municipalities and participants on the ground as a
phased evolution. I then describe the various forms of PDD that were used in El Salvador
during the time of my fieldwork from 2017-2019 in section 5c. Building upon the initial
discussion of PDD’s effects described in the introduction to this chapter, section 5d explores
the impacts of PDD participation using both quantitative and qualitative data analysis at the
individual level. I close this chapter with a summary of my findings in section 5e.
5a. Context: PDD via Gradual Innovation and Institutionalization
The height of the conflict in El Salvador lasted from 1980 to 1991 resulting in the death
of over 75,000 Salvadorians (Wood, 2003, p. 8). The two primary parties to the conflict were
the Government of El Salvador, led by heads of the military with the backing of the armed
forces, and the FMLN, a left-leaning guerrilla group made up of several smaller rebel factions.
International actors supported the parties from abroad, notably the US in favor of the
government and the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Nicaragua in favor of the FMLN. Some scholars
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have pointed to the failed US-backed counter-insurgency coup in 1979 as the trigger event of
the ensuing civil war, while others site the institution of controversial agrarian reform, the
murder of Archbishop Oscar Romero, and subsequent mass shooting at his funeral in 1980
(Call, 2003; Celis Falcon, 2015; Quan, 2005). Root causes of the conflict stem from El
Salvador’s early history as a Spanish colony; socio-economic inequality, particularly land
distribution; and political exclusion. (Lopez-Reyes, 1997; Thompson, 1997; Wade, 2008).
While several attempts were made at negotiating peace throughout the 1980s,
politically-based and social-psychological approaches to mediation were unsuccessful. Only
when the UN became involved in 1990 was progress made toward a ceasefire, constitutional
revision, and judicial system restructuring (LeoGrande, 2012, pp. 4-9). The Chapultepec Peace
Accords were signed on January 16, 1992, officially ending the civil war. The accords focused
on reforming and reducing the armed forces including an end to impunity, the establishment
of a national civilian police and independent judiciary, and land reform. The key political
provision in the accords was the transition of FMLN from insurgent to political party.
However, as Ramos, López, & Quinteros (2015) point out, “the peace negotiations were
primarily carried out by the ruling and incoming elites” and “the constitutional reform resulting
from the peace accords made clear that the political parties were the only legal means of
political representation available to citizens” (p. 9-10). As such, no guarantees were made with
regards to the general public’s participation in policy making or future development.
The United Nations Mission in El Salvador or the Misión de Observadores de las
Naciones Unidas en El Salvador (ONUSAL) was charged with overseeing the cease-fire and
peace accord provisions in coordination with the National Commission for the Consolidation
of Peace (COPAZ). A United Nations Truth Commission reported a year after the accords were
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signed that 85% of human rights violations during the war were attributed to the government
(Wood, 2003, p. vii). With the help and oversight of the international community, the FMLN
successfully transitioned to a political party, participating in general elections for the first time
in 1994 and eventually winning the presidency in 2009. El Salvador’s peace negotiation and
the expanded role of ONUSAL in facilitating state-building alongside peacekeeping was hailed
as a success for the liberal post-conflict peacebuilding agenda (Holiday & Stanley, 1993).
The gradual decentralization of power to local government and PDD implementation
in El Salvador had a detailed and documented track record by international, national, and
nongovernmental organizations (Bland, 2011, 2017; International City/County Management
Association, 2004a; Torres & Humberto López, 2008; USAID, 2005). Indeed, El Salvador
received substantial support for local democratic development from international actors. These
records indicated that PDD was introduced with clear-cut deliberative elements by municipal
governments from the late 1980s through present day.
In the early 1980s, then President Duarte allocated one percent of national tax revenues
to local government for the first time in the nation’s long-term centrist and authoritarian
history. Over time, various national-level associations and codes institutionalizing
decentralization were established to devolve more power to municipalities. In 1985, citizens
began to elect mayors directly. The Municipal Code was reformed by the national legislature
in 1986 to give municipalities increased autonomy, independent decision-making power, and
budgetary control. In 1998, six percent of the national budget was designated for municipal
development projects via the Fund for the Economic and Social Development of Municipalities
or the Fondo para el Desarrollo Económico y Social de los Municipios (FODES), which
increased to eight percent in 2010 and ten percent in 2019. However, municipal elections
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employed a ‘winner take all’ electoral formula until 2015, which meant that the party to win
the mayoral seat completely controlled the Municipal Council as well. Only two reformed
election cycles had passed at the time of my fieldwork, during which Municipal Councils were
more representative of the electorate.
The Municipal Code reform of 1986 also introduced the first PDD mechanism in the
form of local Community Development Associations or Asociaciones de Desarrollo Comunal
(ADESCOs), which gave community members the legal framework to form “community
associations to participate in an organized fashion in the study, including analysis, of social
realities, problems, and needs of the community, development, and execution of projects to
benefit the same” (Decreto 542; Diario Oficial 241; Código Municipal, 1986). As of 1987, the
leading ARENA administration launched a new Foundation for Economic and Social
Development or Fundación Salvadoreña para el Desarrollo Económico y Social (FUSADES)
to direct research and funding toward liberal market ideologies and economic development
initiatives with the assistance of ADESCO leadership (Peceny & Stanley, 2001, p. 165).
These reforms built upon a movement already in motion to open new spaces for
political and civil society participation in a context in which democracy had not existed
previously. Two forces compelled El Salvador’s shift toward democracy. First, “international
actors pursued a liberal strategy of conflict resolution by promoting democracy;” and second,
“Salvadoran elites had begun to adopt liberal norms […] in order to legitimate themselves to
the international community” (Peceny & Stanley, 2001, p. 163). Ucles (1992) outlines how
workers unions began to form just before the war, and although abated temporarily by the onset
of violence, resurged with greater power and appeal across ideological divides as of the mid1980s. He goes on to indicate that these types of inlets to political inclusion ultimately
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contributed to bringing FMLN to the negotiation table and carving out their long-term space
within the political system beginning with their participation in COPAZ in 1991.
A variety of international actors were involved in funding municipal systems and
capacity building as well as directly filling city coffers for economic development and
participatory civic engagement projects, most notably the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP) and USAID (International City/County Management Association, 2004a).
Prior to the end of the civil war in 1987, the US promoted participatory governance through a
program called Municipalities in Action. This program promoted cabildos abiertos, open
Town Hall meetings, with both information-sharing and deliberative decision-making
elements (ISDEM, 2017). The program continued after the war until 1994 with various USAID
supports offered thereafter (Checchi and Company Consulting & Daniel Carr & Associates,
1994; International City/County Management Association, 2004a).
From 2000-2002, an international NGO was contracted by USAID to continue the
participatory effort under the Municipal Development and Citizen Participation Project (RTI,
2002). From 2003-2005, the same partnership instituted the Democratic Local Governance
Activity which launched participatory budgeting, known as the plan de inversión participativo
(PIP), in twenty-eight municipalities dispersed widely across the country (RTI, 2005). The
newest iteration of PDD in El Salvador took the form of participatory strategic planning or
planes estratégicas participativas (PEP) often in coordination with ADESCO and other
community leaders. This effort was spearheaded by the Sub-Secretary of Territorial
Development and Decentralization (SSDT, 2011). In addition to these mechanisms supported
by international development assistance, individual mayors and Municipal Councils also
developed their own forms of engaging the public in decision making from coordinating
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regular community visits to holding consultation meetings with key sectors of the society, such
as local business owners, to guide and influence policy development and implementation.
Though these various forms of citizen participation were slowly developed through
international development programs in small sets of municipalities with set timelines or
individual mayoral innovations, the country gradually institutionalized these mechanisms
nation-wide. A major milestone in this regard came through a substantial set of reforms to the
Municipal Code in 2005. These reforms indicated that “it is the obligation of municipal
governments to promote citizen participation, in order to inform the public about municipal
management and deal with matters that neighbors have requested as well as those that the
[Municipal] Council considers convenient” (Art. 115). The same set of reforms outlined eight
different PDD mechanisms to achieve this goal including open Municipal Council meetings,
open Town Hall meetings, mandatory budget hearings, referendums, neighborhood
consultations, the PIP, the PEP, and an expanded role for ADESCOs. The revised Municipal
Code also left open the possibility of the local Municipal Council and mayor to develop new
mechanisms as they saw fit. As Bland (2017) suggested, “this case of sustainability and
institutionalization […] may allow us to be more optimistic about the potential effects of
participation” in El Salvador.
Though PDD had become institutionalized in law, there was reason to believe that
implementation was uneven and still under development. For example, records of municipal
PEPs were still not available in many towns and cities during my administrative document
review even though the PEP was mandated in the Municipal Code for over a decade at that
time. In the next section, I share how current municipal officials and PDD participants
experienced the evolution of these mechanisms in post-conflict El Salvador.
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5b. Implementation: Scaling PDD Prototypes from the Field
From 2017-2019, over twenty-five years after the conflict ended in El Salvador, I spoke
with thirty-seven local officials in twenty-six of the nation’s municipalities and thirty-six PDD
participants across seven municipalities to understand how PDD was implemented, how it was
functioning across the country, and the impacts of these mechanisms created to engage citizens
in policy decision making. Tables 13 and 14 below show the number of municipalities I
interviewed and observed in each quadrant of my case selection matrix at the meso-level.

Table 13: El Salvador Municipal Interview Sample Matrix
Case
Selection
Matrix

Majority Urban
Municipalities

Mixed Urban/Rural
Municipalities

Majority Rural
Municipalities

Left-leaning
Municipal
Leadership

x3 sites

x3 sites

x5 sites

Right-leaning
Municipal
Leadership

x6 sites

x4 sites

x5 sites

Table 14: El Salvador Municipal Observation Sample Matrix
Case
Selection
Matrix

Majority Urban
Municipalities

Mixed Urban/Rural
Municipalities

Majority Rural
Municipalities

Left-leaning
Municipal
Leadership

x1 site

x1 site

x1* site

Right-leaning
Municipal
Leadership

x1 site

x1 site

x2* sites

*One site’s municipal administration changed from FMLN to ARENA during my fieldwork.
My observation took place under the ARENA administration.
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Of the PDD participants I interviewed, 54% identified as female, 41% identified as
male, and 5% identified with other or no gender. The majority were adults (64%) with more
youth (33%) than elderly (3%) individuals. As stated in the research methods chapter, my
participant interview sample is similar to the nationally representative AmericasBarometer
sample of PDD participants with regards to demographics; however, this was not the case with
political party. In my sample, 28% of PDD participants declined to report a political party,
18% specifically noted no affiliation or a-political, 31% affiliated with FMLN, 13% with
ARENA, and 10% with Nuevas Ideas or GANA the parties of the newly elected president.
This distribution over-represents FMLN-affiliated PDD participants, as only 7% of PDD
participants reported that they were FMLN in the AmericasBarometer sample. The explanation
for this oversampling is two-fold: 1) I rarely encountered ARENA participants in FMLNcontrolled municipalities, and 2) ARENA administrations I worked with tended to be rather
new to their roles. As a result, I pull heavily from a small number of ARENA participant
interviews (x5) in my discussion below. Given the history of PDD implementation in El
Salvador, FMLN participant perspectives may well skew trends identified in my qualitative
data toward greater enthusiasm for PDD processes, as these forums for citizen participation
were occasioned directly by FMLN pressure during the final years of the civil war and the
FMLN controlled the national executive branch throughout the period of. my fieldwork.
My interviews confirmed that PDD developed through small-scale innovations by
municipal officials and non-governmental organizations both local and international. Each
municipality employed a mixture of mechanisms with a high level of variation. While
decentralization of state power and government transparency was propelled forward through
the peace process, PDD was not instituted explicitly as a mechanism or tool for peacebuilding.
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Thus, as municipal officials I interviewed explained, each municipality and administration in
succession developed its own approach to engaging citizens in public decision making. Only
three of thirty-seven municipal officials and one of thirty-six participants reported that there
were no significant changes when local administrations changed leadership. In total, I
encountered ten distinct types of PDD. While several mechanisms were unique to a particular
context or a single mayor’s vision, the most common mechanisms included public assemblies,
ADESCOs, and participatory planning. Most other PDD processes were loosely tied to the
ADESCOs in that the same community leaders participated in multiple forums, but there were
also other mechanisms in use open to the broader public. During my interviews, I encountered
examples of all mechanisms outlined in the Municipal Code as well as some initiatives yet
without any basis in law.
Eleven of the municipal officials I interviewed had been working with the municipality
for over ten years, and just a few of those individuals could speak to how PDD developed in
El Salvador after the war. Those with memory of the evolution described the implementation
of PDD in the country as a learning process. ADESCOs and open Town Hall meetings were
introduced in the ‘first phase’ of PDD implementation prior to the end of the war. They offered
now-elected public officials an opportunity to “share their ideas with the city and, by doing so,
give them legitimacy,” according to one official, but rarely gave citizens the opportunity to
vote on projects or ideas put forth. The shift to a more empowering form of participatory
democracy began in the late 1990s. Largely promoted by political leaders in municipalities
under left-leaning FMLN control. According to a FMLN mayor, this ‘second phase’ of PDD
introduced participatory budgeting inspired by the Brazilian Worker’s Party out of Sao Paulo.
As this long-term public official explained:
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We introduced the participatory budgeting process in assemblies. In these
assemblies some coming from the left idealized too much; they led local leaders
to understand that they were going to form a local Development Council and
whatever they decided was going to dictate how the Municipal Council and the
mayor should invest. It was set-up in an almost-military structure! That caused
the first conflict, the first clash that occurred between the legal authority and
the participatory structure that had been formed to help the mayor meet with the
people and turn the tide of local economic development. So, that first stage was
quite complicated. […] The [former] mayor realized that he had made a
mistake. That first phase ended with community leaders enraged and dispersed.

In response to this negative and conflict-inducing experience in the second phase, the
‘third phase’ redistributed authority over decision making back to municipalities giving
officials greater control over the process. Municipalities began to register the ADESCOs to
give them legal authority under the Municipal Code to speak on behalf of their neighborhoods
for the improvement and development of the community. While the basis of the ADESCO
system was rooted in El Salvador’s 1983 constitution promoting citizen cooperation with
municipal governments, I learned from two officials that they only started to register
ADESCOs and formalize this PDD forum in the 2000s. The legally recognized nature of
ADESCOs gave them the privilege to propose development ideas and accept and administer
funds to implement projects. As one official explained, “As they have to have a statute, they
have to be a legal and recognized organization, because if an ADESCO does not have legal
authority, they cannot manage funds.”
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Building on this system of ADESCOs, municipalities began to introduce participatory
strategic planning processes in which each neighborhood would come together in a facilitated
‘diagnostic’ session to prioritize needs. However, this too involved an evolution, as the below
except from one interview demonstrates:
Municipal Official: That [strategic planning] stage was also limited because
people could participate in creating the budget, but only in one project or social
investment in each neighborhood assigned year-by-year. And it's like you might
imagine. In a poor city, when the budget is as tight as it was twelve years ago,
you say: “For your neighborhood you have 15 thousand dollars.” Well, what
are you going to do with that? And the people, all with their little piece, want
to have their ...
Researcher: “My project, my project!”
Municipal Official:

Exactly. Then it turned to madness! So, then we

introduced a prioritization matrix based on population, based on social benefit,
based on priority, based on poverty, based on marginality, vulnerability,
urgency, etc. When those assemblies ended, everyone loved the group process.
Why? Because they won specific projects and the rest said, “Better luck next
time.”

However, not all communities had progressed to this third phase of PDD. Though participatory
planning was mandatory for municipal governments as of the last reforms to the Municipal
Code, in six of the twenty-six municipalities I interviewed, they had yet to develop a strategic
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plan. In over half of those with strategic plans, they had only developed one plan thus far,
which in at least two cases had long since expired.
As of the time of my fieldwork, PDD continued to be implemented in various formats,
often in tandem. In this ‘fourth phase,’ there was wide acceptance amongst municipal officials
that they should engage citizens in public policy decision making. However, each municipal
administration had its own unique approach and mixture of PDD mechanisms. Indeed, no two
municipalities that I interviewed were employing the same set of PDD mechanisms, although
community size and political party did produce some overarching patterns in approach. In the
following section, I outline how each mechanism is structured and its variants across
communities.

5c. Structure: Locally Situated, Innovative, and Easily Derailed
Interviews with municipalities in El Salvador revealed new and innovative ways that
local mayors and Municipal Councils engaged citizens in public policy decision making at the
local level. Every municipality offered its own banquet of PDD options based on the tastes of
their leadership and local traditions, with a handful of common strategies used more broadly.
Some innovations were unique, pushing the roles and expectations of the citizen’s role in the
policy process to new levels and engaging members of both political parties in the process.
Others were clearly entrenched in the post-war two-party system, such that political favoritism
and corruption were simply the name of the game.
The three most common PDD mechanisms used in El Salvador, according to municipal
officials, were open Town Hall meetings or public assemblies typically in the form of budget
hearings, ADESCOs, and PEPs. It is important to note that these three mechanisms were also
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those required by law within the Municipal Code. Of the officials I spoke with, 96% discussed
open Town Hall meetings or public assemblies, 96% mentioned ADESCOs, and 77% said they
had developed a PEP in coordination with citizens. As these were the most common
mechanisms, I outline how each of these PDD mechanisms was structured in turn below.

Open Town Hall Meetings
Open Town Hall meetings, or assemblies as they were most often called, were
reportedly the oldest PDD process in El Salvador. Fourteen municipalities described holding
these meetings once per year, while others reported holding them after each project or
quarterly. Often the meetings included both a budget hearing, in which the town or city shared
its spending allocations over the last year, and a time for community leaders to present projects
they would like to see funded in the upcoming year. However, the way public assemblies were
executed ranged widely. The ‘traditional’ cabildo abierto, or open Town Hall meeting during
which ideas were received by formal letter, was infrequently used even though this was one of
the first mechanisms re-introduced in the post-war era. Indeed, when asked directly about the
cabildo abierto, several municipalities called the mechanism “outdated” or “almost extinct.”
As one mayor explained, “Even the name tells you that it comes from the colonial era where
the rulers dictated their ideas to the city and there have them legitimized, with the hands of the
masses raised to protest but rarely put to vote.”
However, many elements of the ‘traditional’ cabildos abiertos made appearances in the
more detailed descriptions of the popular public assemblies or budget hearings. For example,
most budget hearings consisted of a presentation by the mayor on projects completed and
planned, followed by a question-and-answer session that tended to involve community
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members informally requesting new projects or inquiring about the status of previously
submitted project solicitations. In both types of the public assemblies I observed, the
presentations always ended with community members approaching the podium or raising their
hands from their seats to discuss their own neighborhood’s project proposals or challenges.
The two most prominent formats of open Town Hall meetings were municipality-wide public
assemblies or budget hearings, reported in twenty-five of the twenty-six municipalities I
interviewed, and then a traveling version with a virtually identical agenda by neighborhood,
reported in sixteen municipalities. Municipal-wide public assemblies tended to be the approach
for mayors of larger cities, whereas traveling variations were more frequent in smaller towns.
Attendance at municipal-wide public assemblies ranged from 300 in a smaller town to
over 1000 citizens in a larger city, according to my municipal interviews. Unfortunately, I was
unable to observe first-hand a municipal-wide public assembly during the window of my
fieldwork in El Salvador as these types of events only take place once per year. However, two
of my municipalities published videos of every large assembly or budget hearing, as well as
every Municipal Council meeting, on their Facebook pages. Thus, I was able to observe the
flow of these events and their size via video stream in December of 2018 and May of 2019.
Attendees visible in the videos were of all sexes and ages, including small children. As one
might anticipate, large events such as these were highly prescriptive and more informative than
interactive. In the first observation, there was no community member participation at all. The
meeting proceeded directly from a welcome address by the mayor to a PowerPoint presentation
by the director of one of the city’s most popular programs involving student scholarships. In
the second observation, one ADESCO leader had been selected to speak on behalf of the
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community for three minutes of the forty-five-minute presentation, and her remarks expressed
gratitude for a handful of projects completed in the community in the last year.
Based on my interviews, deliberation appeared to increase in municipal-wide
assemblies as the community size decreased. In one mid-sized town with a large urban center,
the municipal-wide open Town Hall meeting was described as such:
Each year the mayor discusses, alongside the City Council, the different
activities completed and projects in development in the various communities of
the city, which include eighteen city neighborhoods and 146 suburbs outside
the urban area. Here it’s largely informative, and at the same time, communities
can submit petitions to the Council and mayor where they are then prioritized
according to funding, which projects have a greater need, and which ones are
short-term, medium-term, or long-term. This is something the Council uses to
make decisions, based on the priority, need, or urgency for the community.

Another official from a mid-sized town of the opposite political party explained,
“Honestly, there is not much dialogue. The way it works is that citizens present their requests
and they are given a limited amount of time only. So about ten people are going to speak, or
maybe fifteen, and the rest will just turn in their petitions at the end. […] Each project is given
an estimated budget for completion, and all of those requests then go into sequence.”
On a spectrum of deliberation, information exchange, and opportunities for intergroup
contact, open Town Hall meetings offered little chance for citizens to engage with one another
or determine outcomes to maximize community benefit. Thus, these mechanisms received a
score of zero points in the categories of respect for counter arguments and constructive politics.
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Given the lack of actual deliberation in these municipal-wide assemblies, these mechanisms
scored quite low on the DQI and CQI overall with resultant scores of 7/13 and 6/8 respectively.
As such, one may not classify these events as PDD mechanisms at all. In my participant
interviews, those that had attended a budget hearing or public assembly did not have much to
say about them. “I went one time. Yeah, one time,” shared one interviewee, “It’s only when
the mayor holds them, at the end of every year they do it. He invites all the leaders for a budget
hearing.” When I asked community leaders to rank PDD processes by how effective they were
at getting things done for their communities, not one PDD participant listed open Town Hall
meetings at the top of the list.
In two of the five mid-to-small sized towns I observed during my fieldwork, mayors
had opted to conduct their annual budget hearings or public assemblies within each village or
neighborhood separately. Attendance at these events ranged from 80 to 100 people, again with
a wide diversity of participants from small children to youth, adults, and elderly populations.
A small-town mayor described his travelling assembly mechanism in this way: “The majority
of mayors hold an assembly and send out invites to some community ADESCOs and then do
just one assembly, and most importantly usually in the town or city center. I go out by
neighborhood, each neighborhood, and I do my meetings by neighborhood. So, because we
have two large town center neighborhoods, I do around sixteen assemblies every six months.”
In my three observations of this type of assembly, which were much easier to catch because of
their frequency, there were more opportunities for participation and dialogue between the
mayor(s) and community members. Approximately 30% of the meeting time was designated
for questions and comments after the mayor and his team presented during my observations.
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In one of my observations in a rural village of a small municipality, the mayor and
some national-level legislators gave a presentation about an upcoming household survey they
planned to run to help policy makers determine the need for a series of social benefit programs
targeting infants, young mothers, and the elderly. This sparked a series of remarks from
community members with feedback on the proposal. One individual approached the
microphone and requested that the proposed monthly stipends under this program be raised.
Another, who did not wish to speak into the microphone, simply yelled out from the crowd:
“Will you be sending people to our homes [for the survey]?” The legislator at the microphone
replied, “Yes, but don’t be scared. It’s okay.” However, the elderly female participant was not
persuaded, and yelled back, “Well, you better send someone from our same party, so we aren’t
worried!” As these exchanges demonstrate, the traveling-type of public assemblies do allow
more room for debate. On the DQI and CQI, this PDD mechanism scored an average of 10.5/13
and 5/8 respectively. The categories that scored low in these meetings were constructive
politics on the DQI and equal status on the CQI because there was little effort to build
consensus or make decisions in these spaces, and speakers directly brought in positional
politics which resulted in inequitable treatment of those from alternative political parties.
This last quoted exchange highlights an interesting dynamic I saw in all traveling
budget hearings and assemblies, related to El Salvador’s deeply engrained, war-era
partisanship. Regardless of the town or political party of the mayor I was observing, these
events tended to be highly politicized. The mayor and municipal officials in attendance often
wore t-shirts or hats for their political party, and remarks tended to progress from general
announcements about community projects or spending to direct requests that participants vote
for the mayor’s party in the upcoming national elections or band together on a policy issue
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pursued by one party or another. Even if the mayor did not make such remarks him or herself,
the participants would. In the same observation I referenced above, the very first public remark
during the assembly was one of congratulations to the FMLN legislators in attendance, “Thank
you for the [water rights] march on Wednesday. We need to put some fear into those on the
right!” One might attribute this trend to the fact that most of my observations took place either
just before or after the national-level elections in El Salvador, but my participant interviews
suggest that this tendency is the rule versus the exception.
Despite the limits of deliberation with a large number of attendees, whether in
municipal-wide or neighborhood assemblies, many local officials felt that this forum was the
best way to understand the full range of views within the community. As one mayor reflected,
“What I want to do, to change, is to have more assemblies, more participation. When I meet
with only one ADESCO, just 10 people, sometimes they just tell me the message they want
me to hear when it would be better to meet with 100 or 200 people.” Others saw assemblies as
the best way to hold elected officials accountable, “On certain occasions, not always but in
certain cases, we do assemblies. We invite the community here to the municipality, in a couple
of cases only four people attend and other times 700 or 300 people, where we tell people the
projects we want to complete and who on the [Municipal] Council voted yes or no. […] There
are various Council members that reject projects, so we call together the community so that
they know who voted for a project to save lives or not.”
As hinted at by this last quote, assemblies could be used as a tool for large-scale,
participatory conflict resolution. In one case I was told about, for example, an assembly was
called so that the Municipal Council could hear feedback about the impact of raising local
taxes. Similarly, an assembly was used to decide whether to take out a large municipal loan
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and raise the city debt ceiling in another town. In a larger city, an assembly was used to shut
down a strip of bars that was attracting crime and disreputable behavior near a city schoolyard.
In these cases, dialogue and voting was reportedly used within the assembly to build the case
for policy decisions. As such, though not always reaching a high level of deliberation, the
public assembly could be a powerful tool within the set of PDD mechanisms in El Salvador.
Note again, though, the political implications of PDD usage in this way. When I asked
municipal officials to reflect on whether PDD mechanisms such as assemblies were impactful,
they would often reference re-election to office as their measure of success.

Local Development Associations
ADESCOs, another commonly employed mechanism, were the bedrock of all PDD
forums in El Salvador. One public official described the role of ADESCOs in his community
as such:
These organizations at the municipal level help us to understand the needs of
their communities; because the leaders are there living in the neighborhood,
each one of them brings to the mayor’s office the projects or local
improvements that are required, like paving roads or upgrading the local school.
[…] This is our primary interaction with citizens, represented by those involved
in the ADESCOs. They prioritize needs and requests and, generally, they look
out for the development of their community and the welfare of their population.

Participants, too, backed up this assertion. As one participant shared, “The ADESCO has a lot
of impact because the community participates there. We present projects to the community,
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and the community participates and say they like it or don't like it. We communicate to them
about what is happening. We are the vehicle of communication between the mayor's office and
the community.” When asked to rank the impact of various forms PDD used in El Salvador,
participants would nearly always list ADESCOs at the top, rivaled only by committees within
the political party structure.
ADESCOs members met within their neighborhoods either monthly or as needed and
often had a rotational audience with the mayor at least once per year. ADESCOs required a
minimum of twenty-five community members to officially register as an association, with 810 leaders listed as part of the Board of Directors with the positions of President, Vice
President, Secretary, Treasurer, and members. Every year, according to the Municipal Code—
or every two years, according to all but one of my interviewees—communities would hold an
assembly to vote for who will serve on the ADESCO board. These meetings were sometimes
overseen by a municipal official, whose only function on paper was to verify the result and
maintain a record of the proceedings. The meeting minutes were then submitted to the
municipality and a national registry, alongside their articles of incorporation, to formally
register the association nationally. Once registered, the ADESCO had an elevated legal status,
which allowed them to request projects and manage budgets from the municipality as well as
third parties. There were two predominate ADESCO formats, the more common
geographically-based ADESCO and the less common and newer thematic ADESCO organized
around a common issue such as ‘women’ or ‘education.’ The next paragraphs discuss each
type in turn.
Geographically-based ADESCOs were comprised solely of neighbors from one
neighborhood, suburb, or rural community. Depending on the community, there was just one
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ADESCO per neighborhood or village or multiple ADESCOs by geographic area. Their
primary focus was to secure funding for community development projects. As such, these
ADESCOs were often better organized in rural communities that tended to lack basic amenities
and felt greater urgency around development than their urban counterparts. One municipal
official described the difference in this way, “In the rural area they ask for schools, health
centers, or more general things, street pavement going into the community. Whereas in the
city, people ask for more personal things, that help them get a job, like paving the road right in
front of their house.” Another official explained:
ADESCOs are formed in places where there is a prominent level of poverty.
[…] There they don’t even have anything to eat because they just don’t, and
there the situation is really bad. They lack water, they don’t have electricity, the
roads are bad. So, there, the municipality needs to go out and install at least
basic services, so they don’t fall into a deplorable situation. Thus, they value
this, they value that they can participate to get something that will solve one of
these problems.

While the most common ADESCO format, reported in twenty-five of the twenty-six
municipalities I interviewed, the limitations of this geographically-based formation were twofold. First, the distribution of benefits was uneven between communities. ADESCOs situated
in neighborhoods with a higher overall socio-economic class tended to be better educated and
organized, therefore securing more projects. Neighborhoods that voted for the local mayor
would also receive more benefits. This concentrated resources for development in only certain
communities.
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Regarding the socio-economic class of a neighborhood, urban versus rural community
dynamics came into play. “In a community that’s organized,” one municipal official shared,
“it’s easier to develop projects and provide resources.” Organization was not necessarily linked
to education level, but leadership with the ability to read and write was essential in a system
dependent on written proposals and legal documentation. In communities with high rates of
illiteracy, often in rural areas, it could be a challenge to overcome the bureaucratic hurdles
associated with making municipal requests or undertaking the research needed to direct the
request elsewhere. This challenge was reported in six of my seventy interviews with officials
and participants.
A far more frequently reported challenge facing geographically-based ADESCOs,
shared by nineteen of thirty-six PDD participants in my interviews, was political favoritism
toward neighborhoods known to have voted for the current mayor’s political party. While
mayors would never directly say that they prioritized projects for their political allies,
participants made dynamic this clear. “It’s a matter of party favoritism. That weighs heavily in
this country. So, obviously, if here in our village there are people who are not in favor of the
FMLN, which today is in charge of the mayor's office, there are problems.” In this case, the
individual I interviewed was reflecting on the difficulty of getting a project approved when
geographically-based ADESCO leadership was known to be of the opposing party to the
mayor. But the knife cut both ways. As outlined in greater detail by another participant in the
same municipality, political alliances helped one ADESCO pull strings to get things done.
In my own personal case, I am the president of the ADESCO. In the political
arena, outside of my community, I work with the party, the FMLN party and
the mayor as the top official of this community. I am personally responsible,
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because I am the head of the center, and it is up to me as the head of the center
to organize all the political events in which the mayor participates. All political
events where there will be a meeting, an open Town Hall, community visits.
[…] That is one of our principal functions, to be that link with the community.
As a community leader, in line with the mayor's office and the party, there’s a
greater possibility of having direct contact. So, I think that when communities
are organized in this way, it becomes easier to solve community problems.

While this example shows a more extreme case of the influence of politics on ADESCOs,
given that this individual was both in party leadership and community leadership, this storyline
came up in seven other participant interviews. The phenomenon was reported more often in
urban or suburban areas, where tribalism by party manifested more directly than in tight-knit
rural communities in which neighbors relied on one another for support regardless of party
affiliation.
The second limitation of geographically-based ADESCOs was that communities rarely
had an opportunity to share experiences across neighborhoods. Without any cross-cutting
themes to bring together sports-lovers, women, or environmentalists, most project requests that
filtered up to the municipalities through geographically-based ADESCOs were focused on
infrastructure versus social programming. Capital versus social projects were coded at a ratio
of 2:1 in my interviews. This was because, as one might imagine, infrastructure was more
obviously beneficial across stakeholder groups within a geographic area. Uniting public
opinion could still be quite challenging, though, as one municipal official explained:

183

It is exceedingly difficult when it comes to wanting to unite a community or
wanting to unite a neighborhood around a common good, and you cannot. Like
I said, there are good things and there are bad things. We want everything to be
good, but sometimes we cannot raise people's awareness, and they’re going to
reprimand us for the very same thing, right? “But you did not bring us food,”
“You didn’t do this, you didn’t do that,” and it makes us sad. A man once said
to us, after we had just paved a new street, “Why did you do the street when I
don’t have anything to eat? The street? Really? I want food. […] I do not even
have a car. How does this help me? That's only good for people who have a
car.” I said, “But you do not dream of the day you have a car, or maybe your
child who may one day have a vehicle, or that it becomes easier to sow your
vegetables in the field when the road is good?’ […] So, it's quite sad when we
cannot make people aware that everything, everything helps.

Infrastructural investments are vital in a country that still struggles with high poverty rates and
low levels of development; however, most municipal officials agreed that social programs were
central to overcoming key issues such as crime rates, the gender gap, or climate change.
During my time in the field, I had the opportunity to observe two geographically-based
ADESCO meetings, one in an urban area and one in a rural area. I was also invited to see one
neighborhood ADESCO project in execution. In both cases, the formal ADESCO meetings
took place without municipal representatives. The deliberative quality of these spaces was
quite high. In the rural ADESCO meeting, one community had been raising funds to build a
community cemetery for several years. They had purchased the land for the project but were
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now faced with the decision to attempt to raise the funds for all of the building permits and
environmental risk assessments for the construction themselves or to donate the land to the
municipality which would then take the lead on those processes. The meeting was attended by
just under 30 community members, about 50/50 men versus women and skewed toward
individuals over age 60. After the ADESCO president shared the details of the two alternative
paths forward, a lively debate sparked with community members shouting out their questions,
ideas, and hesitations and the ADESCO board and other community members responding to
each comment in turn. In the end, the community took a vote by hand, with around 60% of
those in attendance opting to donate the land to the municipality. One individual on the board
apparently against the outcome told the crowd, “You know full well that people will soon start
saying we ‘stole’ their money for the cemetery. So, you better remember this vote, and tell
your friends.” The president indicated his agreement with this sentiment. Interactions like this
during ADESCO meetings pushed the DQI scores up for these PDD mechanisms in the
categories of counterarguments and constructive politics where other PDD processes tend to
lose points, resulting in an average score of 11/13. However, given that municipal
representatives were not present in these meetings and because there was rarely equality of
status and cross-community or political party contact in these spaces, the average CQI score
was only 5/8.
Thematic ADESCOs and their less formal counterpart in the form of thematic local
committees, while certainly rarer, were mentioned in seventeen (65%) of my municipal
interviews. These theme-based ADESCOs took two main forms. The first type involved
creating an entity akin to an ADESCO with a focused agenda. The second type involved
assigning committee leaders within each ADESCO to work on thematic issues. In this case,
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the committees did not have their own formal registration with the municipality, but they could
make requests and participate in municipal deliberations and events as representatives of a
thematic issue within a neighborhood-based ADESCO. The most frequently noted forms of
thematic ADESCOs or committees focused on crime prevention as reported in thirteen
municipalities, sports clubs as reported in twelve municipalities, water boards as reported in
four municipalities, women as reported in three communities, and disaster prevention and
response as reported in three communities. Other examples of thematically-based ADESCOs
included youth groups, religious groups, environmental groups, and farmers or other business
associations.
The main types of thematically-based ADESCOs or committees were developed in
response to national-level laws or initiatives boasting established funding sources. Violence
Prevention Committees formed largely in response to the national Plan El Salvador Seguro,
which was launched in 2015 to reduce crime rates via preventative programming,
improvements to the criminal justice system, rehabilitation programming, victim response, and
improved institutional efficiency. Sports clubs were often set up as part of the preventative
programming suite because they provided a productive pastime for youth. “In the violence
prevention pipeline, there is a technician that visits schools to work with the children and
adolescents. The aim is to keep them busy—exercising, painting, or playing sports,” explained
one municipal official. These Violence Prevention Committees brought together community
stakeholders across sectors to develop a unified response to crime. This initiative was funded
by USAID in communities with the highest crime rates. One small, largely rural municipality
I interviewed had jumped on board with a similar mechanism, supported by local NGOs.
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Women’s participation was a focal point for policy in El Salvador for the past decade.
In 2011, El Salvador passed the Law of Equality, Equity, and Eradication of Discrimination
against Women (Decreto No. 645), which called upon local governments to create policies to
promote women’s equality. In three municipalities, my interviewees mentioned the creation of
committees to encourage women’s participation in policy making specifically. Similarly, Civil
Protection Commissions were launched as of 2013 as part of the National Civil Protection,
Prevention, and Disaster Mitigation Plan. They were slowly becoming a mandatory
thematically-based commission, housed under the umbrella of the neighborhood ADESCO.
However, the formalization and registration of these commissions was still substantially
underdeveloped, or fully unrealized, in many municipalities. Such commissions were
mentioned in only three of my municipal interviews.
These thematic ADESCOs appeared to have two benefits. First, they tended to draw in
individuals passionate about the issue at hand. This motivated progress. “We have an
association of farmers and ranchers, we have an association of women, we have a youth
association, we have an association of evangelical churches; that’s how we achieved the goal
(to organize all of the municipality). It is not easy to bring alive the various forces in a
municipality,” one mayor shared. During my fieldwork, several community members reported
participation in sports committees, farmer’s associations, water boards, or women’s groups.
One ADESCO president, for example, shared how he started a youth motorcycle club with
other community leaders and had solicited support for an upcoming tournament and track
modification through the municipality. His excitement and motivation for this project came
out immediately upon starting our interview, and his leadership in this club was presented with
the same level of importance as his geographically-based ADESCO role.
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Water board members, in particular, had to be passionate about the job. These entities
were often formed in rural areas to manage water distribution, quality, and billing. Despite the
incredible amount of responsibility involved in this role, such that two water board members
in one small municipality said they spent 60% of their time focused on tasks of the board, the
members were unpaid. When I inquired about what motivated them to serve voluntarily in such
a work-intensive, unremunerated role, one participant explained, “It is something that is born,
I believe, from the heart. It is of my own will, to bring well-being to the community. I like to
participate.”
Second, there was a greater level of diversity in terms of education level, life
circumstances, and political party affiliation in thematic ADESCOs or committees. The most
effective ADESCOs I observed or spoke with, under any administration, were comprised of a
diversity of members: the retired businessperson, a stay-at-home mom, a lawyer, a teacher, a
farmer, and a construction worker. Amongst them, they could assign the most time-consuming
tasks to those with the most ‘free time,’ while technical work such as writing up petitions or
organizing neighbors to help install new drainage systems could be taken on by resident
experts. Similarly, ADESCOs with more diverse political party representation were better
placed to receive benefits no matter which party controlled the municipal administration. As
one ADESCO participant shared, “It’s important for us to have relationships with different
parties, because if my guy wins instead of theirs, then help comes to the community. If it goes
instead to the other guy, they still come out to the community.”
However, this was not often how things unfolded in geographically-focused
ADESCOs. Often, the workload ended up on one or two capable, wealthy, or well-connected
individuals that pulled the weight of the community. Apathy or disinterest in continued
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participation was reported in thirteen of my seventy interviews. The shift toward thematic
ADESCOs was a response to this as well: “That is why we want to go in the direction of
themes, because right now, if we want to address a sports issue, we will look for the president.
If we want to address an infrastructure issue, ‘let's find the president.’ If we want to address a
woman's issue, ‘let's find the president.’ If we want to address any issue, ‘let's find the
president’.” In this community, the local community development official elaborated his plan
for a more effective ADESCO system in our interview, one that combined the regular
leadership roles alongside thematic committee heads. “That is why we want to shift, so the
work is distributed across the collective, not just one leader, but several leaders.”
While in the field I observed two local project-focused committee meetings, one urban
and one rural. I also visited two different projects in execution, one by a project-focused
committee and the other by a women’s group. Unlike geographic ADESCOs, thematic
committees were usually facilitated by municipal representatives and community leadership in
tandem. During one project-focused committee observation with plans to install a
neighborhood park, the municipal representative in charge welcomed participants to the space
saying, “We hope to empower the community through this process, to ensure you all are the
decision makers.” The three main parties he called out as stakeholders were the municipality,
the community, and the Social Investment Fund for Local Development or the Fondo de
Inversión Social para el Desarrollo Local (FISDL) which funnels international development
funding to projects. ADESCO leaders were identified as important actors, although only two
of four ADESCOs in the suburb were represented. Despite the warm welcome, the community
itself was not pleased with project progress to date and held the municipality to account. “It
has been a year since we last met, and the community has lost hope. Why did the project just
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stop?” In response, the municipal officials and FISDL representatives explained why the
project had been stalled and proceeded to outline how far they had come with the project plans
developed by a third party.
Once the plans had been presented, a debate sparked about elements the community
wanted to change. Two different ADESCO leaders, of two separate parties as I eventually
learned, then presented counterarguments. One asked that changing rooms be added to the
plan, and the other suggested that the entire plan be scrapped. The second participant’s
justification was sophisticated in that he provided two reasons for his demand: “Speaking for
the ADESCO, well just my community, I don’t presume to speak for the whole community,
we have an issue with black water. This is a serious issue. Every time you come to town; we
show up. It’s been over a year on this project, and we have other priorities too.” Initially, the
municipality downgraded both suggestions as they had already invested considerable time to
get the plan through the permitting and risk assessment processes. The community pushed
back, however, ultimately concluding that it was worth still investing in the project but with
the addition of bathrooms to the existing plans at the cost of some gazebos. This decision was
made via vote. The diversity of participants and opinions did push all stakeholders to weigh in
on mediating proposals, but uninterrupted participation and respect for counterarguments
scored lower on the DQI scorecard due to interrupted speech acts and pushback from the
municipality on community ideas. The CQI would have been scored higher, but youth group
representatives in the space were not treated with equal status. When the youth group president
suggested that novel ideas should be open to debate, the ADESCOs shut him down. As such,
the average DQI and CQI score for this PDD mechanism was 9/13 and 5/8 respectively.
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Ultimately, ADESCOs were the most important of the PDD mechanisms in El
Salvador. They were established in 96% of the municipalities I interviewed, and participants
reported feeling the most empowered by these spaces versus the others. ADESCOs allowed
for a higher level of deliberation than open Town Hall meetings and had the legal legitimacy
to petition for projects from the municipality. However, their influence was mediated by the
municipal government. While municipal officials indicated that they deferred to communities
or made decisions based on urgency or need, participants said these decisions often came down
to politics. As one participant described, “If you [INGO] bring a project or social good for an
undefined community, it will pass through the government to say where it should be
designated. They will send it where there are people who backed their political campaign.”
This type of narrative was reported by just over 50% of participants I interviewed. Given that
the Municipal Councils in El Salvador had the final say over any project’s implementation,
ADESCOs helped direct resources to community needs by identifying them and submitting
petitions. However, they did not give citizens much, if any, control over decision making, and
they could be a source of discontent and disillusionment when politics influenced resource
distribution.

Participatory Budgeting and Planning
Participatory budgeting programs still existed in some communities despite the
challenges experienced in the ‘second phase’ of PDD development in El Salvador, but they
had fallen out of favor. In place of annual budgets co-developed with the community, most
municipalities had a participatory strategic plan, more commonly referred to as the PEP, that
was renewed every few years. This PEP dictated a portion of the city or town’s annual
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operating budget, and it was the third most frequently cited PDD mechanism in use. As one
official described, “With the participatory budget, it’s really just that the participatory strategic
plan outlines around 70% of the budget. Thus, 70% of our budget is set aside for projects and
that part of the budget has been generated from what the community says they need.” The PEP
was developed in consultation with community members through workshop-style focus groups
in which participants, often facilitated by an external consultant, were asked to list areas of
need and projects that would address those needs for inclusion in subsequent annual budgets.
As described by one official:
We hire a company that goes out when it is time to do the three-year plan. The
plan lasts for whatever period that the mayor has chosen. […] The methodology
that the facilitator employed was simple. Each neighborhood would prioritize
three projects of however many they requested, the first was the most important
and the third the least important. The consultant then put together a report for
the city, and that’s our strategic plan.
Another municipal official outlined the process in almost the same way for his community:
This PEP was developed from participation in each of our five neighborhoods,
its people, and all the groups. […] We hired a company to go out there, to take
the time for us to make a three-year plan, which lasts for the period that the
mayor has chosen. The methodology the company followed was simple. They
simply prioritize three items of the heap (each neighborhood) requested. So,
from the range of projects they requested, they prioritized three: the first most
important, the second least important, the third that is. What is in the plan right
now is what they prioritized.
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The size of strategic planning meetings ranged from forty to over 100 people
depending on community size and neighborhood boundaries according to municipal officials.
PEP development tended to follow a multi-phase process, involving multiple meetings of
constituents from each neighborhood over a period several months, sometimes 3 months other
times as many as 6 months. Given the intensive nature of the PEP development process, and
its culminating written report, this mechanism was highlighted as one of the most “eyeopening” or “valuable” PDD processes in use. As one mayor stated, “This [PEP] helped us a
lot because we could see what people needed, and it was repeated in the polls. […] The biggest
problems that people are dealing with at the moment, and about which they write to us, well
they criticize us about, are the trash, the streets, and public lighting because they equate
streetlamps with safety.” Another mayor shared a similar sentiment:
When I started my campaign, I made my municipal political plan, where I
projected an economic plan, a social plan, an education plan, and an
environmental plan laying out what I wanted to do. Of course, this was taken
from my experience working in the countryside. But while I may see one need
for a community, the people of that community may see it another way, right?
There are things that coincide, but the PEP provided us support for what we
were doing, that our plan was addressing the needs expressed by the population
at that time.

The duration of a PEP ranged from three years, within the term of one mayor, up to
eight years, in the case of one municipality I visited. This distinction fell to the discretion of
the current administration. While it may seem useful to have a long-term strategic plan for
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community development, the four PEPs I read were more reductive versus strategic. Rather
than projecting a vision or aim for the future that was comprehensive, these plans boasted long
lists of project requests, sometimes over twenty-five per neighborhood or village, without
attempting to identify cross-cutting themes or broader development goals municipality-wide.
This was especially true of consultant-led processes. The one municipal-led process I heard
about seemed to have been undertaken with the goal of justifying the mayor’s political agenda
and the requests being made by residents. The content of the PEP read more as a set of policy
proposals rather than a community-generated needs assessment. According to both municipal
officials and participants, one project can take multiple years to complete. Thus, in practice,
only 1-3 top-priority projects had a possibly of completion given time and funding restraints
within the plan’s duration.
Based on these accounts, the participatory strategic plan provided citizens with the most
control over the decision-making process as compared to other PDD mechanisms in El
Salvador. Projects decided upon in these forums were indeed allocated municipal funds for
implementation. The PEP also boasted the most structured deliberation process, as it was often
led by external trained facilitators. However, the frequency of the plan’s renewal, the extent to
which each municipality adhered to community interests when budgeting, and community
participation ranged widely. Thus, institutional support and execution of this process was felt
unevenly from one municipality to the next. Indeed, some municipalities had not bought into
the process at all. Two municipalities told me they planned to develop a participatory strategic
plan to “comply with law,” but neither one followed through on this aim when I reached out a
year later. One explicitly stated, “why change a process that already works just fine”? The
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other simply stopped taking my calls once I asked to see the PEP elaboration in progress. In
the end, I was unable to observe a PEP process in action.
Apparently, I was not the only one that had a tough time getting into a PEP meeting.
Even after interviewing thirty-six individuals nation-wide about their participation in PDD
mechanisms, only three people knew about the PEP. Furthermore, two of the individuals,
though community leaders for nineteen and seventeen years respectively, opted not to
participate given the cost and time commitment required. One community member described
the situation as such: “Well, they invited us to the strategic plan, right? But […] sometimes
your pockets are empty and there is no way to get there. There have been moments when I
have not been able to participate because, as I say, ‘one moves at one's own cost’.” The second
individual shared, “I want to say that when they held these meetings I was able to come to a
couple, but I explained to the coordinator: ‘I cannot be at all of them because when you sent
me the meeting invitation, I already had a full agenda’.” I question, therefore, the true value of
the PEP for the municipality and participants alike even though municipalities reported that
this process could influence budgetary decision making.

In addition to these three commonly reported PDD mechanisms and their variants,
municipalities reported several other mechanisms they used to engage citizens in decision
making. Table 15 below lists the full spectrum of PDD mechanisms that were shared during
my interviews with municipal officials. It is important to bear in mind that the table below was
developed from an inductive analysis of semi-structured interviews, not deductively or via a
survey tool. While I certainly pushed each municipal official to generate an exhaustive list of
PDD mechanisms in our conversations, it is quite possible that other municipalities use more
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or even different mechanisms than those reported during my fieldwork. As the table shows,
some municipal governments employed rather unique PDD processes adapted to their local
context. In the following sub-sections, I explain how some Salvadoran municipalities within
my sample set were innovating with PDD.
Table 15: PDD Mechanisms Employed by Municipalities in El Salvador
PDD Mechanism

Percent of Municipalities
Reporting Use (#)
96% (25)

Field Observations by
Author (#)
2

Neighborhood Local
Development Association
Meetings

96% (25)

2

Participatory Planning

77% (20)*

0

Thematic Local Committees
(e.g. Women’s Committees,
Youth Groups, Conflict
Prevention Committees,
Business Committees)

65% (17)

2

Neighborhood-based Open
Town Hall Meetings or
Assemblies

62% (16)

3

Participatory Budgeting

41% (9)

0

Civic Engagement Trainings
with PDD Components

36% (8)*

1

Municipal-wide or
Regionally-based Local
Development Association
Meetings

15% (4)*

1

Legislation Consultations

4% (1)

1

Municipal-wide Open Town
Hall Meetings or Assemblies

Referendums
4% (1)
0
*Additional municipalities spoke of these mechanisms as aspirational next steps
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Trainings in Citizen Participation
Eight municipalities shared that they offered training in civic participation or
community leadership. Often these trainings were provided to ADESCO Boards of Directors.
As one official noted, “We gave courses on how an ADESCO should work, there were
seminars. Some leaders came here, and we explained: ‘Look, this is what we want. These are
the statutes. This is what this means, how they are interpreted’.” In other cases, trainings were
delivered in the context of preparing to implement a new project. One municipal official I
spoke with, who coordinated external funders, indicated:
[In trainings] the issue of community organization is discussed, how a
community must be organized. First there must be an ADESCO, definitely. We
talk about it, what roles there are for each person or each institution within the
community. Within the community, organizing involves not only an ADESCO.
There are churches, there are committees, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry
of Environment, all these institutions make up the entire network of actors who
must work in a community.
In just one case, a municipality reported the coordination of broad-based training for
community leaders, not necessarily just ADESCO leaders. I was hesitant at first to classify
trainings such as these as PDD mechanisms, thinking that they did not really offer spaces for
deliberation on policy, but my perspective shifted upon observing the mechanism in action.
In this municipality, the administration had coordinated a community diagnostic and
planning process over a series of trainings with the purpose of having a small village population
develop and lead a development project to address areas of need. The project was funded by
Japan’s development agency JICA as a targeted effort to improve the economic conditions of
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rural communities in Morazán, a region of the country particularly hard hit by the civil war.
Municipal officials facilitated each training workshop. I had the opportunity to ride along with
the municipality to the countryside for an observation of two workshops in the six-month
series, and the experience was compelling. Men and women from across the village,
representing different political parties, came together for four hours during each workshop to
listen to a short lecture and then apply new learnings in small discussion groups to determine
which projects they wanted to implement in their community. I observed them rank projects
across categories such as economy, health, or civic participation by level of urgency, and then
use that information to prioritize their project ideas.
For example, on the topic of education, the deliberation involved several justifications
and counterarguments, but proceeded in a way that prioritized mutual respect. A young female
participant began by making her case that education should be ranked as a high priority. “Do
you remember the little girl that graduated at the top of our school’s class a few years back?
Well, when she went off to university, she couldn’t keep up with the other students. Our kids
don’t learn how to read or write. Even our third graders cannot sign their own names. We send
our kids to school, and all they do is sing and dance all day. They aren’t really learning.” A
male participant noted that the teachers were not the only ones to blame. He admitted, “Yeah,
I mean our kids sleep all day, and they never listen… but we do have teachers here, we have a
school. I don’t think we can rank education as the highest priority because we don’t want to
throw all the fault on the teachers.” After a few more minutes of exchange, the group mutually
agreed that education should be ranked toward the middle of the priority list, with the
justification: “Teachers are not helping our students learn to read. But parents are also not
helping the kids with their homework.” As this exchange demonstrates, the discussion was
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deep and detailed as community members gave specific examples to justify a need and dug
into how that need could possibly be addressed. The quality of dialogue and intergroup contact
in these training sessions was unparalleled in any of the other processes I observed in the field,
with a resultant DQI score of 13/13 and CQI score of 8/8.

Municipal-wide Development Associations
My very first successful interview in El Salvador uncovered one of the most promising
models for PDD that I encountered in my fieldwork in this case country. In this small
community, the municipality had been involved in several early initiatives funded by USAID
to establish participatory decision making. Indeed, I sought out this community specifically
because it had a detailed track record of PDD implementation in USAID administrative records
from the 1990s to the 2000s. On my first of many visits to the municipality, I spoke with an
FMLN municipal official largely about her experience with participatory budgeting, but she
also touched upon a monthly meeting the administration held with ADESCO leaders from
across the municipality. Having not realized at the time how unique this was, I made the rookieinterviewer error of not digging in deeper with my questioning. However, a little over a year
later, I returned to speak with the subsequent administration, now led by an ARENA mayor.
In most cases an administration change in El Salvador results in a full participatory system
change too. However, to my surprise, the topic of these monthly meetings came up again. In
this community, the system somehow endured despite making a shift from FMLN to ARENA
leadership. Why? I knew enough by that interview to explore the topic in more depth.
Apparently, over a decade ago, this community had passed a local ordinance complimentary
to the Municipal Code specifically calling for monthly meetings with the mayor in which all
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ADESCO presidents had an established seat. Only on my fourth interview in the municipality
did I learn the full story:
[We have] an ordinance, which expresses the political will of the municipality
itself. That ordinance, unlike the Municipal Code and the Constitution of the
Republic, was not made by politicians. That ordinance was born of the people;
it is the people who made it. Now people demand: “Look, that ordinance, they
[the municipality] are not in compliance. It says that meetings with leaders
should be held periodically to inform us about what the municipality is doing
and coordinate decisions of the local government.” If we stop doing it, it would
upset citizens first, and second it would not be appropriate for the administration
because it violates current regulations in the municipality. That’s why we keep
doing it.

I was invited to attend one of these monthly meetings, and I found it to be more of a
hybrid between an open Town Hall meeting and a public audience that involved quite a bit of
question-and-answer style deliberation. The most notable dynamic of this meeting, as opposed
to other PDD mechanisms in El Salvador, was the prominent level of respectful and critical
debate. Other PDD processes facilitated by the mayor rarely involved public exchanges about
points of disagreement. Indeed, participants were either silent or deferential in other municipalwide PDD forums. However, this mayor navigated tough public critiques of her administration
and staff and outlined how she would respond on each occasion for fifty minutes of the 1.5hour meeting.
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In one exchange the municipality had sent out a team to fix and install streetlights in
various neighborhoods. However, in a few cases, lamps were installed in locations that the
ADESCO did not agree to. “As ADESCO leaders, we should really be consulted” complained
one participant. The mayor asked, “Did you talk to the person in charge when they came out?”
“No,” replied the speaker, “I just wanted to know if you knew what was going on.” “Well, this
is the first I am hearing about this, so no. But thank you for reporting it to me, we will look
into it,” said the mayor. The ADESCO leaders began to murmur. “We had this issue too,”
another leader shouted out. The mayor turned to a team member and whispered an exchange,
they then established a new rule, “We will tell the team that they have to have the seal of the
ADESCO leader on their paperwork before starting work in each community. I’ll also have
them come to the next meeting to explain.” In this case, a problem with municipal services was
both raised and resolved.
Even though the meeting took place just after the national elections, not one of the
criticisms levied was overtly political. Debate on each topic focused on finding solutions and
the ‘common good’ for the community. At the end of the meeting when I asked for volunteers
interested in participating in an interview, there was widespread interest and interview sign-up
sheets revealed that participants spanned the full political spectrum rather evenly, though most
participants declined to declare a party. Ultimately, this unique process scored 10/13 on the
DQI and 7/8 on the CQI due to the sophisticated justifications made during the deliberations,
how counterarguments were valued and included, and demonstrated equality and respect
shown between and across groups. However, three of six participants that I interviewed in this
town after the meeting revealed that, despite their efforts to hold the mayor accountable, there
was rarely any follow-through. Although participants felt empowered to speak up and make
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requests, this PDD mechanism was not seen as contributing positively to community
development. One FMLN participant attributed this to political favoritism by the ARENA
administration, but two others identifying with either no party or Nuevas Ideas explicitly stated
that members of all political parties were treated equally.

Referendum with Dialogue Tables
In another municipality I interviewed, municipal officials shared about the only
recorded use of the local referendum tool across the country. In this case, the mayor decided
to tackle a long-term problem with the city’s unruly local market, which had gradually
expanded over many years to spill out into the main street entering town from the highway. He
coordinated a referendum, which would not typically be a deliberative mechanism, but used
the vote in favor of action to kick start a dialogue process. to resolve the congested town market
problem. Given that this mechanism was rarely employed, although it was listed as a possible
PDD option in the Municipal Code, the mayor was criticized heavily at first. However, once
the vote showed that there was support for addressing the congestion challenges of the city, he
was able to open lines of communication with the key stakeholders necessary to resolve the
issue. One of the municipal employees shared, “There was a dialogue process that lasted almost
a year and a half. Just talking, talking, and talking constantly. In the end, an agreement was
reached among the market leaders that they would transfer their stalls out of the streets. On the
day of transfer, people moved on their own. Almost 3500 people, they took down their stalls,
and moved to their place in the municipal market. It was a participatory process, a dialogue
process. There were no conflicts.”
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When I later met with the mayor to hear why he opted to use such a unique PDD
mechanism, he reflected: “Let's just say that it was the mechanism that best fit the given
situation. As in surgery, when you want to treat a problem there are at least four or five surgical
techniques. We must choose the one that best suits a patient for that situation. When you have
a project that involves that amount of city resources, we have to consult the entire
municipality.” Though this participatory process took place several years before I entered the
field, I classified this sole instance of a local referendum as a PDD mechanism given its
implementation alongside a multiyear dialogue process. What this case represented, more
broadly, was how individual mayors and their administrations had substantial scope and
flexibility in how they chose to engage with the public to inform policy.

Legislation Consultations
In another unique case, a city mayor opted into piloting a new online platform,
alongside dialogue groups with relevant local stakeholder groups, to allow citizens to give
feedback on new local legislation before it became law. While there were several challenges
with its implementation over the 9-month period in which I maintained contact with the
municipality, the pilot was successfully launched and completed in spring of 2019. This
mechanism made no appearance in the Municipal Code at the time, but the municipal official
leading the effort assured me that the process was legitimized under the Public Information
Access Law and would eventually be a requirement for all municipalities. In the planning
meetings leading up to the first legislative consultation process, the quality of deliberation
between community member volunteers that signed up to facilitate dialogue tables and school
presentations and the municipal official heading up the effort was quite high. Every detail of
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the project was open to discussion, and I observed the community member volunteers shift
plans for both the structure and format of the dialogues in real-time.
One element of the deliberation demonstrated best the level of respect and constructive
politics in this forum. After spending around thirty minutes of a three-hour session learning
about how the new online portal for legislation feedback worked, participants that had signedup to roll out the initiative at local schools mentioned some key concerns. First from a
university professor, “You need to make this part of the registration much clearer. You want
them to send it out on Facebook, it won’t work like this.” The municipal representative replied,
“We have that planned already. It will be ready. I’ll send you more information by email.”
From a local NGO representative, “The design of this page is for adults, can we do something
in these sessions to make it easier? For a teen, they’ll just look at this long document and
scroll.” The municipal official agreed, “So this is not recommended for anyone under 15.” At
this point, they realize that they had been scheduled to talk to classes with kids as young as age
12, and they launched into a dialogue about how to meaningfully engage children in a
discussion about legislation. The municipal official facilitated an exchange of ideas and took
notes on next steps. Ultimately, they selected a video appropriate for the age group to orient
the students to the topic and selected a few simple clauses from the proposed ordinance that
the younger children could reasonably debate. On the DQI and CQI scorecards, this mechanism
scored 13/13 and 6/8 respectively.

Public Audiences
In addition to the commonly cited PDD mechanisms and highlighted variations above,
municipal officials often referenced one other way in which citizens could influence public
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policy: the public audience. Just as with other mechanisms, the structure of the public audience
varied from one municipality to the next. Most often, municipalities had one or two days a
week in which they were committed to being in-office to receive individuals, groups, or
community leaders and address their requests. On a few occasions, mayors employed “open
door” policies in which they would offer an audience to any citizen or visitor if they were on
site at the municipality that day. Finally, several municipal officials talked about visits they
themselves, or their staff of “promoters,” would make out in the communities themselves.
Sometimes these events were televised or live-streamed on Facebook, and in two cases
individuals could call in as well as appear in person. I had the opportunity to observe all three
of these forms of public audiences in action across various communities, and I benefited on
more than one occasion from public audience days or open-door policies to secure my
interviews.
After having observed this practice in action, and much reflection and re-bucketing
throughout my analysis, I determined that public audiences cannot really be classified as a
PDD mechanism because they lack the critical deliberative component between stakeholders.
While there was certainly discussion and debate between citizens and their elected
representatives in these spaces, public audience forums fell back on the age-old patrón model
of clientelism versus spaces in which citizens were empowered to make decisions for
themselves and their communities. In one of my formal observations of a public audience day,
I noted that only two of the thirteen visitors whose conversations I overheard in my observation
had to do with community-wide requests. Even in these cases, typically only the ADESCO
president stopped in. Everyone else came to resolve an individual issue from asking for a job
or new roof on their house to getting a permit to take down a tree in the front yard. My
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municipal contact for this observation estimated that only 15% of public audience requests
concerned more than one party. When asked why it was beneficial to attend a public audience
day, one ADESCO president said, “I like to talk to the mayor more than the municipal staff
because I can talk to him directly, he’s the boss of everything, and he is the one to say, ‘get
this done please’.” In many ways, these spaces seemed to side-step or undermine PDD
mechanisms more than support them.

Open Municipal Council Meetings and Social Media
Another set of mechanisms often discussed by municipalities were those established
solely with the aim of improving municipal transparency, thus neither particularly deliberative
nor sometimes even participatory. The types of mechanisms mentioned within this bucket
included open or recorded Municipal Council meetings, transparency and accountability
offices, and social media pages. In all these spaces, citizens were able to observe and discover
more about the work of their local governments. One mayor indicated that citizen participation,
community organizing, and transparency are “three themes that are closely related,” all of
which are found in Article 9 of the Municipal Code. However, transparency mechanisms often
did not offer the public an opportunity to participate. Only in the case of social media was there
a space to ‘comment’ or express opinion, but with no guarantee of a response, much less a
dialogue. In only one case that I encountered had a transparency and accountability office—in
this case a corruption hotline—offered the community member a chance to influence broader
municipal policy. In this instance, a gentleman called to complain because he had to visit three
different offices to pay one municipal fee, a process which took him several days because he
had to work around variable hours of operation across offices. In the end, his complaint resulted
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in an administrative policy change because the municipality decided to eliminate a step in the
process.
Despite the lack of deliberation, PDD participants suggested that these steps toward
greater transparency were valued. When asked how participants knew if the municipality had
the funds for a project, community ADESCO leaders mentioned being able to see these types
of details online. As one ADESCO secretary noted when I asked her about how she knew if
the municipality was telling the truth about budget shortfalls for community projects, she
explained: “There is a website where they upload which bonds the [national] government sends
to [our city], and where they are being spent and how much money is left. So, there you can
see if they are really managing [the budget] well or telling us lies.” Municipalities also placed
emphasis on the value of transparency, but for a different reason than its inherent value to the
public. In one municipality, I had the chance to observe an internal municipal staff meeting
about the importance of municipal-wide support for citizen participation. The speaker showed
the Municipal Code, pointed to the section outlining various PDD mechanisms a municipality
could use, and then went on to read the possible fines associated with lack of transparency and
the aim of the municipality to improve its national transparency rating. Transparency
mechanisms, which sometimes did overlap with PDD mechanisms, were monitored and
evaluated. This meant they were also more highly valued by mayors motivated by getting good
marks. As such, while these tools for boosting transparency were not the primary focus of this
study, they did underpin the success or failure of PDD in El Salvador.

An overarching take-away from both my interviews and observations in El Salvador is
that this gradual, bottom-up implementation of PDD results in a wide variety of approaches to
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engaging the public in policy decisions. Each municipal administration is empowered to
choose the mechanisms they use, which allows for adaptation to the context of each
community. However, this also means that PDD processes can be easily derailed or completely
undermined by changes in municipal leadership. “We realized that the prior administration
manipulated the assemblies to put in political players […] so we told everyone that we were
going to do a new assembly,” recounted one official. Another shared: “Here the other big
problem we have is that, imagine if I lost the last election, for example. If the mayor of the
other party had won, for example, the PEP would be thrown out, they’d put it on a shelf or toss
it.” While eliminating PDD completely would be politically unwise and likely result in a
mayor’s unseating in the next election cycle, this shifting landscape upon each administration
change could be unsettling and destabilizing for participants. Major shifts in PDD approach
between administrations were a more common occurrence under the pre-2015 ‘winner take all’
electoral formula, but even with the introduction of representative Municipal Councils this
dynamic continued to be a challenge. Thus, as the next section turns to the impacts of PDD on
peace-related political, economic, and social dimensions this important structural factor takes
center stage.

5d. Impacts: Improving Municipal Trust, Detracting from Negative Peace
Descriptive Statistics
To set the stage for a deeper analysis on the relationship between participation in PDD
and its impact on peacebuilding, it is important to note some key demographic and community
characteristics of El Salvador in both 2008 and 2018. These statistics have been developed
using AmericasBarometer data from the full nationally representative sample in each year.
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Table 16 below provides a quick-glance view of several descriptive statistics described in more
detail below. Additional summary statistics of the variables included in my models are
presented in Table 17 further below.
Table 16: AmericasBarometer Control Variable Descriptive Statistics for El Salvador
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AmericasBarometer survey respondents in 2008 reported an average household income
of $145-288 per month, and about a quarter of families received remittances from abroad as
part of their monthly income. In 2018, the average income decreased slightly to $121-215 per
month. Note, the income bands on the survey changed from 2008 to 2018 to include more
bands and decrease the upper threshold. Slightly more women (52%) were included in the 2008
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sample than men (48%), but by 2018 the percentage of men versus women was split evenly.
This was not a flaw in sample design in 2008; this gender distribution was also present in El
Salvador’s national census data in 2007, attributed by national statisticians to the considerable
number of men that left the country due to war and gang-related violence. Sixty-two percent
of survey respondents reported their ethnicity as mestizo or Hispanic-white mix, 19% identified
as white, and the remaining 18% percent identified as indigenous, other/unknown, afroSalvadorian, and mulata or black-white mix, in order of cumulative percentage in 2008. As of
2018 there was a clear trend away from these ethnic labels, with over 20% reporting as other
or “I don’t know.” The mestizo population continued to be the largest at 41%, followed by
white at 23%, and indigenous, black, and mulata just breaking 10% combined. Regarding
community economic development, those living in rural areas were more likely to be without
access to clean water for drinking, though 71% and 81% of respondents overall reported having
access to a safe water source in 2008 and 2018 respectively. Internet access in one’s home was
around 30% in 2008, climbing to 36% as of 2018. Overarchingly, there was a clear social shift
in the country over this ten-year period, but few if any shifts with regards to economic
indicators.
Politically, the country leaned further left- than right- in terms of ideology as of 2008.
Those that leaned left outweighed those that leaned right by nine percentage points. This was
to be expected just prior to the first election in which the FMLN party won the presidency in
2009. Twenty-four percent reported an affiliation with FMLN, and 13% identified with
ARENA. However, may people sat in the middle of the spectrum (32%), and 62% of the
sample did not identify with a political party. However, as of 2018, the political scene had
shifted significantly. Ideologically, only two percentage points separated those that leaned
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toward the left- versus right- with the left-leaning cohort leading popular opinion only slightly,
but 37% sitting in the middle of the spectrum. In 2018, 68% of the sample opted not to report
a political party. Twelve percent of the population identified with the Nuevas Ideas party,
which was not an officially registered party but represented those that supported the young,
charismatic Nayib Bukele elected to the presidency in 2019. Bukele ended up running under
the banner of GANA, which made up just 3% of the electorate. Affiliation with the war-era
parties had decreased to 6% and 10% for FMLN and ARENA respectively.
Though most people had not personally experienced a violent attack in the past year in
both survey cycles, nearly everyone agreed that crime was a threat to the future of the country
in 2008 and 17% of respondents felt insecure in their community as of 2018. Larger cities were
seen as more violent than smaller cities, a trend that carried over time. Sixty-two percent of the
sample lived in urban areas in both years the data was collected. Notably, the culture of distrust
of those outside one’s circle of acquaintance was extremely high; 95% of respondents said that
“one should be careful when deciding whether to trust others” in 2008. Questions on the topic
of crime and violence changed between survey rounds, but the situation did not appear to
improve by 2018. Just under 40% of the sample reported that there had been a murder in their
community within the last year. Despite these negative perceptions, 82.5% of the population
said they are satisfied with their life, and 80% were satisfied with their neighborhood in 2008.
Unfortunately, this question was phased out as of 2018 preventing me from providing a
comparative statistic over time.
Importantly for this study, PDD participation decreased from 2008 to 2018. In 2008,
33% of individuals in the sample were participating in some form of PDD, but in 2018 only
30% of individuals reported participation. In both years, the largest number of participants
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were involved in community improvement committees (25% in 2008 and 26% in 2018)
followed by open Town Hall meetings (12% in 2008 and 8% in 2018) and then municipal
budgetary decision making (3% in 2008 and 4% in 2018). When in the field, I confirmed that
these AmericasBarometer questions trigger affirmative responses from PDD participants
involved in ADESCOs in the first case, open Town Hall meetings in the second case, and
participatory planning or budgeting in the third case. In 2008, FMLN respondents participated
in PDD at a slightly higher rate than ARENA followers, but the difference was not substantial
enough to be statistically significant. In 2018, participants spanned all political affiliations, and
38% of both ARENA and FMLN affiliated respondents reported participation. Those reporting
GANA, Nuevas Ideas, or no party affiliation participated at lower levels than did those that
affiliated with the two war-era parties. More men (53%) participated than women (47%) in
both years. Those that participated were slightly less educated than those that did not, a
statistically significant relationship (p<.001). Although over 60% of the population lived in
urban areas, only 46% of PDD participants were urban based, which aligns with municipal
reports that rural communities participated more actively than their urban counterparts.

Regression Analysis
I developed six statistical models to determine the association between PDD
participation and peace-related outcome variables. The econometric specification for each
model by dependent variable is listed below. Models were either OLS regression or logit,
selected depending upon the format of the dependent variable (*=logit). Additional details
regarding the model construction and each of the variables operationalized therein can be found

213

in Chapter 3, Section 3f. Additional summary statistics for my key model variables are
included in Table 17 below.

𝑀𝑢𝑛𝑖_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒I
= 𝛽K + 𝛽L 𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡L + 𝛽M 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠M
+ 𝛽O 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠O + 𝛽P 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑡_𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦P + 𝛽Q 𝐴𝑣𝑔_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒Q
+ 𝛽S 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠S + 𝜀
𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛_𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔I
= 𝛽K + 𝛽L 𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡L + 𝛽M 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠M
+ 𝛽O 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠O + 𝛽P 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑡_𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦P + 𝛽Q 𝐴𝑣𝑔_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒Q
+ 𝛽S 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠S + 𝜀
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡I
= 𝛽K + 𝛽L 𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡L + 𝛽M 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠M
+ 𝛽O 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠O + 𝛽P 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑡_𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦P + 𝛽Q 𝐴𝑣𝑔_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒Q
+ 𝛽S 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠S + 𝜀
𝑆𝑎𝑡_𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦I
= 𝛽K + 𝛽L 𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡L + 𝛽M 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠M
+ 𝛽O 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠O + 𝛽P 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑡_𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦P + 𝛽Q 𝐴𝑣𝑔_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒Q
+ 𝛽S 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠S + 𝜀
∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝_𝑉𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒I
= 𝛽K + 𝛽L 𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡L + 𝛽M 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠M
+ 𝛽O 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠O + 𝛽P 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑡_𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦P + 𝛽Q 𝐴𝑣𝑔_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒Q
+ 𝛽S 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠S + 𝜀
𝑉𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒_𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛I
= 𝛽K + 𝛽L 𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡L + 𝛽M 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠M
+ 𝛽O 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠O + 𝛽P 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑡_𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦P + 𝛽Q 𝐴𝑣𝑔_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒Q
+ 𝛽S 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠S + 𝜀
𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥I
= 𝛽K + 𝛽L 𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡L + 𝛽M 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠M
+ 𝛽O 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠O + 𝛽P 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑡_𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦P + 𝛽Q 𝐴𝑣𝑔_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒Q
+ 𝛽S 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠S + 𝜀

214

Table 17: AmericasBarometer Model Variable Descriptive Statistics for El Salvador
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The model results for each dependent variable in 2008 reveal that participation in these
processes has a statistically significant (p<.01) and positive relationship with trust in municipal
government, the political dimension indicator. There is no statistically significant association
between PDD participation and economic or social indicators of PDD, however. There is also
no association between PDD participation and satisfaction with the democratic system, the
‘positive peace’ indicator, or the additive ‘peace perception index’ which aggregates the
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indicators across all five dimensions. In a troubling revelation, PDD has a positive statistically
significant (p<.10) relationship with one’s experience with violence, the ‘negative’ peace
indicator, in 2008. Indeed, PDD participation appears to be associated with exacerbated
violence levels for the individuals involved. The odds of falling victim to violent crime for
PDD participants is 1.34 times that of non-participants controlling for all other demographic
and community characteristics in the model. The marginal effect of participation in PDD on
personal experience of violence is a .0412 (4.12 percentage points) estimated change in the
probability associated with those that participate in PDD calculated at the sample mean of all
independent variables in the model using Stata’s mfx command.
As of 2018, there are some interesting changes. PDD continues to have a positive
political effect on trust in municipal government, statistically significant at the p<.001 level. I
ran a multinomial logit model to double check the finding of the OLS model, and I find that
on average, the probability of having a higher level of trust in municipal government increases
by over 12 percentage points for those that participate in PDD processes versus those that do
not when all other factors are held constant. Political sway is also statistically significant in
this model, but the effects are different depending on the party. FMLN affiliates trust municipal
government less, whereas ARENA supporters trust municipal government more. In 2018,
ARENA controlled over three quarters of municipal administrations, so this is not surprising.
What continues to be interesting is that, even controlling for party, PDD participants still trust
government more than non-participants. The question asked in the survey relating to economic
perceptions changed from 2008 to 2018, but regardless of the wording there is still not a
statistically significant association between PDD participation and this dimension of peace.
There is also no association with the social dimension indicator. In a promising shift, PDD is
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no longer associated at a statistically significant level with direct personal violence.
Furthermore, PDD continues to be associated with the ‘peace perception index,’ now at a lower
p-level than in 2008. Evidently, the additive effect of minor differences in perception between
those who participate and those that do not in outcomes across all dimensions results in an
observable and statistically significant increase in one’s overall perception of peace.
Table 18 below shows the coefficients and standard deviations across all OLS models,
or odds ratios and standard errors for the one logit model, by independent variable (PDD) and
dependent variable (dimensions of peace). The following two tables show the same models run
with each type of PDD process as an isolated binary variable. The sample size for the final
models included around 1,050 observations in 2008 and 1,300 in 2018 due to missing data
points in one or more variables included in the models.

Table 18: Model Results by Independent and Dependent Variable for El Salvador
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Qualitative Findings
The primary quantitative results of the above models indicate that PDD is associated
with a higher level of trust in the municipal government, a result that appears to strengthen
over time. Individual’s experience with incidents of violent crime shift from a negative
association to a null association over the same period. The value-add of mixed methods, versus
solely quantitative or qualitative methods, is the ability to use one set of data to inform the
other. The opportunity to interview thirty-three municipal officials and thirty-six PDD
participants provided me with important context and perspectives to gain a deeper
understanding of these results through qualitative data. Furthermore, I was able to gain firsthand insights to the promise and shortcomings of El Salvador’s participatory deliberative
democracy mechanisms through observation of seventeen PDD processes across seven of my
sample municipalities. With the 2008 quantitative results in hand as I entered the field, I was
surprised to find contradicting evidence for the political and ‘negative’ peace associations
indicated in my early models.
Politically, the quantitative analysis shows that PDD participant trust of local
government is higher than non-participants; however, in my interviews political favoritism was
reported as a challenge by just over half of those interviewed. Furthermore, six of the thirtythree individuals I interviewed indicated that PDD participation had no effect on their
confidence in local government, and six additional individuals reported that PDD participation
had degraded their trust in the municipality. Thus, the qualitative data does not fully support
the statistical finding for the political dimension. However, upon further quantitative
investigation guided by the nuances expressed in my interviews, I discovered that the political
dimension association in my models is robust and tied to El Salvador’s emphasis on
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transparency through PDD forums. Economically, three municipal officials and ten
participants shared that they felt PDD was not making an impact on their own lives or
communities. Those that did report a connection between PDD and improved community or
economic development described the relationship between the two as indirect in that PDD
processes improved the overall community’s development, a perspective shared by thirty-three
informants. Socially, only six PDD participants reported working with other communities to
achieve mutually-beneficial goals, even though all but one municipality held city-wide open
Town Hall meetings at least annually. Within a neighborhood or village, around a third of
participants reported that they made connections with other community members in PDD
forums, coordinated community events via their ADESCOs, and maintained friendships with
other participants.
With regards to satisfaction with the system of democracy, municipal officials in eleven
towns or cities shared how the projects coordinated through PDD processes “changed lives”
and “improved the quality of life” for participants and their communities, a perspective relayed
in five participant interviews as well. In only one of my interviews did a participant or official
suggest that the PDD structure was not of value. Violence against one’s person as a PDD
participant, though not commonly reported in my interviews, was indeed noted in areas of high
crime with depressingly vivid recall. In two cases, mayors reported being unable to enter
certain neighborhoods due to gang rivalries. Participants provided three examples of violent
threats resulting from their involvement in PDD processes. However, most of the officials I
interviewed indicated that they had formed violence prevention committees to improve
delinquency. I expand upon this brief overview of my qualitative results and how they serve
to further inform and explain my quantitative findings below.

221

Political Dimension
In my observations, I noted that several PDD forums such as open Town Hall meetings
and urban ADESCOs appeared to exclude, whether purposefully or simply by chance,
individuals that were not of the mayor’s political party. Most municipal officials agreed that
PDD mechanisms provided more opportunities for communication and collaboration with
citizens; however, the majority of participants shared that their relationships with the
municipality were tightly entwined in partisan politics. As one official touched upon
diplomatically, “The ADESCOs have a political tint. We look out for what they need, solve it,
and if so, logically we continue [to be elected] here in the municipality.” Seven of the twentysix officials who had been in office for three or more terms reported that citizens were “happy
with the results” enough to “re-elect” the incumbent mayor.
New mayors and their staff indicated that citizen trust generated by PDD was mediated
by their ability to complete projects, maintain transparency in decision making and
implementation, and heated partisanship during election season. Indeed, in at least three cases,
municipal mayors reported frankly that they were unable to push through community projects,
even those with clear public support proposed in PDD forums, because they could not get
approval in the politically gridlocked Municipal Council. Thus, although political trust appears
to be influenced by PDD in El Salvador in my quantitative models, the political structure that
is still sharply divided along conflict party lines reportedly had greater impact on government
legitimacy with participants in my interviews than PDD. As one of my participant interviewees
shared: “Honestly, here power is almost always political; political spaces and business spaces,
so to speak, are the ones that take control of everything.”
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Political partisanship was most frequently reported as a factor in determining which
ADESCO projects would be approved and funded, even though ADESCOs are—by law—
supposed to be apolitical. In one town it took me several weeks to find an ADESCO leader that
was not of the same political party as the mayor. Her description of the challenges she faced
in lobbying for beneficial public expenditures or policies for her neighborhood was quite
revealing of the extent to which political party affiliation influenced PDD. She explained how
she was a staunch supporter of ARENA, and when an FMLN administration won the seat of
the mayor, things changed:
The municipal representative that used to work with me said, “I invited you
to a participatory event with the new mayor and you didn’t come. So now
he [the mayor] is going to restructure the ADESCOs and he told me to ask
that you submit a note to renounce your position.” “Yes,” I told him, ‘”I can
do that, if he doesn’t want to work with us, then yes I can.” “Yes, because
they won the election,” he said. The leader of his party! Those are the words
he used with me! I went and took the paper and signed it.

In another mid-sized town on the opposite side of the country, a youth participant in a
local Town Hall meeting told me that his parents used to run the neighborhood ADESCO “until
the leadership changed.” Apparently, ARENA supporters had been elected to the Board of the
ADESCO, so this FMLN family decided to get things done another way. “They are so arrogant,
they never give priority to our needs, they go to all measures to ignore them. So, what I do is
just work with the [FMLN] municipality directly, only with them because they are the ones
helping.” In another right-leaning mid-sized town, I spoke to a group of local community

223

members that opted out of forming or joining an ADESCO in their village. “Here there is one
[an ADESCO], but the problem is that they see everything as political. […] What they should
do is during the time of politics come out and put on the party shirt and do politics. But when
you are with the people, you take off that party shirt and put on the shirt of the people, you
work with the people. You have to know how to differentiate, and most people in those types
of committees do not know how to differentiate.” When I asked the party affiliation of the
other ADESCO, the informant confirmed that they were FMLN supporters.
In yet another small rural community, I sat waiting to meet with the mayor for over two
hours listening to citizens of the opposite party—which they stated loudly—complain in the
lobby about the unsatisfactory quality of services they were receiving in their neighborhood.
The environment was tense, broaching on hostile. As soon as they left, perhaps by coincidence
however unlikely, the mayor re-initiated the open audience hours. Every official and staffer in
that municipality wore their party emblem on the right pocket of their shirts, further
emphasized by baseball caps that also adorned the colors and symbolism of the mayor’s party.
Upon meeting the mayor, he too was wearing his party colors, albeit in a slightly more
professional plaid. When asked how community leaders were selected in this town, he shared,
“First, well, they have to sympathize or empathize with me as a public servant, and above all
they should also want to work for the municipality.” This was the only municipality that did
not mention ADESCOs, rather “community leaders” who were hand-picked to serve.
Given that identity politics and favoritism was such a strong theme in my qualitative
data, I was not confident in my initial quantitative model results. If I controlled my model
somehow for party alignment with the mayor, would the association between PDD
participation and trust in municipal government fade? Thus, I devised a test to see if people of
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alternative parties to the mayor were being excluded from these spaces. To do this, I added a
new variable to the AmericasBarometer dataset in 2008 for mayor’s political party, using data
from the municipal elections in 2006. I then generated a new binary (0/1) datapoint to identify
those whose political party aligned with the mayor of their city and those that did not. As
suspected, more PDD participants align with the mayor’s party than seen in the population at
large, a difference of 6 percentage points. I ran an ANOVA test to conclude that the 6percentage-point difference is likely true of the population as in the sample (p<.01). However,
only 19% of those that participate in PDD mechanisms aligned with the party of the mayor in
2008. For the 2018 data, I did not run this test because so few individuals reported identification
with one of the two traditional war-era parties.
My line of inquiry then shifted to whether the heightened number of PDD participants
aligning in political affiliation with the mayor was mediating the increased level of trust PDD
participants have in the municipality. I ran a test with the 2008 data to see if those of an
alternative party to that of the mayor also demonstrated higher levels of trust if they
participated in PDD. The results confirmed the strong relationship between PDD participation
and municipal trust, regardless of alignment with the party of the mayor. If one participates
and is of the same party as the mayor, his trust level is dramatically higher than those that do
not participate, by a jump of 9 percentage points in those that report they are “very confident”
in the municipality. If one participates but is of a different party to that of the mayor, his trust
level is still higher, though only by a jump of 2 percentage points in those that are “very
confident” in the municipality. Participation has a positive effect on trust in the municipality,
in both groups, affiliated or not with the mayor, at the p<.05 level according an ANOVA test
on these associations. Even though ARENA and FMLN support drop off substantially at the
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individual level within the AmericasBarometer dataset in 2018, 199 of 262 mayors elected to
office in 2018 ran as either ARENA (53%) or FMLN (23%). So, in both 2008 and 2018, the
majority of those that participate are not, in fact, of the same political party as the mayor.
These additional quantitative tests suggest that, despite the emphasis on political
partisanship from my interviews, these processes do not fully exclude those of ‘other’ parties
to that of the mayor. The tests also suggest that the statistically significant and positive
relationship between trust in one’s municipal government and PDD participation is also a valid
and verifiable finding within the general population. Thus, I conclude that introducing PDD in
a post-conflict environment with recently implemented decentralization can improve the
legitimacy of newly formed municipal institutions. It does not matter which side of the political
spectrum the participants are on vis-a-vis the municipal government, the impact of these
processes on trust in municipal government is consistently positive, although the effect is
greater for those of the same party as the mayor.
Returning to my qualitative data for counter-narratives, I looked for an answer as to
why PDD participants of the opposite political party to the local mayor might also exhibit
increased levels of trust. The central explanation from my participant interviews is increased
transparency, a theme raised in fourteen municipal interviews and ten participant interviews.
PDD participants knew quite a bit about the municipality, including justifications about why
certain projects were contemplated or completed while others were not. Nearly all PDD
participants acknowledged the fact that municipalities were underfunded, a point on which
both municipalities and participants were 100% clear and aligned in their accounts of their
experience with these processes. Participants also knew far more nuanced points about rules,
regulations, and relationships that were holding back their neighborhood’s development. This
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was quite evident during the observation with the ADESCO president that opened a dialogue
about how to proceed with the cemetery project that had come to a halt. While the community
had raised funds to buy the plot to extend the cemetery, they did not have the knowledge or
funds to pay for all the permits required. They had three possible options: 1) build without the
permits and risk getting shut down or fined, 2) raise more money to get the permits done
independently, or 3) donate the land to the municipality so that they could complete the permit
process at their own cost. The negotiations the ADESCO president undertook with municipal
officials to reach this level of understanding took several weeks, but without the elevated legal
status of an ADESCO the process may have never moved forward. It is far easier to be critical
of local government when one does not know its limitations. It is also more likely that one who
is informed will be more confident in municipal works knowing all the steps, processes, and
hurdles behind the scenes.
Another contributing factor may be that PDD participation plays a role in holding the
municipality accountable, which therefore increases trust. This element was brought out in
three municipal and three participant interviews. It was also clear in all five of my open Town
Hall meeting observations and one of the project-focused committee observations. Reflecting
on one community that I observed in project execution mode, the members of the local project
oversight committee—who opted not to form or join the local ADESCO—were in political
alignment with the mayor. The affiliation was so strong that at the top of the street an entire
wall had been painted with the party emblem; it was the only sign you could see from any one
of the houses on the newly-paved street. In my post-observation interviews, I asked why the
committee did not formalize and become a registered ADESCO. The first reason provided was
that the registration process was too complex, the second reason provided was that an
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ADESCO already existed for the community but “it has become politicized.” I clarified, “So
you mean it is run by the opposite party?” “Yes,” the committee member replied. This case
revealed that communities of the same party do not necessarily need the ADESCO structure to
get their needs met. They could use party favors for that. However, those of the opposite party
could fall back on the ADESCO structure and other PDD mechanisms to demand voice and
investments in their own community’s development. “So, do you like the process of
[ADESCO] registration?” I asked one ADESCO leader in an interview, “Of course, it’s better
because everything is legal.” These spaces exist in law, stemming from the war-era,
specifically to circumvent the exclusion of dissident voices in decision making.

Economic Dimension
Economically, municipal officials and participants in my interviews made an indirect
connection between PDD processes and economic improvements because they increase the
community’s overall level of development. This link was made in fifteen of thirty-seven
municipal interviews and seventeen of thirty-six participant interviews. The logic behind this
connection was that infrastructural improvements and training programs facilitated through
PDD forums led indirectly to improved individual finances, noted in twenty of my participant
interviews. By directing municipal resources toward community-identified needs, a function
of PDD processes reported in twenty-one of fifty-nine interviews overall, participants could
target municipal investments on what mattered most for a community.
When participants equated positive economic outcomes with PDD participation in my
interviews, it typically related to improved infrastructure leading to better health or small
business environments. In rural communities, a paved street can mean the difference between
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life and death. One ADESCO leader in a small rural village told me during his interview that
he kept going because he had personally witnessed a neighbor pass away on route to the
hospital because of poor road conditions. He shared, “When a patient is in serious condition,
many times along the way they get stuck, they die. […] It’s hours to the hospital, it is a long
journey that you have to walk. So that's the problem we have, because we don't have a health
post. So, well, we will continue working until we get it.” In another case, a municipal official
spoke about how adding a bridge to a rural community, divided from the municipal center by
a river, directly increased their ability to access markets and earn an income, thus increasing
their quality of life. Another official remarked, “What can I say? After not having water, and
then to have water. The truth is it’s like a party! It’s a real accomplishment for these
communities.” Also, development means business. “If a person who had no electricity, today
has electricity […] now that person can start a business, a little store. To sell ice cream. To sell
baked chicken, or eggs from the hens. All that benefits.” However, some officials warned that
short-term outputs did not always translate into long-term outcomes for communities,
especially when the infrastructure was not maintained.
ADESCOs requested infrastructure projects, such as paving roads, building bridges, or
constructing new schools, at a ratio of 2:1 compared to social or cultural projects like holding
community events, supporting soccer clubs, or training programs. However, social programs
too were cited as improving economic well-being in the community. The most obvious
economic link with PDD-petitioned social programs took the form of job trainings or
workshops. As one participant described, “Two years ago at the start of my term, we petitioned
for a workshop on cosmetology and they gave it to us in the ADESCO, so we participated. We
wrote up the petition, took it to the municipality, and they sent it to Ciudad Mujer [a women’s

229

empowerment initiative]. That was how we ended up with the project. When you set out to
learn new things, you get experience.” Other participants talked about home gardening
trainings and other vocational trainings coordinated by way of PDD processes.
The mechanism underlying these impacts is summed up well by one official: “Looking
at it from an objective point of view, citizen participation helps us focus on the things that the
community needs. That helps us a lot because it has happened where we were going to give
them electricity and the community does not want electricity; the community wants drinking
water. So, when people are open to citizen participation, they ask for what they need.”
Community development impacts were also highlighted, particularly with regards to
infrastructure projects and community-based education programs.
However, participants in PDD processes often stated definitively, “No, there’s no
economic benefit. I’m a volunteer.” Indeed, three municipal officials and ten participants
reported that PDD did not impact on their own lives or communities. Some participants went
even further, reporting a net loss in their own financial position because of their participation.
One ADESCO leader in a small rural village told me during his interview that he wanted to
quit because of the risks and costs of being a community leader. PDD participants usually paid
for their own transport to events or meetings with the municipality. Substantial time was
invested in coordinating and leading community projects. They did all this without pay. Thus,
for many, participation could result in loss of income. Some communities had produced unique
solutions to the challenge. As one ADESCO president stated, “From each inhabitant in the
community, we ask an economic collaboration so that I can go to the mayor's office, to pay my
expenses, to pay for transportation, and so that I can eat. We do a collaboration. It’s not much,
a dollar per month.” However, in all but two of my interviews, I came to understand that
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ADESCO leaders bear the brunt of the costs of citizen participation without a clear connection
to any personal economic gain. Thus, while indirect benefits to the community and oneself are
verifiable benefits of the PDD structure in El Salvador, I was not surprised to see that PDD
participant’s perception of their own economic well-being was no different than nonparticipants in my quantitative models.

Social Dimension
Improved social cohesion within a neighborhood or village was mentioned by
municipal officials and participants in my interviews, usually about forming “friendships,”
increased “civility” in community interactions, and improved “harmony” between neighbors.
This theme emerged in twelve PDD participant interviews and seven municipal interviews.
Additionally, ten participants reported that they made connections with neighbors in PDD
forums and eleven participants shared that they coordinate community events via their
ADESCOs. As one municipal official described, “There are quite a few changes because there
are people that did not have conversations with their own families, and in this type of activity
they talk and then they have a more fulfilling relationship between neighbors, between
families. So, they see each other and that is good because the harmony between a community
is… well, it’s a social and community harmony.”
One participant shared how increased contact helped her better understand the
conditions of her neighbors:
We try to understand the subject, to understand what the problem is that’s
happening and many times it’s like: ‘No, that doesn’t happen,’ because they do
not know the subject. It’s something that’s there but is not seen, it has been
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invisible. So, when a problem is invisible, it is not given much importance. I
think that with this [PDD process] what is being highlighted, is we notice that
there is a problem, there is a problem that needs to be attacked, that needs to be
prevented and if it is not done it will continue and will continue, and grow and
grow, and there will be more people affected, more people whose rights are
violated. So, I think socially this has a very good impact.

However, some communities in which neighbors were already quite tight-knit did not feel that
PDD contributed much to changes in community relations. As another participant asserted, “I
think that we’ve maintained relations.”
The relationships and social impacts of PDD described by officials and participants
were typically limited to one neighborhood or village versus across neighborhoods or the full
municipal population. I did not observe many instances in which participants of multiple
communities or political parties deliberated in PDD forums. Indeed, I only saw crosscommunity and cross-party deliberation in three of my seventeen observations. This is likely
because few PDD mechanisms in El Salvador were structured to bring together multiple
neighborhood leaders or the public at large in dialogue, the closest of which were public
assemblies or Town Hall meetings which were more informative than deliberative in nature.
Only six PDD participants reported working with other communities to achieve mutuallybeneficial goals, even though all but one municipality held city-wide open Town Hall meetings
at least annually. Also, ADESCOs were more often geographically-based (96%) versus
thematically-oriented (65%) and therefore did not involve much cross-community or crossparty interaction.
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Another probable explanation for the limited social impacts seen in the quantitative
models was a generally low level of participation. Increased participation and collaboration
amongst community members was regularly referenced as a goal, not yet attained, of PDD
forums. Indeed, officials reported a general apathy from community members toward getting
involved at all. “Sometimes when we want to organize the ADESCOs, they don't understand
that it is about strengthening the community, a more organized community will be able to
weather the storm.” Another shared, “when the community is organized, they get more projects
than one that is not organized. That’s because in the one that is not organized… nobody takes
the initiative.” Participants, too, talked about how they often ended up working alone on
ADESCO Boards. As one participant explained, “Many people don’t want to sign up to work
on an ADESCO, because they don’t want the responsibility. That’s what comes up first, they
don’t want to be in charge.” Reflecting on the dynamic in her ADESCO, one president shared,
“The problem that we have is, look we have twelve people on the Board and a mini-Board in
charge that is made up of six people, but of these … well, I think they just soldier on, as I say.
They are conspicuously absent. […] I’m alone.” This theme, brought up in thirteen interviews,
is likely behind the decrease in PDD participation seen in the AmericasBarometer survey data
from 2008 to 2018.

Positive Peace
Throughout my interviews, I asked PDD participants about how participation made
them feel, as a reflection on their satisfaction with the system. In all but one case, municipal
officials and participants said that PDD mechanisms should be retained in El Salvador, albeit
with twenty-two individuals recommending adjustments. Common themes across both
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municipal official and participant interviews were related to improved “quality of life”
stemming from PDD projects and individual empowerment.
Projects that reportedly “changed lives” were tied to infrastructure improvements in
around three-quarters of my interviews. One municipal official explained this tie quite well:
If you do an infrastructure project, if you do an electricity project, if you do a
water project, if you do a road project, it makes an impact within the community
that improves the standard of living. That’s why we prioritize these projects. If
you go to the river to fetch water, go to the river to wash clothes, how much time
do you spend doing that? How many diseases do you have because you are
drinking contaminated water? When you have a tap in your house with fresh
drinking water, you can spend your time on other things and to improve your
well-being.

The frequently referenced link between community development and life quality speaks to
how integral development is to ‘positive’ peace, seeking broader social justice and structural
equity. This benefit of PDD participation, not only for the individuals involved but for the
community overall, was brought up in sixteen of my fifty-nine interviews.
Additionally, municipal officials coupled PDD with individual and community
empowerment. One official made the first link explicit: “Citizen participation for me is
important because, and I think that it’s for them more than for the municipality, it’s important
for them to participate. We see it reflected through these ADESCOs, that they, by participating,
improve their self-esteem because they see that they are part of the solution to the problems of
day-to-day life in the poorest communities in the city.” Participants, by and large, talked about
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how happy it made them to give back to the community and to have a better understanding of
how decisions were being made in the municipality; it made them feel like they had agency.
One participant spoke to me about the process she followed to petition the municipality for
materials to build and repair houses for impoverished neighbors in her village. When the goal
was finally achieved, she shared, “I was happy, very happy, so happy I can’t even tell you.”
Another participant shared, “I feel glad, happy, because I understand a lot.” Along a similar
vein, one youth participant reflected on how engaging in PDD helped her to grow personally.
She explained:
The best thing for me has been that I have learned, more than anything. I am no
longer that shy woman who felt afraid to put myself out there. I felt like that,
didn't I? I used to leave and say, “Maybe they won't even listen to me.” No, now
I've learned so much, even though I’m not well-read, but now I do know I can
do it, I can do it. Because I feel like we all have the capacity, but a lot of times
we cut ourselves off and say, “Maybe” or “No.” Now I feel very happy because
I think, “I was able to organize myself.”

In summary, both municipal officials and participants felt that PDD was making a positive
overall impact on their daily lives and communities by allowing them to contribute to projects
for the community while increasing their own capacity.

Negative Peace
Despite the statistically significant association between PDD and ‘negative’ peace
found in my quantitative analysis from 2008, I heard only three stories during my fieldwork
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about increased levels of personal violence experienced by PDD participants. That said, there
were some notable instances in which both mayors and participants said they worried about
safety. In one case, I spoke with a mayor in an urban city close to the capital known for high
rates of gang violence who reported that he could not even venture into some neighborhoods
controlled by the maras. Thus, as a logical extension, community leaders involved in PDD also
experienced these types of problems. He explained, “We’ve had a series of difficulties, more
in the past than today, where people from one neighborhood could not go to the other
neighborhood because of the gangs. We’ve had great difficulty even with those that aren’t gang
members. […] The gangs have radicalized such that merely living in one community means
you can’t pass to another. And there’s been a lot of murders due to this situation.”
In the second instance, I interviewed an ADESCO president that reported his vice
president had once been held at gun point and beaten in an ambush by gang members of a rival
community on the way to a public assembly meeting with the mayor. As a result, he would no
longer accept responsibility for taking any youth to programming across neighborhood
borders. Likewise, this same PDD participant shared with me the immense amount of guilt that
he felt because he could not get the municipality to replace a streetlamp lightbulb fast enough.
“I told the municipality, ‘Look, we have a light out in the sector, please come take a look.’
Nothing. Time passed, one month, two months, three months, five months. And then in that
same sector on one dark night, there they killed a kid, a student studying in the city. Right in
front of there.” His eyes filled with tears, “And for that reason, when I see things like that, I
get worried. […] And look, they dropped that kid right off in front of where I live, his body
there riddled with twelve bullets.” He continued to talk about wanting to “throw in the towel”
then and there with the ADESCO, and then he opened a plastic bag he had brought to our
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interview. Inside was a lightbulb. “I don’t want this to happen again, so that’s why I came
today to petition for the lightbulb.” His story was truly harrowing, but it was this very
experience that pushed him to keep participating.
The most common narrative with regards to violence was that PDD mechanisms
offered several ways of managing delinquency. This theme was reiterated in twenty-eight of
my fifty-nine interviews in El Salvador. As the story above indicates, even the simple act of
reporting and replacing a burnt-out lightbulb can make an impact. One mayor shared:
As of the last three months of last year, we have controlled perhaps 80% of the
problems we were having with assaults. Today, our town is characterized as a
beautiful municipality where harmony amongst the population is very, very
good. To give you an example, when I became mayor in 2006, there were still
some social problems during our annual festivals in 2007, 2008, and 2009. Our
festivals last from 11-14 days, and to ensure there is no crime during that time
is a significant task. […] From 2010 to date, these past four years, we’ve not
had one murder.

I heard a similar story in another small town. In both cases, community participation efforts
were heralded as helping to bring down crime levels by bringing community stakeholders
together in Violence Prevention Committees. Thus, despite the evidence of increased personal
risk for PDD participants that emerged from the 2008 quantitative data analysis and a minor
portion of my qualitative data, there is a strong counter-narrative in support of the role of PDD
for ‘negative’ peace today. This is most likely the reason that I find a positive and statistically
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significant association, though weak, between PDD participation and lower levels of perceived
violence in one’s neighborhood in 2018.

5e. Conclusion: PDD, Politics, or Just Time for Peace?
PDD in El Salvador has had a positive influence on trust in local government, however,
impacts on economic well-being and social influences were muted in my quantitative models.
Given that PDD was not integrated into the peace process overtly in El Salvador, municipal
officials did not tend to equate PDD with peacebuilding directly. When the effects of PDD
were linked to peace-related change across political, social, or economic dimensions, the
connection was frequently mediated by macro-level partisan politics. This finding highlights a
challenge of PDD implementation from the bottom-up, which is more innovative and
contextually appropriate to local realities but also more easily derailed.
Though I rarely asked directly about the civil war or reconciliation in my interviews to
maintain my focus on modern-day PDD and its impacts, the few times that it came up in my
interviews lead me to believe that PDD has made a discernable impact, however limited it may
be, on peace over the long-run. Opening spaces for citizen participation was a definite victory
for FMLN in the final years of the war at a macro-level, and the positive effects of participation
on trust in the newly-elected municipal governments is certainly laudable at the meso- and
micro-levels. One official who said he had served behind the lines during the civil war in a
medical evacuation role summed up his view on PDD and its links to the peace process in this
way: “If you read the peace accords you will realize, right, that civil society seized strength
over the military […] It was strengthened, citizen participation was strengthened. Look, anyone
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speaks today, anyone says, anyone asks. Well, I guess that's why citizen participation has
improved.”
Overarchingly, the biggest challenge to PDD implementation in El Salvador according
to my interviewees was partisan politics. The common refrain was that the ADESCOs and
other PDD processes had become “politicized.” While only two sitting officials shared that
their own administrations had contributed to the politicization, many municipal officials
pointed the finger at the “last administration.” Participants were not discerning; political
favoritism was pervasive. This dynamic suggests that, at least in this case, the post-conflict
statebuilding agenda that encouraged an enduring power-sharing relationship between
ARENA and FMLN has overshadowed the less predominant participatory deliberative
democracy agenda. Additionally, officials spoke about the challenge of implementing PDDgenerated projects due to insufficient funding. These issues were brought up in eleven
municipal and nine participant interviews. This complaint was often accompanied by
references or physical demonstrations of the number of petitions received per year in relation
to municipal funds available. Without a specific budget designated to PDD implementation,
even mayors with the best intentions cannot follow through on policy decision making in
participatory forums. These common challenges indicate that PDD processes often fall victim
to the two-party political polarization stemming directly from the civil war era and lack strong
mechanisms to ensure or reinforce their implementation.
Time more than any other factor appears to have helped with the consolidation of peace,
simply by running its course. As one municipal official reflects, “The impact of the war, well,
perhaps it remains with the elderly. But the young, those people under 26 or 25 did not live
that moment. So, they study those who can study, those who can work do, and we’ve moved
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along because that time has been left behind us.” One PDD participant reflects this same
sentiment from her own perspective: “I did not live it [the war], but my parents did. They say
that they suffered considerably, that it was very ugly how they lived. And now we live much
better. In my community, I’d say it’s tranquil. We don’t have gangs or anything like that here.
So, it’s greatly improved.” Over twenty-five years post-conflict, it is hard to say if things would
be all that different without the introduction of PDD. Of all the quotes I collected in the field,
there are two that I believe best characterize PDD implementation in El Salvador. The first
speaks to how much leverage individual mayors and their political parties hold over the system:
“Well the truth is that citizen participation has had its impact because many have organized to
solve their problems. […] Citizen participation has always been important, the thing is that it
depends on the mentality with which the official comes into office, right? If you want to do it
in a participatory way or not, right?” The second highlights how far El Salvador has to go:
“Here we are in the process of adapting. I always say, though I could be wrong, ‘We have first
world laws, but we continue to live as a country in poverty. So, in law, we are rich’.”
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND APPLICATIONS

This dissertation marks the first international comparative case study on the
relationship between participatory deliberative democracy and post-conflict peacebuilding.
Though the case studies themselves have been explored previously in the literatures on both
peacebuilding and PDD, my research question linking these two fields and my comparative,
mixed methodology are unique contributions to the scholarly community across public policy
and peace studies. The primary aim of the study was to explore PDD as a mechanism to bolster
the sustainability of post-conflict peacebuilding to prevent and mitigate a return to violence
following civil war. Given the empirical evidence on the failure of peace settlements and the
possibility of post-conflict societies backsliding into violence, it is vitally important that
innovative approaches be evaluated for areas of impact and optimal contextual and structural
factors that may contribute to effective implementation.
In the following section 6a, I compare my two case studies on the implementation of
PDD in Central America. Next, in section 6b, I respond to the academic literature on the local
turn in peacebuilding and assert that PDD makes up one tool in the kit of hybrid peacebuilding
approaches. I then derive a set of policy implications from the comparative findings in section
6c. Tempering my assertions and policy proposals in section 6d, I reflect on the limitations of
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the study and suggest future areas of research. I conclude in section 6e with suggestions about
the how the lessons learned from these two cases can potentially inform other cases in which
PDD implementation is being contemplated during post-conflict peace processes in the future.

6a. Comparing Outcomes Across Post-Conflict Contexts
In both Guatemala and El Salvador, the PDD processes implemented in the post-war
era have influenced, to varying degrees, ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ peace. I also find evidence
of PDD’s impacts across political, economic, and social domains of peace as outlined in the
propositions stemming from literature on other contexts. However, the associations between
PDD and the multiple dimensions of peace differed by country as outlined below.
In both countries, PDD mechanisms have increased municipal points of contact with
the public and improved transparency about public policies and service delivery as outlined in
my qualitative interviews, resulting in statistically significant higher levels of municipal
government trust by PDD participants than those that do not participate. As El Salvador
introduced PDD earlier than Guatemala, this effect can be seen quantitatively in the analysis
of AmericasBarometer data from 2008 as well as 2018. In Guatemala, the introduction and
institutionalization of PDD at the beginning of the twentieth century results in a marked
increase in trust at a statistically significant level when comparing 2008 and 2018
AmericasBarometer data.
Economic effects measured quantitatively across both contexts are non-existent
regardless of the year of analysis. It is likely that the AmericasBarometer question used in this
analysis, which asks about one’s perception of his or her personal economic well-being as
compared to one year prior, does not adequately capture the nuances of how PDD can influence
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one’s personal and community economic development. Qualitative data in both countries
suggests that economic impacts, if any, are indirect for PDD participants. When projects are
proposed in PDD forums to improve a community’s economic development, individual
economic outcomes can also improve. My interviews suggest that a lack of sufficient
municipal funding, and thus follow-through on decisions made in PDD forums, often limits
the influence of citizen participation on local policy and budgetary decision-making.
Socially, the two cases diverge significantly. While no impact on trust in one’s
neighbors is evident in El Salvador, there is a positive and statistically significant impact on
this social dimension of peace in Guatemala when comparing PDD participants and nonparticipants, which becomes stronger over time. Likewise, the association between PDD
participation and ‘positive’ peace represented by satisfaction with the democratic system
strengthens over time in Guatemala, whereas there is no association in either of the years in El
Salvador. My interviews suggest that Guatemala’s PDD mechanisms are more robust for
peacebuilding than those employed in El Salvador because they encourage cross-community,
intergroup contact and devolve greater control over decision making to participants.
One of the most compelling findings in both countries is an association between PDD
participation and firsthand experiences with violence in 2008, an effect that becomes null by
2018. While this finding might at first seem troublesome for the utility and promise of PDD in
post-conflict contexts, my interviews suggest that PDD spaces have become an avenue for
responding to violence within a community even as they expose some participants to increased
physical vulnerability. PDD can therefore act as a release valve for participants to engage in
local-level policy decisions relevant to addressing violence without resorting to violence
themselves.
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Despite differences across my case countries in the social and ‘positive’ peace
dimensions, in both countries PDD is not associated with one’s overall perception of peace in
2008, but a strong positive association emerges as of 2018. Table 19 below shows how PDD
is associated with peace across various dimensions in both Guatemala and El Salvador in years
2008/09 and 2018/19.
Table 19: Comparative Model Results for Guatemala and El Salvador

Despite a similar historical legacy of civil war and cultural context, Guatemala’s
experience with PDD and its impacts on peace differ from the case of El Salvador. The reason
for these differences is linked directly to how PDD was implemented and structured either
from the top-down or bottom-up as well as the macro-level legacies of the war-era—an
emphasis on institutionalizing citizen participation in Guatemala, and a priority on bringing
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the rebels into the political fold via power-sharing in El Salvador. In the following subsections, I compare my key findings from Guatemala and El Salvador for each dimension of
peace to highlight pivotal lessons learned from these cases.

Political Dimension
The political effects of PDD are more consistent and of greater strength in El Salvador
than in Guatemala. Even though participants reported several occasions of partisan favoritism
within ADESCOs, El Salvador’s PDD participants of all political affiliations, regardless of
alignment with the party of the mayor, demonstrated a higher level of trust in municipal
government than those that did not participate in both 2008 and 2018. As of 2008 in Guatemala,
there was no statistically significant relationship between PDD participation and political trust.
At that time, the Development Council system had been introduced, but it was in its infancy in
terms of implementation. This dynamic shifted as Guatemala’s COCODEs and COMUDEs
became institutionalized and widely adopted, resulting in a strong positive association with
trust of municipal government by 2018.
In both nations, the reason for the positive political effect of PDD on participants was
two-fold. First, PDD improved communication between municipal officials and their
constituents. As summed up by one official in El Salvador: “The impact it [PDD] generates is
that the communities are informed of what the municipality is doing, and the municipality is
aware of the needs of the communities. It is very difficult for the municipality to just know.
There are 146 villages in our municipality and eighteen neighborhoods in the city itself. How
can the municipality know exactly what this community needs, or the needs of this other one?
So, the impact is that we now know the needs of these communities.” Second, PDD processes

245

improved accountability through increased transparency. As one Guatemalan participant in an
open Municipal Council meeting explained, “If we had forty people, and not just in a meeting
but following up and following up, not only would our town, but all of Guatemala, would be
different. Just by being present, we bring transparency and witness, in solidarity with
Guatemala as a whole.”
Despite this common trend in political-dimension outcomes between the two countries,
the impact of PDD on political trust in the municipality was not always the same across
contexts. In Guatemala, even ten years after the peace accords were signed, the effect was null.
This was because Guatemala’s system took substantial time to gain its place and acceptance
amongst both municipal administrations and participants. El Salvador had a head start by
introducing legally-protected PDD spaces in the Municipal Code prior to the end of their civil
war. Thus, what peacebuilding practitioners can learn from this comparative finding is that
PDD processes from both the top-down and bottom-up take time to have demonstrative effects
on political trust. Trust in the system must be earned, and it appears that it took at least ten
years to build up that confidence in local government amongst participants in these two postconflict contexts. This lesson reaffirms the notion that peacebuilding investments, whether
through PDD or otherwise, must be thought of as long-term endeavors.

Economic Dimension
Economically, both countries showed weak statistically significant relationships, if
any, between PDD participation and perceptions of economic well-being amongst citizens.
While open Town Hall meetings in both countries demonstrate a slight positive uptick in PDD
participant perceptions of economic well-being versus non-participants in El Salvador in 2008
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and Guatemala in 2018, the relationship was statistically weak (p<.10). This result is tied to
poor economic and infrastructural development across the two nations in general. Although
my interviews with participants and municipal officials suggest that there is a relationship
between PDD and a community’s economic development, that relationship is indirect and
predicated on the ability of the municipality to follow through on decisions made in
participatory and deliberative spaces. Unfortunately, in both countries, municipalities report
that they struggle with insufficient funding to be able to invest in community improvements.
Furthermore, participants themselves often spend substantial time and personal finances to
participate in PDD forums.
Though it may present an increased risk to international donors to invest in a fragile
economy and unstable political environment in the wake of civil war, funding for economic
development funneled through PDD processes can improve the legitimacy of local government
and its spending. Furthermore, PDD forums help to target investments to verified needs of
communities under reconstruction. PDD processes also introduce extra layers of bureaucracy,
which can help to curb corruption. While PDD is no panacea for addressing individual corrupt
government officials, as both seen and heard during my qualitative fieldwork, it can certainly
make a difference. Checks and balances, restricted pools of funding for community-based
development, and monitoring systems installed in Guatemala and El Salvador, to a lesser
extent, improve transparency and help direct resources to where they are needed most.

Social Dimension
With regards to social impacts, Guatemala saw substantial and positive gains in the
association between PDD participation and trust in one’s neighbors from 2008 to 2018. In El
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Salvador, the effect was largely null in both years, apart from a slight decrease in trust
associated with participatory budgeting and planning in 2008 (p<.10). This finding is rooted
in how PDD is structured in the two countries.
In Guatemala, participants in the COCODE system attend regular, monthly COMUDE
meetings with the municipality and other community stakeholders and leaders. They are
prompted to make collective decisions about how municipal funds should be spent in
competition and collaboration with individuals from other neighborhoods or villages.
Participants I interviewed in the field shared that they built friendships and gained access to
new networks in the COMUDE meetings. In these spaces, former conflict parties and victims
of the civil war do indeed sit at the same table of debate with, typically, an equal voice and
vote. Municipal officials also talked about seeing changes in how indigenous rural and
ladino/mestizo urban populations interacted. In my observations, I noted that when leaders of
different communities banded together to push an agenda, they held incredibly powerful
influence over policy and community development decisions.
Alternatively, in El Salvador, PDD mechanisms did not facilitate interactions between
communities as frequently as they did within communities. ADESCO leaders on the
neighborhood or village Board of Directors did sometimes interact with other community
leadership in public assemblies or open Town Hall meetings, but there was little, if any,
deliberation in these spaces. Likewise, only participatory budgeting and planning processes
called upon communities to prioritize their needs in a systemic way, and these processes took
place on rare occasions such as every three to eight years. As such, PDD participants interacted
most often on a one-to-one basis with the municipality to petition for their community projects.
While this cadence of PDD interaction did not often lead to overt conflict or debate between
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ADESCOs or the communities they represent, it did open up avenues for resentment to build
when participants perceived that political favoritism had influenced policy or budgetary
decision making. Thus, the social impacts of PDD participation in El Salvador were muted.
Guatemala’s PDD system promoted cross-community contact and collaboration, thus
aligning much more closely with Allport’s (1954) ideal conditions for contact as a means to
create affective friendships (Swart et al., 2011). In El Salvador, it was easy to avoid contact
with the ‘other’ by simply setting up a separate ADESCO to bring together those of the same
war-era political affiliation. Perhaps this is why El Salvador’s municipal officials reported that
a clientelist mentality was still quite prominent even though communities were making a
marked shift toward mobilization to resolve their own challenges. Though up-and-coming
generations of Salvadorans have started to reject the polarity of partisan politics, the possibility
of cross-conflict-party contact and relationship building in PDD spaces was overshadowed by
politics for over 25 years post-conflict. This finding highlights the importance of structuring
PDD in a consistent way across communities with scaffolding points of interaction between
cross-community stakeholders up to the national level, only possible with a top-down
approach. PDD from the bottom-up, while innovative and locally situated, can certainly
improve political trust and even economic outcomes for communities, but largescale social
reconciliation following civil war necessitates a more comprehensive approach.

Positive Peace
Ultimately, the combination of political, economic, and social impacts associated with
PDD participation reflects on one’s level of ‘positive’ peace. In El Salvador, PDD was not
associated with satisfaction with the democratic system in either 2008 or 2018. In Guatemala,
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satisfaction with the democratic system in 2008 is not associated with PDD participation, but
a statistically significant and positive association develops as of 2018. The reason for this
difference in outcomes relates to the way in which PDD was implemented in each country and
how conflict parties integrated into the political system in the post-war era.
Meso-level implementation from either the top-down or the bottom-up influences how
PDD participants interact as well as the amount of control they have over decision making in
PDD forums. Guatemala’s top-down PDD implementation has guaranteed a sustained, regular
space at the table for citizens to influence decision making. In 100% of the municipalities I
visited, they had registered COCODEs and held monthly COMUDE meetings amongst
leaders. The national government monitored compliance with participation and transparency
laws, and it also set a pool of funding aside for projects only accessed through the Development
Council system. In El Salvador, PDD developed and propagated from the bottom-up, and
though there were laws compelling municipalities to engage citizens in policy making, it was
largely up to the discretion of the local mayor as to how and how often PDD forums would be
engaged. Likewise, funding for community development was filtered through municipal
administrations before it ever reached participatory processes.
As one of my ADESCO interviewees explained, funding for development is highly
politicized in El Salvador because it goes through the municipality. She suggested that an
independent body be established to evaluate community needs: “Go, visit the ADESCOs and
see the needs, as an NGO. Coming from the outside, where do you see the priority? Where
should you invest the projects that you bring, right? Then the system would be apolitical,
because [funders] are not involving the mayor's office.” I found this fascinating; she basically
made an appeal for some form of Guatemala’s development funding structure which calls upon
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communities to determine where funds should be directed rather than the municipality itself. I
must conclude, therefore, that El Salvador’s system allows for more innovation, but opens up
PDD spaces to the pitfalls of partisan politics. In Guatemala, PDD participants exercise far
greater control over decision making.
The post-war political systems in each country also come into play. Guatemala’s postwar political party system boasts both numerous and unstable parties, in stark contrast to El
Salvador’s two-party system still dominated by war-era FMLN and ARENA factions. In the
decade preceding the peace agreements in both countries, liberal democracy gained gradual
acceptance due to changes in elite strategy and an effort to garner greater appeal for investment
by the international community. Peceny & Stanley (2001) reflect on the key reason the two
countries diverged in terms of political structure following the civil wars. They share,
“Guatemala's civil war ended without the benefit of forceful guarantees or power-sharing
arrangements […] In the end the URNG put down its weapons in exchange for government
promises to carry out liberal political and institutional reforms” (p. 170). In El Salvador,
however, the FMLN became a major player in the political system asserting its place at the
table and winning the presidency as of 2009.
Just as there is a protected space for citizens in PDD forums in Guatemala, so too have
new laws been instituted allowing many parties to vie for public office. Even before the end of
the war, the URNG and the governing party at the time had already greatly dwindled in
influence compared to rising power in the private sector, the military, and conservative elites.
By the year 2000, the key conflict party actors in the peace negotiation were reduced to a
minority power within the new legislature (Peceny & Stanley, 2001), and these competing
interests continued to shape the political scene in Guatemala for decades. In Guatemala’s 2019
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elections, over twenty parties put forth a presidential candidate. Best outlined in the words of
Peceny & Stanley (2001): “[Guatemala’s case] is in sharp contrast to El Salvador, where the
FMLN rebels could compel significant concessions from the government, where ARENA had
enough power to implement the accords despite opposition from some quarters, and where
ARENA and the FMLN are still dominant actors in the political system” (p. 173). Certainly,
in the 2019 presidential election in El Salvador, it was the first time since the war that a thirdparty candidate succeeded in winning the national executive office. Taken together, these
divergent post-war approaches to PDD implementation and marco-level political structures
altered the outcomes for ‘positive’ peace. The approach taken in Guatemala improved
‘positive’ peace conceptualized as satisfaction with the democratic system through the eyes of
PDD participants. Whereas, El Salvador has remained entrenched in war-era partisanship, and
PDD participation has had no discernable impact on satisfaction with the democratic system.

Negative Peace
The logit models used to measure the relationship between PDD and ‘negative’ peace
turned up an initially strong and adverse relationship across both case countries in the 2008
AmericasBarometer data. However, upon entering the field, I did not encounter many stories
from participants or municipalities about increased incidence of violence for those involved in
PDD processes. While some notable cases of participants involved in violent episodes stick
out amongst my interviews in both Guatemala and El Salvador, the vast majority of those I
spoke with reported that PDD was used as a mechanism to combat violence by bringing
together community stakeholders to solve problems of unoccupied youth, unemployment, and
weak infrastructure associated with poverty and crime.
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Given that the data used in this study is cross-sectional, I cannot confirm with certainty
the direction of the relationship between PDD participation and experience with violence. In
fact, I argue that the relationship has quite possibly changed directions over time. COCODE
and ADESCO presidents in both countries sign up for two-year terms in most communities,
and many serve in their posts for more than a decade, yet the question related to one’s
experience with crime in the AmericasBarometer survey is timebound to events within the last
year. Thus, the relationship between PDD participation and experience with violence during
the 2008 mano dura campaigns and before PDD-embedded Violence Prevention Committees
were introduced in the mid-2010s, likely indicates that PDD participants were more vulnerable
to violent crimes than non-participants at that time. As one municipal official shared about the
transition moment between the pre- and post-peace accord system of citizen participation in
Guatemala, “Nobody dared to assume this kind of leadership because everything had a cost…
everything had a cost. For us here, the cost was in lives—as in many parts of the country—
those who assumed those leadership roles ran the risk.” Many of the stories I heard related to
violence stemming from PDD participation recalled incidents from the early years of
implementation.
There are factors, however, that point to the statistically significant relationship
identified in 2018 running in the opposite direction. Based on my qualitative interviews from
years 2017-2019, I am inclined to believe that many participants now get involved in PDD in
response to their experience with violent crime to help resolve these issues. This could explain
why the association between these two variables fades in my 2018 models. Modern-day PDD
participants are using these spaces to eliminate crime in their neighborhoods and villages; as
crime decreases, the association between personal experience with violence and participation
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also diminishes. The implication of this finding is that there can be an increased physical risk
to PDD participants in the early aftermath of civil war. However, the interim increase in risk
can be mitigated when PDD spaces integrate forums and programs specifically designed to
address community conflicts and violence.
In an article on the relationship between post-conflict violence and democracy,
Diamond (2006) sums up the conclusion I draw from this result quite well, “No order, no
democracy. Democracy cannot be viable (and neither can it really be meaningful) in a context
where violence or the threat of violence is pervasive and suffuses the political calculations and
fears of groups and individuals. Thus, the promotion of democracy in post-conflict situations
cannot succeed without the rebuilding of order in these contexts, and the tasks of democracy
building and of peace implementation are inseparable” (p. 96). He goes on to discuss how postconflict settings may require an extended period of stabilization before elections are viable. I
would argue that the same concept applies to post-conflict PDD. It is important to set up these
institutions early on, or even before the civil war comes to an end as was done in El Salvador.
It is even more imperative that such institutions be designed with the dynamics of conflict and
violence in mind. Violence, including gang-related crime, must be mitigated for the
sustainability of the peace process over time. PDD can be an integral part of a post-conflict
nation’s response to spoilers and those profiting from the post-conflict vacuum of authority by
engaging citizens in violence prevention. My findings suggest that these processes can and do
help with violence control once they are up and running.

254

Overall Perception of Peace
With regards to building long-term and sustainable peace, PDD in Guatemala shows
more promise overall as a tool for making multi-dimensional gains toward peace. While
impacts in El Salvador are seen largely within the political dimension, the effects of PDD
participation in Guatemala are demonstrated across political, social, and ‘positive’ peace
dimensions with greater strength over time. That said, the data suggests that long-term
implementation of PDD in both Guatemala and El Salvador is associated with promising
overall perceptions related to peace, as demonstrated by the statistically significant relationship
between PDD participation and the additive ‘peace perception index.’ These comparative
findings suggest that the meso-level structure of PDD mechanisms and the macro-level
political context greatly influence the outcomes reported in both countries.

6b. Policy Implications
In the field of peace and conflict studies, there is a strong tendency for scholars or
practitioners to avoid abstracting lessons learned from highly contextualized case studies for
alternative contexts and cases. In this spirit, the policy recommendations stemming from my
research in Guatemala and El Salvador should not be construed as ‘one size fits all’ or ‘best
practices’ that can be plucked from these cases and applied uniformly to other post-conflict
nations. Indeed, despite the overlapping history and geography of these two neighboring
nations, I would not propose that Guatemala’s system be transferred to El Salvador or vice
versa even though Guatemala’s experience with PDD has resulted in more associated
dimensions of peace long-term. Peacebuilding policy and practice must bear in mind how
macro-, meso-, and micro-level systems interact. Only with a thorough understanding of such
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dynamics should policy makers consider lessons learned from these cases as insights and
possible policy implications for PDD implementation in alternative contexts. The divergent
results for PDD participation and outcomes at the micro-level are attributed to meso-level PDD
design and macro-level factors associated with how peace was negotiated. It all comes down
to structure and context, both of which I discuss in greater detail below.

Structural Factors
Related to structure, my two case countries show how top-down versus bottom-up PDD
structures influence impacts on peace. Guatemala’s PDD mechanisms ensure that local leaders
interact monthly with the municipality and with each other in COMUDE meetings. This space
has been designed so that twenty leaders, selected as representatives of their micro-regions,
have time for deliberation and sufficient decision-making power even when additional
community representatives are invited to be present. In El Salvador, most municipalities only
hold one annual public assembly or open Town Hall meeting with limited opportunity for
deliberation because participant numbers tend to be much higher and the nature of the meetings
is more informative. It makes sense, therefore, that Guatemalan officials indicate more crossneighborhood relations and social capital improvements than El Salvador.
The first structural policy implication stemming from this comparative case is that PDD
mechanisms should encourage cross-community contact. This is not to say that increasing
community contact within a neighborhood or village is not valuable. Indeed, even in the case
of Guatemala, COCODEs within each neighborhood were rolled out prior to bringing the
leadership of all these groups together in the municipal-wide COMUDE meetings or
departmental CODEDE meetings amongst mayors. It is beneficial for participants in these
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processes to learn how to deliberate in a ‘safe space’ amongst those they know well, before
they apply their deliberative skills in a potentially more conflictual setting. The challenge with
ADESCOs in El Salvador is that they have not yet progressed to cross-community contact in
most municipalities, bar one that I encountered during my fieldwork. At some point, most
likely around 5-10 years post-conflict, local community members should be encouraged and
incentivized to sit at the same table as their former, and possibly current, enemies to engage in
dialogue. PDD can provide an appropriate space for this interaction, if it is set up to do so.
Second, PDD processes that truly empower citizens with the agency to make policy
and municipal budget decisions have more positive effects on peace. Guatemalan COMUDEs
have a greater degree of influence over decision making and a budget set aside specifically to
cover projects suggested within that space. El Salvador’s ADESCO leaders only have the
power to request projects, but they do not participate in prioritizing needs or making the final
call on which projects are funded. They also have no protected budget specifically for citizenrequested projects. Thus, it makes sense that Guatemala’s PDD processes are reportedly more
collaborative while Salvadoran PDD retains a clientelist quality. The fact that Guatemalan
PDD participants show a higher level of satisfaction with the democratic system than nonparticipants speaks to the importance of this structural design feature.
A third structural policy implication stemming from this comparison between PDD in
Guatemala versus El Salvador is the importance of striking a balance between decentralization
of power to local government and citizen control over policy making. In El Salvador,
participatory budgeting appears to have reached the highest rung on Arnstein’s (1969) Ladder
of Citizen Participation and truly Empowered Deliberative Democracy (Fung & Wright, 2001).
However, my interviews with municipal officials about this PDD process indicated that the
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mechanism undermined an already tenuous and only recently established legitimacy for
municipal government. In Guatemala, there was already a strong precedent for devolving some
decision-making power to community leaders. Thus, it was not as shocking to introduce a
revised form of PDD to the local participatory system. As these two cases demonstrate, it is
beneficial to build post-conflict PDD mechanisms upon complementary civil society structures
even if the distinction between new and old systems is not entirely clear at the onset. It is also
helpful to scale up the Ladder of Citizen Control one rung at a time to avoid a clash of power.
If during the war, citizens were at the level of “nonparticipation,” as was the case in El
Salvador, then they will often not have the capacity or baseline understanding of democratic
decision making required to jump immediately to the level of “delegated power” or “citizen
control” (Arnstein, 1969, p. 217).
A primary barrier to PDD in Guatemala and El Salvador outlined during interviews
with municipal officials and participants was insufficient funding for projects put forth in PDD
spaces. In Guatemala, funds were disbursed at the CODEDE level of the Development Council
system for community projects decided upon in PDD spaces. Municipalities also received
transfers from the national government, collected nationally via taxes, for operating costs such
as service delivery and salaries. El Salvador funded municipalities via FODES, which directs
nationally collected taxes back to local government. Twenty-five percent of FODES funds
were earmarked for municipal operating costs such as building maintenance and employee
salaries, the other 75% of FODES funds were to be directed specifically to infrastructure
development projects. However, funds were not tied to project proposals stemming from a
participatory forum as in Guatemala.
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This scenario points to a fourth structural policy implication related to PDD
implementation in post-conflict contexts with a decentralization agenda. Even as municipal
transfers from the national government in both countries have increased over the years since
decentralization began, these small increases have not made a significant impact. In an
international aid report on El Salvador released recently by the World Bank (Aguilera, Stanley,
Zhang, & Ijjasz-Vasquez, 2017) loan officers share that “municipalities remained highly
dependent on fiscal transfers from the national government to cover operational expenses and
debt service costs” (p. 1) throughout the loan period, indicating that only 2.3% of municipal
revenue is self-sourced or earned income. This municipal financial reality indicates that this
issue will not go away any time soon. Thus, in addition to increasing the responsibilities
delegated to local government and bolstering capacity in municipalities, sources of funding
should also be devolved. This is especially important for reinforcing decisions made with
citizen input as participation reportedly drops off when implementation is stalled due to budget
shortfalls, as shown by the decrease in El Salvador’s PDD participants from 2008 to 2018.
A fifth policy implication builds upon the former. On a local level, one northwestern
town in El Salvador developed a solid strategy to deal with funding gaps for community
investments. In 1996, a forward-looking administration successfully passed a local business
tax law which greatly increased their internal operating budget. The town is now one of the
richest municipalities in the nation, and this has had a major impact on community
development. In my interview with a municipal official in this town, he boasted that “95% of
the rural area has electricity and running water, likewise we have been able to improve the
transit system.” He continued for several minutes speaking of various municipal programs they
were able to administer to improve the community. This town was also one of the highest
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ranked municipalities in terms of transparency by El Salvador’s Institute of Access to Public
Information, an achievement I attribute to their ability to fully staff their offices with qualified
professionals. Thus, I recommend that municipalities be guided to raise their own funds to
cover PDD projects. However, this is far easier to propose on paper than in practice. Trust must
be extant to successfully collect taxes, while taxes can help to ensure funding is available for
community-determined developments that improve trust in local government.
In Guatemala a complex bureaucracy has developed, underpinning the Development
Council system, which inhibits timely follow-through on implementation of PDD-determined
projects. While this has been a reported challenge in El Salvador too, Guatemala’s
municipalities and PDD participants mentioned this challenge far more frequently. The reason
for this commonly reported challenge is that spending through the COCODE system, and
indeed spending for community projects in general, has come with an increased need for
transparency. There are several layers of permits and studies required for each development
project, especially capital projects with potential environmental or ethical impacts.
Additionally, Guatemala has set up a public bidding system for government contracts. Given
that corruption is a well-known challenge in Guatemala, these checks and balance systems are
not necessarily a bad idea. However, they do add time and complexity to the completion of
community development projects.
Additional training and communication for COCODE leadership can help to curb the
learning curve and set expectations about municipal project timelines. These training spaces
can also be helpful for generating dialogue and problem-solving without the pressure of
debating specific project proposals and thus generating possible competition between
communities. Indeed, in both Guatemala and El Salvador, civic participation training programs
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I observed ranked highly on both the DQI and CQI scales. A sixth structural policy implication
can be derived from this analysis, suggesting that local, national, and international time and
funds be directed toward regular training events either in parallel to or outside PDD forums.

Contextual Factors
When it comes to macro-level contextual factors, Guatemala and El Salvador differ
greatly in the way that public participation versus politics were balanced during the peace
processes. In Guatemala, citizen participation processes were a principal component of the
peace accords, above and beyond integration of the rebel URNG as a political party. Thus,
PDD took center stage as a tool for overcoming the root causes of the conflict and post-conflict
challenges that may have plunged the country back into war. A seventh policy implication
from this comparative case, this time of a contextual nature, is that including participatory
deliberative democracy within the national-level and elite discourses on peace can greatly
improve the chances of PDD success over time.
On the other hand, one of the greatest challenges facing PDD processes in El Salvador
was partisanship. The reason that this challenge was reported so consistently in my interviews
with PDD participants in El Salvador stems from the internal conflict itself and how the
integration of the FMLN into the political process was prioritized in the peace agreement.
Indeed, PDD was never mentioned in the peace accords and is rarely thought of in modernday El Salvador as having anything to do with the peace process. There are two lessons from
this case, however, that offer hopeful signs and policy implications on this frontier. First, time
has eventually chipped away at the conflict parties’ dominance and diminished the hold of the
war-era political parties on national political power. Second, the local electoral formula was
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recently reformed to encourage greater deliberation amongst politicians themselves, a policy
prescription that is worth further discussion and exploration as a political peacebuilding tool
in other post-conflict contexts, though it has not been the focus of my dissertation research.
During the longest stretch of my fieldwork in El Salvador, I had the opportunity to
observe the first national election since the civil war in which a third party, neither ARENA
nor FMLN, would win the executive office. Though many were surprised by the land-slide
victory of now President Nayib Bukele running under the banner of the Nuevas Ideas and
GANA parties, the popularity of the two war-era political parties has been on the decline for
years. Using the AmericasBarometer data on political sway, I found that a little over a decade
after the Chapultepec Peace Agreement was signed in 2004, forty-three percent (43%) of the
nationally representative sample still identified strongly with either the far-right or far-left and
a quarter (25%) of the population self-identified with the ‘middle’ of the political spectrum.
By 2016, only a quarter (25%) of the population identified strongly as either far-right or farleft on the political spectrum, and the middle had grown to thirty-eight percent (38%) of the
population. Figure 2 below demonstrates that El Salvador’s population shows an overall trend
toward the ‘middle’ in terms of political ideology over time.
Figure 2: Percent of the Salvadoran AmericasBarometer Sample in the ‘Middle’ of the
Political Spectrum from 2004-2016
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In a separate investigation I undertook, also using AmericasBarometer data, I find that this
shift toward the ‘middle’ of the political spectrum is strongly correlated (r = -.93) with the
gradual decline in the percent of the population that remembers the civil war. I believe that this
trend and its strong correlation with declining memory of the war highlights some of the
challenges that political power-sharing presents for long-term post-conflict peacebuilding.
Power-sharing, or consociationalism (Lijphart, 1969, 1977), has long been promoted
as a policy approach to conflict management in intrastate conflicts by incorporating the primary
warring parties into the post-conflict political system. Early studies on the effects of powersharing agreements focused on political or democratic stability (Lijphart, 1969), but more
recent research has explored the impacts of power-sharing on the durability of peace (Cammett
& Malesky, 2012; Hartzell & Hoodie, 2003; Mukherjee, 2006; Ottmann & Vüllers, 2015; D.
Rothchild & Roeder, 2005; Wantchekon, 2000). While many scholars find that power-sharing
can aid peaceful transitions to democracy (Hartzell & Hoodie, 2003; Wantchekon, 2000),
others contend that power-sharing can result in extremist forms of exclusion and further
factionalism (Horowitz, 1993), especially in the long-term (D. Rothchild & Roeder, 2005).
Rothchild & Roeder (2005) argue that “after intense conflicts [power-sharing institutions]
typically have a set of unintended but perverse consequences. They empower ethnic elites from
previously warring groups, create incentives for these elites to press radical demands once the
peace is in place, and lower the costs for these elites to escalate conflict in ways that threaten
democracy and peace” (p. 29). In El Salvador, power-sharing may have brought the conflict
between the government and rebels to an end, but it has also entrenched modern politics in
war-era ideological divides. Only with time and the relative increase of younger populations
with little to no memory of the war has the legacy of war-time politics started to break down
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in El Salvador. Thus, an eighth policy implication of this study is that the enduring effects of
political power-sharing agreements on efforts such as decentralization and PDD must be
weighed against their utility in negotiating an end to direct conflict.
Another related issue in El Salvador is that the country had a ‘winner take all’ electoral
formula until 2015. This meant that the political party securing the most votes in any one
municipality would then hold all seats on the Municipal Council. So, while representative
politics was employed at the national level to help bring the war to an end, this was not the
case at the local level until recently. This local-level election policy closed the door on
meaningful cross-conflict-party interactions for both municipal politicians and citizens.
Without any ideological balance within municipal administrations for over twenty years postconflict, it was relatively easy to exclude individuals of alternative political parties (and thus
the opposing war-era conflict party) from the policy-making arena. ‘Plural Municipal
Councils,’ as they are called in El Salvador today, have given proportional representation in
the Municipal Council to all parties that receive a vote in local elections. This also means that
PDD participants, even those in the political minority, now have officials on the Municipal
Council to ask for support of their projects even if they are not aligned with the mayor. This
new electoral formula increases the potential of breaking down entrenched war-era
partisanship divides by giving citizens of all political stripes a real voice in PDD spaces, and
more broadly, in the future. A ninth policy implication stemming from this contextual factor
is that all spaces for public deliberation and decision making must be modeled in a way that is
conducive to cross-party discourse. The former ‘winner take all’ electoral formula and
subsequent administration composition cut out deliberation at the meso-level and consequently
undermined both macro-level power-sharing efforts and micro-level PDD processes.
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When we compare PDD as implemented in El Salvador versus Guatemala, the
structural and contextual factors in the latter case have had more success than the former in
helping to advance multiple dimensions of peace over time. However, this does not mean that
Guatemala’s system should be duplicated in every post-conflict context. There are many
factors at play in post-conflict societies, from different forms of traditional mechanisms used
for community decision making to the key negotiation points within a peace agreement. The
structure of PDD must be designed in each case to respond to these contextual factors, and it
must be acknowledged that short-term impacts are likely to be detrimental to ‘negative’ peace
even if they support ‘positive’ peace in the long-run.

6c. Responding to the Literature
Reflecting on this comparative case study of PDD in Guatemala and El Salvador
illuminates several of the key inflection points and lessons learned by scholars writing within
peacebuilding literature. As I set out to explore the central research question for this study, I
situated the premise of this dissertation within the context of the liberal versus local
peacebuilding debate. As this debate has evolved over time, so too have the real effects of local
PDD evolved in my case countries. This study’s contribution to this debate and the wider
literature on peacebuilding is that it takes the long-view. It highlights two divergent ways that
internationally supported peacebuilding, national political systems, and local-level PDD
processes have shaped peace in Central America. In this section, I embed my research in the
literature by detailing how the debate has evolved over time and underscoring how the results
of this study reflect a present-day consensus that there is no one liberal or local approach to
building peace.
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Though the role of local actors was recognized as an important component of
peacebuilding in the late 1990s (Lederach, 1995), studies on the effects of post-Cold War
peacebuilding approaches and the role of civil society were only just emerging at that time.
Critical analysis on the liberal peace and empirical scholarship on the role of civil society and
local leadership in the peace process came to the forefront of the peacebuilding literature in the
mid-2000s. In the academic journal Conflict, Security & Development, a special issue was
released in 2006 to explore “some of the assumptions and practices of institutions and agencies
that promote the liberal peace in the context of the post-Cold War phase of globalization”
(Turner & Pugh, 2006, p. 471). The editors of that edition concluded from the articles therein
that “peacebuilding was failing civil society” (Turner & Pugh, 2006, p. 472). Also, in 2006,
the World Bank released a report outlining the functions of civil society in building peace and
called for additional evaluation and research on the topic. They framed the challenge of
discerning civil society’s influence on peace processes as such:
Civil society has a unique potential and can make many positive contributions
to peacebuilding and conflict mitigation. […] Despite many successful
initiatives on the ground, however, civil society should not be considered a
panacea. The existence of civil society per se cannot be equated with the
existence of peacebuilding actors. Similarly, civil society strengthening and
support does not automatically contribute to peacebuilding. While civil society
organizations are frequently actors for peace, they equally have the potential to
become actors of violence. […] Without greater clarity on objectives and
intended impacts, and without addressing institutional constraints and
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distortions, activities run the risk of being well-intentioned but unlikely to
achieve sustainable results (World Bank, 2006, p. v).

My own interest in peacebuilding sparked in 2005 as the UN launched the
Peacebuilding Commission. I started my master’s program in Peace Studies at the University
of Bradford in the UK to delve deeper into the topic in 2008. By then a chorus of voices had
joined in calling out the liberal peace for its failures and shortcomings. Some of my favorite
article titles from this era include: “The Tragedy of Liberal Diplomacy: Democratization,
Intervention, and Statebuilding” (Jahn, 2007c, 2007b), “On the crisis of the liberal peace” (N.
Cooper, 2007), and “Myth or Reality: Opposing Views on the Liberal Peace and Post-War
Reconstruction” (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2007).
Nearly a decade later, the tide had shifted, and a more tempered conceptualization of
both top-down liberal peace and bottom-up local peace had emerged. Several scholars had
started a counter-discourse to highlight that the liberal project has taken on many forms and
been applied in a diversity of ways, often specifically tailored to a local context during peace
agreement negotiations (Selby, 2013). Central critical theorists within the debate such as Oliver
Richmond and Roger Mac Ginty had started writing about ‘hybrid peace’ and the variety of
ways that external and internal actors within peace processes mix and combine their influence
and strategies in pursuit of peace (Mac Ginty, 2010; Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2015; Richmond,
2009; Richmond & Mac Ginty, 2014). The critique became more refined as well, as it
challenged peacebuilders to reconsider the concept of ‘local’ altogether as “de-territorialized,
networked, and constituted by people and activity rather than place” (Mac Ginty, 2015, p. 841)
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and focus on individual’s ‘everyday peace’ (Firchow & Ginty, 2017; Mac Ginty, 2014; Mac
Ginty & Firchow, 2016).
Just as the peacebuilding literature has come to temper its criticism of the liberal peace
and enthusiastic embrace of all things local, El Salvador and Guatemala have played out this
debate on-the-ground and in real-time. Both countries were looped into the liberal project
through peace agreements negotiated via the UN and overseen by subsequent international
military observer missions. In these two cases, liberal peace served its typical function, that
which “reinforces the position of power-holders (national, regional, international elites and
their private-sector allies)” and “uses statebuilding as its principal vehicle of reform, promoting
Western-style governance and electoral processes” (Mac Ginty, 2010, p. 394-395). However,
the elite-led negotiations opted to engage and involve, to varying degrees, local leaders and
civil society. In Guatemala, the liberal peace directly called for local participation and set up
laws and systems to ensure its implementation; whereas in El Salvador, local participation was
not a central component in the peace accords and thus developed municipality by municipality,
intergovernmental intervention by nongovernmental intervention, over time and with little
oversight. In other words, each peace process demonstrates a different type of ‘hybrid peace.’
Looking to Mac Ginty’s (2010) conceptualization of the hybridization of peace
processes, Guatemala demonstrates the “compliance powers of the liberal peace” in which
“promoters of the liberal peace are able to mobilize a formidable suite of compliance
mechanisms to encourage conformity and to discipline attempts at deviance” (p. 398). He goes
on to explain how systems of compliance typically filter down from international to national
and then to local, often via the funders of peace processes and their elite local agents. Certainly,
in the case of Guatemala, we can see this top-down compliance piece in action even today as
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municipal funding is released by the national government and international donors based on
adherence to the established laws and bureaucratic norms of the COCODE system. Yet, we
might also see the case of Guatemala as exemplary of the “the ability of local actors, structures,
and networks to present and maintain alternative forms of peace and peacemaking” that “draw
on traditional, indigenous, or customary norms and practices” (Mac Ginty, 2010, p. 403)
because of how closely the COCODEs mirrored the structure and function of traditional
community mayors in (generally) indigenous communities. In combination, top-down
compliance structures paired with a PDD mechanism echoing tradition have resulted in an
incredibly powerful platform for citizens to influence municipal decision making with
promising long-term effects on peace.
In the case of El Salvador, we can see an alternative approach, one which Mac Ginty
(2010, p. 400) might classify as the “incentivizing powers of the liberal peace” at work. While
the UN mission in El Salvador certainly helped to enforce compliance around elections and
demilitarization, there was a far more carrot-versus-stick approach to promoting
decentralization and local participation in public policy making. Recall that PDD evolved
through several iterations on each mechanism, often with the support of international NGOs or
aid (e.g. USAID). Thus, cooperation with PDD initiatives under the umbrella of the liberal
peace in El Salvador can be characterized as “a route through which to access resources,
whether power or legitimacy or livelihood” with the caveat that “‘incentives’ and rewards are
[often] illusory and unevenly shared” (Mac Ginty, 2010, p. 401). Indeed, those that signed-up
to implement early prototypes of PDD such as open Town Hall meetings in the 1990s,
participatory budgeting in the 2000s, and participatory planning in the 2010s have reaped the
reward of gaining access to small pools of money to support the processes and assist with
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implementation follow-through. However, these systems and the incentives driving their
development have not withstood the test of time as participation has decreased and initial
promising outcomes have faded away.
Embracing hybridity versus a binary view of peacebuilding provides a solid framework
to explain how top-down and bottom-up forces have shaped PDD processes, and ultimately
peace, in both Guatemala and El Salvador. In response to my key research question—How, if
at all, does the implementation of participatory deliberative democracy in post-conflict
contexts impact peacebuilding?—my research offers two divergent and context-specific
responses. The structure of PDD and the context in which it is implemented mediate the effects
of PDD on political, economic, social, ‘positive,’ and ‘negative’ dimensions of peace in
Guatemala and El Salvador. The top-down approach as seen in Guatemala took longer to have
an effect, but the modern Development Council system is remarkedly robust and influential on
political, social, and ‘positive’ dimensions of peace as Guatemala verges on the 25th
anniversary of its peace agreement. El Salvador’s bottom-up approach has elicited a wide
variety of experimental PDD mechanisms over nearly thirty years post-conflict, but fewer
institutionalized processes, incentives, or monitoring systems result in muted effects across all
but the political dimension of peace. Yet, despite the divergence of PDD impacts in these two
cases, the overall result is similar: PDD does indeed have a positive and measurable influence
on long-term, sustainable peace. I therefore submit to the scholarly community that, regardless
of the nature of hybrid peacebuilding, PDD can play a beneficial role in peace processes.
6d. Study Limitations
I addressed the topic of research design limitations in Chapter 3 for each of the methods
I employ in this study, but I return to this topic again as I conclude to emphasize the
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predominate ways this study is limited by my approach and illuminate possible additional
avenues of exploration for future researchers. As hinted at in Chapter 3 and the section above,
this analysis is limited by two key factors. First, my researcher identity influenced my entrée
to the field, the data I was able to collect, and my interpretation of that data. Second, though
my research design includes various levels of analysis and research methods to ensure a
thorough investigation of PDD implementation and its impacts in Guatemala and El Salvador,
the data used is itself limited. The quantitative data is limited as it has been collected by a
secondary party and is cross-sectional in nature, making comparisons over time both
challenging and unfulfilling as compared original longitudinal data. The qualitative data used
in the study is limited by the time I was able to commit to my fieldwork, the locations I was
able to access and study in greater depth, and the individuals I was able to interview. Third,
my research design as a mixed methods study does not sit squarely within any one
epistemology. The mixed methodology employed lends strength to my analysis and
conclusions drawn therein, but it may not appeal to researchers that prefer either a strictly
positivist, interpretivist, or critical approach. I discuss each of these limitations in turn in the
paragraphs to follow.
First, regarding my identity, I am a Western female working toward a doctoral degree,
factors which inevitably come into play in international research. These intersectional
identities greatly influenced by ability to gain entrée in the field. Throughout my fieldwork, I
was regularly reminded by passers-by and my interview participants of my ‘outsider’ status as
a blond-haired, blue-eyed, white, US-American entering Central America. Being a gringa,
white female foreigner, carries with it both positive and negative connotations in Latin
America. On the one hand, I benefited from stereotypes related to my assumed level of
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expertise, socio-economic status, or possible association with international development
funders in the US. On the other hand, I encountered distrust related to rising tensions between
the US and Central American nations surrounding the migrant caravans during my fieldwork
as well as the historical role the US played in both the Guatemalan and Salvadorian civil wars,
intervening on the side of the authoritarian government against the leftist rebels.
Whether or not I agree with modern US policies on migration or historical intervention
in these countries’ civil wars, I was seen by default as a representative of the US in all my
interactions abroad. Indeed, several interviewees referenced having recently spoken with my
compatriota, countryperson, the Ambassador of the United States during my visits, as if we
knew one another. While I made it clear that I did not work for the US government,
conversation often circled back to the work of USAID, the migrant caravans heading to the US
border, or other US-centric themes. My approach to navigating these passing comments, and
at times in-depth conversations, was to make light of the association, saying – “Goodness, the
Ambassador is going think I am following her!” – or to ask questions to show my naïveté about
the relationships each community had with US development programs or funding structures.
As a female researcher, I also needed a strategy to navigate Latin American machismo,
the male dominant social hierarchy extant across the region. Thus, I often played the role of
“honorary male” when conducting my research with formal entities (Warren, 2001, pp. 214216). I made conscious choices about how to present myself to gain credibility in a largely
masculine field site both in the way I chose to dress, often in business casual pant-suits, and
how I held myself in initial interactions. This approach, however, was not always well received
by PDD participants, particularly female participants in largely indigenous communities in
Guatemala. When working with individuals of this demographic, I would often highlight my
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identity as a mother to open the door to conversation. Some PDD participants even requested
that I bring my infant daughter along to our interviews. As these two approaches demonstrate,
I employed various facets of my identity to gain entrée to the field.
While I made various efforts to avoid clashes of my identities in the field, these same
factors contributed to the extraordinary ease I experienced gaining entrée to the field and whilst
conducting interviews. I was never denied an audience with a municipal official during my
visit(s), and aside from some awkward bilingual blunders, conversation flow was easy,
respectful, and uninhibited. Mayors were particularly forthcoming with their trials,
tribulations, and frustrations related to PDD, the office itself, national politics, and citizen
engagement. Only on one occasion did I encounter a PDD participant that did not want to talk
about their experiences with me. In this case, the individual was interested in participating, but
he was not comfortable signing the consent form for the interview because he could not read,
so I discontinued the engagement.
Another element of my identity, this time as both a researcher and an international
public policy practitioner, influenced my ability to collect data and my interpretation of that
data. As a professional, I have evaluated municipal PDD programs in the US, worked as a
Peace Corps volunteer focused on community economic development and citizen participation
in South America, and facilitated cross-sectarian dialogues and trainings in a post-conflict
reconciliation center in Northern Ireland. My practitioner identity allowed me to navigate
municipal relationships and bureaucratic hurdles with relative ease. I was no stranger to the
process of petitioning officials for interviews and negotiating my continued engagement with
a community through observations and participant interviews. However, my interest in this
project and my interpretation of the empirical evidence therein was equally influenced by my
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practitioner perspective and experiences. While I have hesitations about international
development and peace work in practice, I believe that conscientious implementation of PDD
should have a positive impact on peace across multiple dimensions. Thus, during the collection
and analysis of my data for this study, I often felt compelled to emphasize the possible negative
impacts of PDD or temper my endorsement of certain PDD structures to avoid overstating a
result that I am naturally drawn to and hope is true.
Second, related to the limitations of my data, both my quantitative and qualitative
datasets are inherently imperfect. Within my quantitative model, the variables selected for
operationalization are not perfect measures of the peace-related dimensions in my conceptual
framework and the data is not optimally structured for multi-year comparisons. Just as my
quantitative data has its limitations, so too does my qualitative data. These limitations are threefold. Primarily, my interviews and observations were conducted over a limited period and often
during election season. Timing influenced individual perspectives on PDD and its effects as
well as the discourse in PDD forums I was able to observe. Secondly, I did not visit every
single municipality across Guatemala and El Salvador for this study, and I spent quality time
in only a handful of sites. Thus, I cannot state with confidence that the trends and behaviors I
noted in my sample are representative of all municipalities in these two countries, and I also
cannot claim to know about PDD or its effects with the detail of an ethnography. Finally, the
way I accessed PDD participants was mediated by my relationship with the municipality in
each community. This dynamic introduced bias in my interviewee sample, particularly in El
Salvador. I expand upon these challenges with each type of data below.
As with any study conducted using secondary data, creativity must be employed to
select the variables that most closely align with the proposed theoretical constructs. For
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example, Allport’s theory of intergroup contact is largely supported by evidence using
psychological laboratory experiments and quasi-experiments in the field with interviews and
surveys that directly ask participants in contact about their views of a defined ‘other’ (white
Americans rating their feelings toward black Americans, Israeli students asked about
Palestinian students, etc.) rather than their trust of ‘others’ generically (Pettigrew, 1998).
Additionally, researchers that study trust (e.g. Lewicki & Tomlinson, 2014) have identified a
difference in calculus-based trust, granted when the ‘other’ faces consequences for breaking
with agreed upon expectations, versus identity-based trust, in which one grants trust due to
affinity with the ‘other’ over time. It could be that municipal trust is interpreted on a calculusbased spectrum whereas trust of ‘others’ in general is interpreted on an identity-based spectrum
in the minds of respondents. In short, given that the AmericasBarometer is a secondary dataset,
the measures are not as precise as they could be in an original survey. A survey tool modeled
after those used by expert social scientists exploring these theories directly may produce more
consistent and comparable results with former studies, though such an endeavor is outside the
scope of this dissertation.
On a related theme, the AmericasBarometer is not really designed for measuring
individual change in public opinion over time. Questions from one survey cycle to the next
change, and thus measures are not always comparable from one time period to the next either.
Likewise, the individuals surveyed each round are different from the prior cycle; the data is
not longitudinal. Thus, though I have presented my case above as a study about the evolution
of PDD and its impacts in my case countries, my quantitative analysis would be much stronger
if I had access to consistently worded questions from year to year or an static sample of
respondents to track over time.
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My qualitative data also has its limitations. The first of the limitations is the timing of
my fieldwork. My interviews and observations were conducted over a limited and intermittent
period spanning from autumn of 2018 to summer of 2019 in Guatemala and summer of 2017
to spring of 2019 in El Salvador. This was an exciting and tumultuous period in both countries,
which influenced individual perspectives on PDD and its effects as well as my observations.
The most notable timing-based factor was how my research window overlapped with elections.
In Guatemala, all my research took place within one calendar year of elections across all levels
of government. While most of my elite interviews with municipal officials took place outside
the official three-month election campaigning window in 2019, the reality is that the campaign
was in full swing for most of my time in the field. Additionally, nearly all my observations and
participant interviews did fall within the campaign season. Likewise, in El Salvador, there was
a municipal election cycle between my first and second visits to the field and a national
presidential election which took place just as I started my observations and participant
interviews. Thus, though I am inclined to believe that politics plays a key role in PDD processes
outside election season based on my interviews, I cannot say with complete certainty that this
is true. It could be that the partisan favoritism theme I heard time and again in El Salvador was
overstated due to timing.
Additionally, my study failed to quantify the qualitative trends I identified in a way that
could be representative of all municipal administrations because I only worked with a sub-set
of municipalities. Related, but on the opposite side of the methodological spectrum, it also did
not get to the depth of an ethnography. My research falls short of being fully immersed and
reflexive, to dig deeper into the relationship between PDD and peace in just one community.
It also did not employ cutting-edge measurement tools currently under development by those
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that study peacebuilding’s ‘local turn’ in alternative contexts. In my interviews, I asked
individuals about the impacts of PDD bucketed within my own conceptual framework on
peace, not about how PDD or ‘everyday peace’ is conceptualized by the individuals living in
these societies (Mac Ginty, 2014; Mac Ginty & Firchow, 2016).
Finally, taking part in observations at the invitation of the municipal government, even
when used as a validity check on the data gathered from municipal officials, introduced bias
into my understanding of PDD in each country. In order to counter-act this bias, I developed a
sampling matrix that prioritized diversity along key societal divisions, and I made a concerted
effort to speak with individuals of multiple political parties and ethnic groups following each
PDD forum observation. However, it was impossible to avoid all bias introduced by the role
of the municipality in opening up opportunities for me to meet with participants, whether due
to selectivity of the PDD spaces I was invited to, travel safety and time available in the field,
or purposeful manipulation of the individuals I would encounter. In El Salvador, this bias was
the most striking in that I was unable to speak to a proportional set of ARENA supporters
involved in PDD processes. Although I am confident that biases case study wide were less
pronounced due to my sampling strategy, I cannot state with certainty that the views expressed
by PDD participant interviewees were completely balanced.
Third, my research design, though satisfactory for answering my research questions,
may be unsatisfactory to researchers that lean more heavily toward either quantitative or
qualitative methodologies and associated epistemologies. Those that wear their
epistemological traditions as a skin versus a sweater (Marsh & Furlong, 2002) might question
my mixed methods approach. While I stand behind my embrace of multiple research questions
and mixed methodology, my design will not appeal to all.
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Those of a purely positivist camp might take issue with my interest in the ‘big picture’
behind PDD impacts on peace in multiple countries. Rather than answer all the questions, they
would suggest that I aim for parsimony and leave further inquiry to the community of scholars
to attempt another proof or rejection of my conclusions via alternate methodologies or in
additional contexts, as recommended by King et al. (1994). To these critics, I counter that
parsimony ignores the socially constructed structures that influence causation, risking
oversight of some variable that may have a greater impact than those I chose to include in my
statistical models. Others of the interpretivist camp (e.g. Yanow, 1999) may reject that I
suggest an objectively derived ‘best practice,’ ‘policy implication,’ or ‘lesson learned’ at all.
They would argue that it is not possible for me to engage in scientific method without imposing
my own interpretation on the issue studied (Marsh & Furlong, 2002, p. 23) and that “agreed
facts” are as far as I could go (Marsh & Furlong, 2002, p. 29). Critical scholars like Piven
(2004) would jump on board arguing that my ontological grounding undermines my entire
project because research is power at play.
Unable to disagree whole-heartedly on any of these counts, I can only respond to these
critiques by acknowledging this limitation and my biases. I contend that the greatest weakness
of this approach is also its greatest strength. To each set of critics in turn, I would say that this
study has aspired to seek out the truth about the influence of PDD in these two post-conflict
contexts and sought to give voice to communities that have bravely set out to engage citizens
in public policy decision making under less-than-ideal circumstances.
My research is only a small piece of the larger puzzle that seeks to improve postconflict peacebuilding practice. It is my hope that future researchers pursue further academic
inquiry on this topic via alternative means. To this end, I posit that my results occasion more
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questions for future research. First, how is ‘everyday peace’ defined for PDD participants?
Second, is PDD having a positive effect based on participants’ own conceptualizations of
peace? Future research on PDD and peace should, as the broader peacebuilding community
has come to realize, delve into the words, actions, or symbols that signal ‘everyday peace’ to
those involved in such processes. As we better understand how peace manifests itself as ‘local,’
we may illuminate new relationships between PDD and locally defined peace. Third, might
PDD be an effective tool for peacebuilding if it was structured specifically for this purpose?
PDD in Guatemala and El Salvador was introduced to open spaces for political participation
following ideologically-driven civil wars. PDD structure in both cases, at least at first, flowed
from this narrowly defined function. However, PDD structures could be developed with more
than the political dimension of peace in mind. Researchers should therefore explore how PDD
could be purposefully integrated into peacebuilding cross-dimensionally, pulling on the
lessons learned from this comparative case study and other investigations.

6e. Conclusion
This study highlights that PDD mechanisms do hold value for peacebuilding and have
indeed positively influenced the two post-conflict peace processes I investigated in Central
America. In particular, PDD processes help municipal officials to increase contact with citizens
and allocate resources to community needs. To varying degrees, PDD can also improve a
community’s social relationships and shift citizen mentalities from clientelist to cooperative.
The results suggest that PDD processes imposed from the top-down—as in Guatemala—
influence a greater number of peace-related dimensions than those implemented from the
bottom-up—as in El Salvador. On the one hand, top-down imposition guarantees and protects
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spaces for citizen participation and encourages cross-community deliberation. On the other
hand, bottom-up implementation allows for innovation but undercuts the consistency and
reliability of PDD impacts. However, the top-down versus bottom-up dichotomy is not the
only influential factor.
A hybrid and more systemic perspective that acknowledges the interactions between
macro-, meso-, and micro-level systems reveals that PDD implementation is only one element
of why and how PDD influences peace processes. Macro-level political structures, particularly
with regards to how they integrate conflict parties in the aftermath of war, can serve to facilitate
or impede PDD. Meso-level factors such as the structure of PDD mechanisms including how
many people participate, the level of deliberation possible, and how often they are used
influence how much control and empowerment citizens have over policy and budgetary
decision making. Finally, micro-level factors such as individual political party affiliation and
alignment with municipal leadership, urban versus rural living conditions, education level,
gender, and personal motivation to participate also influence effects. Other post-conflict
nations considering the implementation of PDD either as integral to the peace process or as
complimentary to peacebuilding have much to learn from the cases of Guatemala and El
Salvador.
Policy implications from this case are most directly transferable to Colombia, currently
struggling with its own peace process implementation heavily predicated on how accords
balance typical statebuilding efforts alongside PDD implementation and sharing many cultural
and contextual elements of my case study nations. The study also presents compelling
reflections for other post-conflict contexts considering implementation of PDD, with the
important caveat that cultural and historical features are likely to mediate the associations I
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find in this study. There are two such cases that are currently exploring PDD implementation.
The first is Northern Ireland, a case in which conflict ended in 1998 with the Good Friday
Agreement, but which has experienced several roadblocks in the peace process. Bohman
(2012) and Hayward (2014) have called for the introduction of deliberative democracy in this
case to help build the deliberative capacity of citizens, their representative officials, and
transnational supporters of the peace process alike. The second case is that of Israel/Palestine,
in which some scholars (e.g. Ahmed, 2005) have suggested that only local deliberative
democracy may offer inroads to peace in this protracted conflict.
Looking toward the future, I view this research as part of a larger agenda on improving
peacebuilding practice through discourse whether in political spaces, business meetings,
community groups, or team-based sports. In subsequent studies, I look to explore how a similar
research design and methodology in other post-conflict nations with alternative historical and
cultural contexts might illuminate additional links between PDD and peace. I also aspire to
conduct broader research to bridge conflict resolution theory with other disciplines across the
humanities. Just as PDD was not devised in either of this study’s case countries with its effects
on multiple dimensions of peace in mind, business recruitment policies or training on
sportsmanship may well influence peace in ways we do not yet know. Long-term, I endeavor
to uncover more mechanisms that fit within the hybrid peacebuilding toolkit.
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX I:
INTERVIEW PROTOCOLS
**Note: Bolded questions are the most important, if lacking time others can be cut.
Municipal Government Official Protocol
ORIGINAL
Sobre e/la Participante:
• Para empezar, ¿Puedes describir un poco sobre su rol con la
municipalidad/organización?
• ¿En qué manera/forma está usted trabajando en programas de democracia
participativa?
• ¿Cuantos años ya está usted con la municipalidad/organización?
• ¿Cómo empezó usted trabajando con esos programas de participación ciudadana?
Funcionamiento/La Implementación:
• ¿Cuáles programas de democracia participativa están implementando o
aportando (ej: cabildos abiertos, planes estrategias participativas, presupuestos
participativos)?
• ¿Puede usted describir cómo funcionan esos programas?
• ¿Cuáles pasos tienen?
• ¿Cuantas veces durante el año lo hacen?
• ¿Tienen acuerdo o una colaboración con otras organizaciones en la comunidad para
implementar esos programas?
• ¿Quiénes son?
• ¿Cómo están colaborando?
• ¿Cuánto cuesta estos programas?
• ¿Cuáles cosas necesitan pagar para realizar los proyectos?
• ¿Cómo financias estos programas?
• ¿Cuándo se involucró la municipalidad/organización en programas de democracia
participativa?
• ¿Por qué empezaron esa forma de democracia participativa en su municipalidad?
• ¿Quién es el encargado de cada programa? ¿Y cuál es su rol oficial con la
organización?
• Imagina usted que hay un día/paso del proceso que sale súper bueno- ¿cómo se ve?
• Imagina usted que hay un día/paso del proceso que sale súper malo- ¿cómo se ve?
• ¿Tienen entrenamiento para los que participan?
• ¿Qué temas se tocaban en el entrenamiento?
• ¿Las personas involucradas representan sus mismos o sus partidos/grupos en el
proceso? ¿Cómo se manifiestan?
• ¿Cuándo hay un cambio de la administración, cuál es el impacto típicamente en la
implementación de los programas participativos?
• ¿Cuántas personas están involucradas cada vez?
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•

•
•

•
•

¿Quiénes son las personas que participan?
• ¿Son líderes de la comunidad?
• ¿Son los más felices o los más enojados de la comunidad?
• ¿Son más jóvenes o ancianos?
• ¿Son más hombres o mujeres?
• ¿Son más de un partido político u otro?
• ¿Son más de un barrio u otro?
¿Qué hacen para alcanzar la gente? ¿Cómo reclutas?
¿La gente les gustan los programas?
• Si- ¿por qué le gusta?
• No- ¿por qué no le gusta?
• ¿Quién le gusta y quién no?
¿Cuáles programas son más populares (en términos de números de involucrados)?
¿menos populares?

Los Impactos:
• ¿Cuáles son algunos de los impactos de la democracia participativa en su
comunidad/el país que ha visto usted?
• ¿Cómo conoce usted que este impacto tiene algo que ver con la participación
ciudadana?
• ¿Qué quiere/piden la gente que están involucrados?
• ¿Cuáles resultados son lo más común de esos procesos?
• ¿Hay desacuerdos o choces entre los participantes o la comunidad sobre/durante el
proceso?
• Si- ¿cómo se manifiestan? / ¿cómo les resuelvan?
• No- ¿por qué cree usted que es tan pacífico?
• ¿He visto diferencias en esas personas después de su participación? ¿Cómo cambian la
gente?
• ¿Hay ideas/proyectos/puntas de vista que regresan año después del año?
• Cuéntame sobre un momento que se destaca en su mente sobre uno o dos de los
programas de democracia participativa que salió exitoso. ¿Por qué selecciona usted
este momento?
• ¿Está ayudando el desarrollo económico de la comunidad/el país en su opinión? ¿Cómo
conoce?
• ¿Está ayudando la reconciliación entre personas individualmente/de la comunidad/el
país? ¿Cómo conoce?
• ¿Está ayudando la confianza y capacitación en las instituciones/municipalidades al
nivel local? ¿Cómo conoce?
• ¿Deben continuar estos programas? ¿Por qué?
Colaboración
• ¿Qué quiere aprender usted sobre la democracia participativa en El Salvador?
¿Hay oportunidades para colaboración entre nosotros mientas estoy investigando
este tema en su país?
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TRANSLATION
About the Participant:
• To start, can you tell me a little bit about your role or title with the
municipality/organization?
• How you have been involved in working with participatory democracy
programs?
• How many years have you been working here?
• How did you get started working with citizen engagement programs?
Implementation:
• Which types of participatory democracy programs is your organization
implementing or supporting (ex: town hall meetings, participatory strategic
planning, participatory budgeting)?
• How do these programs function?
o What steps do they have?
o How many times a year do they run?
• Do you have agreements or collaborations with other organizations in the community
to implement the programs?
o Who are they with?
o How do you collaborate?
How
much to do the programs cost?
•
o What are the costs involved?
o How are they financed?
• When did your organization start these programs?
• Why did your organization get involved in these programs?
• What is the role of the person in charge (consultant, city official, etc.)?
• Is there universal participation in these processes? One person, one vote?
• Who ultimately decides which projects are selected and how they are implemented,
the community or the municipality?
• Imagine a day/step of the process that goes really well; what does it look like?
• Imagine a day/step of the process that goes really poorly; what does it look like?
• Do you train participants?
o What is in the training?
• Does politics enter the process? How so?
• When there is a change in administration, what is the typical impact on the
implementation of participatory programs?
• How many people get involved in each program/process cycle?
• Who participates?
o Community leaders?
o The happiest/most vocal and unhappy in the community?
o The youth or the elderly?
o Men or women?
o One political party more than another?
o One neighborhood more than another?
• How do people get involved? How do you recruit them?
• Do people like the programs?
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•

o Why or why not?
o Who likes them and who does not?
What programs are the most popular (in terms of number involved)?
o Least popular?
o Why?

The Impacts:
• What are some of the impacts you have seen for the community/country? How do you
know it’s related to the program?
• What do the people that get involved want from the process?
• Are their goals typically the same or divergent from each other?
• What are the most common requests in participatory processes?
• Are there projects/ideas/views that come back year after year?
• Are there ever any disagreements or clashes between participants or in the community
over/during the process?
o If yes- How do these conflicts manifest?
o If no- Why is the process so peaceful?
Tell
me about a moment that stands out in your mind about one or two of the
•
programs that was particularly successful. Why did you select this moment?
• Do you see differences in people after their participation? How do people change?
• Is it helping the economic development of the community/country? How can you tell?
• Is it helping with reconciliation between people individually, in the community, or
across the country? How can you tell?
• Is it helping build confidence and capacity for local institutions? How can you tell?
• Should these programs continue? Why or why not?
Collaboration:
• What do you want to learn about participatory democracy in El Salvador? Are there
opportunities for collaboration between us while I am here studying this topic?
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APPENDIX II:
OBSERVATION FIELDNOTES TOOL
PART I: NOTES
Date/Time
Location
PDD Mechanism
Counts- People
Counts- Gender
Counts- Ethnicity
Counts- Age

# of People:
Males:
White:
<18:

# of Govt Reps:
# of Facilitators:
Females:
Hispanic:
Black:
Other:
18-30:
30-60:
60+:

Episodes- agenda items/blocks of time & like events
Episode
Description

Take-away

**Note on Observation= Description/Evidence for Conclusions + Takeaway/Value
Judgement
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Behavioral/Attitude- What are people doing in interaction? Does it align with what they say?
Description
Takeaway

Values/Standards- What values are being projected by actors? Any standards being applied?
Description
Takeaway

Environmental- How do people present themselves (clothes, hair, etc.)? Room set-up?
Building/space selected for the event? Tools/artifacts used (flip charts, note cards, voting
blocks)?
Description
Takeaway

Stereotypical/Ritualistic- Are there any rituals to start/end event? Norms of behavior
expected explicitly or implicitly in interactions?
Description
Takeaway

Specialized Terms/Language Use- What jargon is used and what does it seem to mean? How
are typical words used and transformed by use in this context?
Term
Meaning
Takeaway
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PART II: DQI – Discourse Quality Index
Participation refers to a speaker’s ability to participate freely in a debate.
(0) Interruption of a speaker
(1) Normal participation is possible

Description

Takeaway

Level of justification refers to the nature of the justification of demands. Here we judge to
what extent a speech gives complete justifications for demands. The completeness of the
justifications is judged in terms of the inferences that are made.
(0) No justification: A speaker says that X should or should not be done, but no reason is given.
(1) Inferior justification: Here a reason Y is given as to why X should or should not be done, but no linkage is
made between X and Y — the inference is incomplete. This code also applies if a conclusion is merely supported
with illustrations.
(2) Qualified justification: A linkage is made as to why one should expect that X contributes to or detracts from
Y. A single such complete inference already qualifies for code 2.9
(3) Sophisticated justification: Here at least two complete justifications are given, either two complete
justifications for the same demand or complete justifications for two different demands.

Description

Takeaway

Content of justifications captures whether appeals are made in terms of narrow group
interests, in terms of the common good, or in terms of both.
(0) Explicit statement concerning group interests: If one or more groups or constituencies are mentioned in a
speech, then a code of 0 is assigned.
(1) Neutral statement: No explicit references to group interests or to the common good.
(2a) Explicit statement of the common good in utilitarian terms: There is an explicit mention of the common
good and this is conceived in utilitarian terms, that is, with reference to the ‘greatest good for the greatest
number’ (Mill, 1998).
(2b) Explicit statement of the common good in terms of the difference principle: There is an explicit mention of
the common good and this is conceived in terms of the difference principle, that is, with reference to helping the
least advantaged in a society (Rawls, 1971).

Description

Takeaway
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Respect for the groups that are to be helped through particular policies. AND Respect toward
the demands of others Note: respect toward demands is not always coded.
(0) No respect: This code is reserved for speeches in which there are only negative statements about the groups.
(1) Implicit respect: We use this code if there are no explicitly negative statements, but neither are there explicit
positive statements.
(2) Explicit respect: This code is assigned if there is at least one explicitly positive statement about the groups,
regardless of the presence of negative statements.

Description

Takeaway

Respect for counterarguments is a summary judgment of the respect toward all these
arguments.
(0) Counterarguments ignored: There are counterarguments, but the speaker ignores these.
(1) Counterarguments included but degraded: This code applies when a speaker acknowledges a
counterargument, but then explicitly degrades it by making a negative statement about it or the individuals and
groups that propose the argument. A single negative statement is sufficient to assign code 1, unless the speech
also contains positive statements about a counterargument (in which case a code of 3 applies). If neutral
statements accompany a negative statement (and there are no positive statements), a code of 1 also applies.
(2) Counterarguments included — neutral: We use this code if a counter- argument is acknowledged and if
there are no explicit negative or positive statements about it.
(3) Counterarguments included and valued: This code applies if the counter- argument is acknowledged and is
explicitly valued. We assign this code even if there are also negative statements.

Description

Takeaway

Constructive politics concerns consensus building, or what we call constructive politics.
(0) Positional politics: Speakers sit on their positions. There is no attempt at compromise, reconciliation, or
consensus building.
(1) Alternative proposal: A speaker makes a mediating proposal that does not fit the current agenda but
belongs to another agenda. In such cases, the proposal is really not relevant for the current debate, although it
may be taken up in a different debate.
(2) Mediating proposal: A speaker makes a mediating proposal that fits the current agenda.

Description

Takeaway
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PART III: CQI – Contact Quality Index
Equal Status captures the treatment of each group (majority and minorities) in the interaction.
(0) Clear inequality of treatment toward one or more groups from facilitator/coordinator
(1) Equality of treatment from facilitator/coordinator toward all groups
(2) Equality of treatment between and across all groups

Description

Takeaway

Institutional Support for Contact refers the local government’s role in facilitating contact.
(0) No support: Municipality does not have any presence in this process (not by definition a PDD mechanism)
(1) Inferior support: Municipality has “rubber stamped” the convocation of this process by recognizing the
group or mechanism but is not itself facilitating the interaction.
(2) Qualified support: Municipality is actively facilitating the process and guiding participants in some form of
structured conversation and contact.
(3) Sophisticated support: Municipality provides training and/or process debriefing before and/or after the
PDD process to encourage productive dialogue, respectful contact, and justified/feasible decision making.

Description

Takeaway

Cooperation toward Common Goals indicates whether the group sees the interaction as a way
to achieve common interests, cooperatively across majority and minority groups, or not.
(0) Explicit statement concerning prioritizing own group interests: When only one group or constituency is
identified as the beneficiary of proposed action.
(1) Neutral statement: No explicit references to group interests or to the common good.
(2) Explicit statement of the mutual interests: There is an explicit mention of the mutual interests or common
goals achieved through proposed action with a call for cooperative/collaborative implementation.

Description

Takeaway

Group Salience refers to the identification of individuals in the interaction as representative
of the minority/majority group versus outliers.
(0) Explicit reference(s) to participant as unique or different from representative group
(1) Explicit reference(s) to participant as representative of his/her group (Hewstone & Brown, 1986).

Description

Takeaway
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APPENDIX III:
KEY QUESTIONS FROM LAPOP SURVEY AND THEIR OPERATIONALIZATION
Operationali
zation
Confidence
in
Government

Original Survey Question

Author’s Translation

¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted
confianza en su municipalidad?

How much trust do you have in
your municipality?

¿Considera usted que la situación
económica del país es mejor, igual o
peor que hace doce meses?

Would you consider the economic
situation of the country to be
better, the same, or worse than in
the last 12 months?

Perception of
Economic
Well-being*

Hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría
que la gente de su comunidad es muy
confiable, algo confiable, poco
confiable, o nada confiable?

Speaking about the people from
around here, would you say that
the people from your community
are very trustworthy, sometimes
trustworthy, a little trustworthy, or
not trustworthy?

Feelings
about
Community
Trust

En general, ¿usted diría que está muy
satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a),
insatisfecho(a) o muy insatisfecho(a)
con la forma en que la democracia
funciona en Guatemala/El Salvador?

In general, would you say that you
are very satisfied, satisfied,
unsatisfied, or very satisfied with
how democracy functions in
Guatemala/El Salvador?

Satisfaction
with
Democratic
System**

Hablando de la ciudad o el pueblo en
donde usted vive, ¿cree que los niveles
de violencia son en general altos,
medios, o bajos? (2008)
__
¿Considera usted que el nivel de
violencia actual en su
comunidad/colonia es mayor, igual, o
menor que el de otras
comunidades/colonias en este
municipio? (2018)
¿Ha sido usted víctima de algún acto
de delincuencia en los últimos 12
meses?

Speaking of the city or town in
which you live, do you think that
the levels of violence are in general
high, medium or low? (2008)
Perception of
___
Violence in
Considering the level of current
Neighborhoo
violence in your community or
d
neighborhood, is it higher, equal,
or lower than other communities or
neighborhoods in this
municipality? (2018)
Have you been a victim of any act
of delinquency in the last 12
months?

Experience
with Physical
Violence

*Note: The ‘peace perception index’ combines all subjective perception questions above (all
but the final row in the table).
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**Note: I had originally planned to use a “satisfaction with life” variable as a measure of
‘positive’ peace, however, this question was cut between survey rounds 2008/09 and 2018/19.
No other measures about life satisfaction were retained, so I included a measure on satisfaction
with the democratic system as this most closely aligns with the democratic peace thesis and
loosely with Galtung’s (1969) “absence of structural violence.”
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APPENDIX IV:
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF EACH MODEL VARIABLE, BY COUNTRY AND
YEAR
Guatemala – Independent and Dependent Variables

293

294

Guatemala – Control Variables
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El Salvador – Independent and Dependent Variables
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El Salvador – Control Variables
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